717 lines
28 KiB
Java
717 lines
28 KiB
Java
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2009 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
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* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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*/
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package se.rfc.unbound;
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import java.io.IOException;
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import java.util.*;
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import org.xbill.DNS.*;
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/**
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* This resolver module implements a "captive" DNSSEC validator. The captive
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* validator does not have direct access to the Internet and DNS system --
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* instead it attempts to validate DNS messages using only configured context.
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* This is useful for determining if responses coming from a given authoritative
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* server will validate independent of the normal chain of trust.
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*/
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public class CaptiveValidator {
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// A data structure holding all all of our trusted keys.
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private TrustAnchorStore mTrustedKeys;
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// The local validation utilities.
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private ValUtils mValUtils;
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// The local verification utility.
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private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier;
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public CaptiveValidator() {
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mVerifier = new DnsSecVerifier();
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mValUtils = new ValUtils(mVerifier);
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mTrustedKeys = new TrustAnchorStore();
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}
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// ---------------- Module Initialization -------------------
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/**
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* Initialize the module.
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*/
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public void init(Properties config) throws Exception {
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mVerifier.init(config);
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String s = config.getProperty("dns.trust_anchor_file");
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if (s != null) {
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try {
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loadTrustAnchors(s);
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} catch (IOException e) {
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System.err.println("Error loading trust anchors: " + e);
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}
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}
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}
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/**
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* Load the trust anchor file into the trust anchor store. The trust anchors
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* are currently stored in a zone file format list of DNSKEY or DS records.
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*
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* @param filename
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* The trust anchor file.
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* @throws IOException
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*/
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private void loadTrustAnchors(String filename) throws IOException {
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System.err.println("reading trust anchor file file: " + filename);
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// First read in the whole trust anchor file.
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Master master = new Master(filename, Name.root, 0);
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ArrayList records = new ArrayList();
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Record r = null;
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while ((r = master.nextRecord()) != null) {
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records.add(r);
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}
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// Record.compareTo() should sort them into DNSSEC canonical order.
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// Don't care about canonical order per se, but do want them to be
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// formable into RRsets.
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Collections.sort(records);
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SRRset cur_rrset = new SRRset();
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for (Iterator i = records.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
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r = (Record) i.next();
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// Skip RR types that cannot be used as trust anchors.
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if (r.getType() != Type.DNSKEY && r.getType() != Type.DS) continue;
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// If our cur_rrset is empty, we can just add it.
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if (cur_rrset.size() == 0) {
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cur_rrset.addRR(r);
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continue;
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}
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// If this record matches our current RRset, we can just add it.
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if (cur_rrset.getName().equals(r.getName())
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&& cur_rrset.getType() == r.getType()
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&& cur_rrset.getDClass() == r.getDClass()) {
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cur_rrset.addRR(r);
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continue;
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}
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// Otherwise, we add the rrset to our set of trust anchors.
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mTrustedKeys.store(cur_rrset);
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cur_rrset = new SRRset();
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cur_rrset.addRR(r);
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}
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// add the last rrset (if it was not empty)
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if (cur_rrset.size() > 0) {
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mTrustedKeys.store(cur_rrset);
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}
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}
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// ----------------- Validation Support ----------------------
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private SRRset findKeys(SMessage message) {
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Name qname = message.getQName();
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int qclass = message.getQClass();
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return mTrustedKeys.find(qname, qclass);
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}
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/**
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* Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation
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* process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was
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* on in the original request, the response was already validated, or the
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* response is a kind of message that is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL,
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* REFUSED, etc.)
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*
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* @param message
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* The message to check.
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* @param origRequest
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* The original request received from the client.
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*
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* @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not
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* mean we can actually validate this response).
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*/
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private boolean needsValidation(SMessage message) {
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// FIXME: add check to see if message qname is at or below any of our
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// configured trust anchors.
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int rcode = message.getRcode();
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if (rcode != Rcode.NOERROR && rcode != Rcode.NXDOMAIN) {
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// log.debug("cannot validate non-answer.");
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// log.trace("non-answer: " + response);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the
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* question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. This generally
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* consists of verifying the answer RRset and the authority RRsets.
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*
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* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
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* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
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* completed.
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*
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* @param response
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* The response to validate.
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* @param request
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* The request that generated this response.
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* @param key_rrset
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* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that matches the signer of the
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* answer.
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*/
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private void validatePositiveResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
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Name qname = message.getQName();
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int qtype = message.getQType();
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SMessage m = message;
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// validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself
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SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
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Name wc = null;
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boolean wcNSEC_ok = false;
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boolean dname = false;
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List nsec3s = null;
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for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
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// Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME.
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// Because of the normalization routines in NameserverClient, there
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// will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME (unless
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// qtype=DNAME).
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if (dname && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.CNAME) {
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dname = false;
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continue;
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}
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// Verify the answer rrset.
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int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
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// If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this message is
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// BAD.
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if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
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// log.debug("Positive response has failed ANSWER rrset: "
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// + rrsets[i]);
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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// Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard expansion.
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// If so, an additional check will need to be made in the authority
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// section.
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wc = ValUtils.rrsetWildcard(rrsets[i]);
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// Notice a DNAME that should be followed by an unsigned CNAME.
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if (qtype != Type.DNAME && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.DNAME) {
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dname = true;
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}
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}
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// validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be the
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// NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem)
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rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
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for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
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int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
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// If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, we have
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// a
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// bad message.
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if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
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// log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
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// + rrsets[i]);
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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// If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a (just
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// verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove that qname
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// doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard was used.
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if (wc != null && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC) {
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NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
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if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname,
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key_rrset.getName())) {
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Name nsec_wc = ValUtils.nsecWildcard(qname, nsec);
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if (!wc.equals(nsec_wc)) {
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// log.debug("Postive wildcard response wasn't generated "
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// + "by the correct wildcard");
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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wcNSEC_ok = true;
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}
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}
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// Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and we have
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// NSEC3 records, collect them.
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if (wc != null && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) {
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if (nsec3s == null) nsec3s = new ArrayList();
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nsec3s.add(rrsets[i].first());
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}
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}
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// If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
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// proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
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// records.
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if (wc != null && !wcNSEC_ok && nsec3s != null) {
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if (NSEC3ValUtils.proveWildcard(nsec3s, qname, key_rrset.getName(),
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wc)) {
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wcNSEC_ok = true;
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}
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}
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// If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
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// response, fail.
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if (wc != null && !wcNSEC_ok) {
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// log.debug("positive response was wildcard expansion and "
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// + "did not prove original data did not exist");
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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// log.trace("Successfully validated postive response");
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
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}
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/**
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* Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a
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* qtype==ANY question, with answers. This consists of simply verifying all
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* present answer/auth RRsets, with no checking that all types are present.
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*
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* NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records
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* here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the
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* upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead
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* treating them as referrals.
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*
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* NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon
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* clarification.
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*
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* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
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* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
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* completed.
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*
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* @param message
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* The response to validate.
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* @param key_rrset
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* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that matches the signer of the
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* answer.
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*/
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private void validateAnyResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
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int qtype = message.getQType();
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if (qtype != Type.ANY)
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throw new IllegalArgumentException(
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"ANY validation called on non-ANY response.");
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SMessage m = message;
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// validate the ANSWER section.
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SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
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for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
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int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
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// If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this message is
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// BAD.
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if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
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// log.debug("Postive response has failed ANSWER rrset: "
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// + rrsets[i]);
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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}
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// validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will be the NS rrset
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// (which could be missing, no problem)
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rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
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for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
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int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
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// If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, we have
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// a
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// bad message.
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if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
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// log.debug("Postive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
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// + rrsets[i]);
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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}
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// log.trace("Successfully validated postive ANY response");
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
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}
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/**
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* Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a
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* NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of verifying
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* the authority section rrsets and making certain that the authority
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* section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname does exist and the qtype
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* doesn't.
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*
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* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
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* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
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* completed.
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*
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* @param response
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* The response to validate.
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* @param request
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* The request that generated this response.
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* @param key_rrset
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* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response.
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*/
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private void validateNodataResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
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Name qname = message.getQName();
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int qtype = message.getQType();
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SMessage m = message;
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// Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to
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// validate. (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here --
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// instead they are broken down into individual CNAME/DNAME/final answer
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// responses.)
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// validate the AUTHORITY section
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SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
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boolean hasValidNSEC = false; // If true, then the NODATA has been
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// proven.
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Name ce = null; // for wildcard nodata responses. This is the proven
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// closest encloser.
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NSECRecord wc = null; // for wildcard nodata responses. This is the
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// wildcard NSEC.
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List nsec3s = null; // A collection of NSEC3 RRs found in the authority
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// section.
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Name nsec3Signer = null; // The RRSIG signer field for the NSEC3 RRs.
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for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
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int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
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if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
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// log.debug("NODATA response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
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// + rrsets[i]);
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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// If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove NODATA.
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// This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case.
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if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC) {
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NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
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if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNodata(nsec, qname, qtype)) {
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hasValidNSEC = true;
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if (nsec.getName().isWild()) wc = nsec;
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} else if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(
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nsec,
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qname,
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rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
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ce = ValUtils.closestEncloser(qname, nsec);
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}
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}
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// Collect any NSEC3 records present.
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if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) {
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if (nsec3s == null) nsec3s = new ArrayList();
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nsec3s.add(rrsets[i].first());
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nsec3Signer = rrsets[i].getSignerName();
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}
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}
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// check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof.
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// The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists (and
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// also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC showing the
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// matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser.
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if (ce != null || wc != null) {
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try {
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Name wc_name = new Name("*", ce);
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if (!wc_name.equals(wc.getName())) {
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hasValidNSEC = false;
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}
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} catch (TextParseException e) {
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// log.error(e);
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}
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}
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NSEC3ValUtils.stripUnknownAlgNSEC3s(nsec3s);
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if (!hasValidNSEC && nsec3s != null && nsec3s.size() > 0) {
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// try to prove NODATA with our NSEC3 record(s)
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hasValidNSEC = NSEC3ValUtils.proveNodata(nsec3s, qname, qtype,
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nsec3Signer);
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}
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if (!hasValidNSEC) {
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// log.debug("NODATA response failed to prove NODATA "
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// + "status with NSEC/NSEC3");
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// log.trace("Failed NODATA:\n" + m);
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
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return;
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}
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// log.trace("sucessfully validated NODATA response.");
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m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
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}
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/**
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* Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN
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* Rcode. This consists of verifying the authority section rrsets and making
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* certain that the authority section NSEC proves that the qname doesn't
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* exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist..
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*
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* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
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* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
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* completed.
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*
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* @param response
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* The response to validate.
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* @param request
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* The request that generated this response.
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* @param key_rrset
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* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response.
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*/
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private void validateNameErrorResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
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Name qname = message.getQName();
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SMessage m = message;
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// FIXME: should we check to see if there is anything in the answer
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|
// section? if so, what should the result be?
|
|
|
|
// Validate the authority section -- all RRsets in the authority section
|
|
// must be signed and valid.
|
|
// In addition, the NSEC record(s) must prove the NXDOMAIN condition.
|
|
|
|
boolean hasValidNSEC = false;
|
|
boolean hasValidWCNSEC = false;
|
|
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
|
|
List nsec3s = null;
|
|
Name nsec3Signer = null;
|
|
|
|
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
|
|
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
|
|
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
|
|
// log.debug("NameError response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
|
|
// + rrsets[i]);
|
|
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC) {
|
|
NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
|
|
|
|
if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname,
|
|
rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
|
|
hasValidNSEC = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNoWC(nsec, qname,
|
|
rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
|
|
hasValidWCNSEC = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) {
|
|
if (nsec3s == null) nsec3s = new ArrayList();
|
|
nsec3s.add(rrsets[i].first());
|
|
nsec3Signer = rrsets[i].getSignerName();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NSEC3ValUtils.stripUnknownAlgNSEC3s(nsec3s);
|
|
|
|
if (nsec3s != null && nsec3s.size() > 0) {
|
|
// log.debug("Validating nxdomain: using NSEC3 records");
|
|
// Attempt to prove name error with nsec3 records.
|
|
|
|
if (NSEC3ValUtils.allNSEC3sIgnoreable(nsec3s, key_rrset, mVerifier)) {
|
|
// log.debug("all NSEC3s were validated but ignored.");
|
|
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.INSECURE);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hasValidNSEC = NSEC3ValUtils.proveNameError(nsec3s, qname,
|
|
nsec3Signer);
|
|
|
|
// Note that we assume that the NSEC3ValUtils proofs encompass the
|
|
// wildcard part of the proof.
|
|
hasValidWCNSEC = hasValidNSEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus.
|
|
if (!hasValidNSEC) {
|
|
// log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: "
|
|
// + "qname does not exist");
|
|
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!hasValidWCNSEC) {
|
|
// log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: "
|
|
// + "covering wildcard does not exist");
|
|
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Otherwise, we consider the message secure.
|
|
// log.trace("successfully validated NAME ERROR response.");
|
|
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// /**
|
|
// * This state is used for validating CNAME-type responses -- i.e., responses
|
|
// * that have CNAME chains.
|
|
// *
|
|
// * It primarily is responsible for breaking down the response into a series
|
|
// * of separately validated queries & responses.
|
|
// *
|
|
// * @param event
|
|
// * @param state
|
|
// * @return
|
|
// */
|
|
// private boolean processCNAME(DNSEvent event, ValEventState state) {
|
|
// Request req = event.getRequest();
|
|
//
|
|
// Name qname = req.getQName();
|
|
// int qtype = req.getQType();
|
|
// int qclass = req.getQClass();
|
|
//
|
|
// SMessage m = event.getResponse().getSMessage();
|
|
//
|
|
// if (state.cnameSname == null) state.cnameSname = qname;
|
|
//
|
|
// // We break the chain down by re-querying for the specific CNAME or
|
|
// // DNAME
|
|
// // (or final answer).
|
|
// SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
|
|
//
|
|
// while (state.cnameIndex < rrsets.length) {
|
|
// SRRset rrset = rrsets[state.cnameIndex++];
|
|
// Name rname = rrset.getName();
|
|
// int rtype = rrset.getType();
|
|
//
|
|
// // Skip DNAMEs -- prefer to query for the generated CNAME,
|
|
// if (rtype == Type.DNAME && qtype != Type.DNAME) continue;
|
|
//
|
|
// // Set the SNAME if we are dealing with a CNAME
|
|
// if (rtype == Type.CNAME) {
|
|
// CNAMERecord cname = (CNAMERecord) rrset.first();
|
|
// state.cnameSname = cname.getTarget();
|
|
// }
|
|
//
|
|
// // Note if the current rrset is the answer. In that case, we want to
|
|
// // set
|
|
// // the final state differently.
|
|
// // For non-answers, the response ultimately comes back here.
|
|
// int final_state = ValEventState.CNAME_RESP_STATE;
|
|
// if (isAnswerRRset(rrset.getName(), rtype, state.cnameSname, qtype,
|
|
// Section.ANSWER)) {
|
|
// // If this is an answer, however, break out of this loop.
|
|
// final_state = ValEventState.CNAME_ANS_RESP_STATE;
|
|
// }
|
|
//
|
|
// // Generate the sub-query.
|
|
// Request localRequest = generateLocalRequest(rname, rtype, qclass);
|
|
// DNSEvent localEvent = generateLocalEvent(event, localRequest,
|
|
// ValEventState.INIT_STATE,
|
|
// final_state);
|
|
//
|
|
// // ...and send it along.
|
|
// processLocalRequest(localEvent);
|
|
// return false;
|
|
// }
|
|
//
|
|
// // Something odd has happened if we get here.
|
|
// log.warn("processCNAME: encountered unknown issue handling a CNAME chain.");
|
|
// return false;
|
|
// }
|
|
//
|
|
// private boolean processCNAMEResponse(DNSEvent event, ValEventState state) {
|
|
// DNSEvent forEvent = event.forEvent();
|
|
// ValEventState forState = getModuleState(forEvent);
|
|
//
|
|
// SMessage resp = event.getResponse().getSMessage();
|
|
// if (resp.getStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
|
|
// forEvent.getResponse().getSMessage().setStatus(resp.getStatus());
|
|
// forState.state = forState.finalState;
|
|
// handleResponse(forEvent, forState);
|
|
// return false;
|
|
// }
|
|
//
|
|
// forState.state = ValEventState.CNAME_STATE;
|
|
// handleResponse(forEvent, forState);
|
|
// return false;
|
|
// }
|
|
//
|
|
// private boolean processCNAMEAnswer(DNSEvent event, ValEventState state) {
|
|
// DNSEvent forEvent = event.forEvent();
|
|
// ValEventState forState = getModuleState(forEvent);
|
|
//
|
|
// SMessage resp = event.getResponse().getSMessage();
|
|
// SMessage forResp = forEvent.getResponse().getSMessage();
|
|
//
|
|
// forResp.setStatus(resp.getStatus());
|
|
//
|
|
// forState.state = forState.finalState;
|
|
// handleResponse(forEvent, forState);
|
|
// return false;
|
|
// }
|
|
|
|
|
|
public byte validateMessage(SMessage message) {
|
|
|
|
SRRset key_rrset = findKeys(message);
|
|
if (key_rrset == null) {
|
|
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int subtype = ValUtils.classifyResponse(message);
|
|
|
|
switch (subtype) {
|
|
case ValUtils.POSITIVE:
|
|
// log.trace("Validating a positive response");
|
|
validatePositiveResponse(message, key_rrset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ValUtils.NODATA:
|
|
// log.trace("Validating a nodata response");
|
|
validateNodataResponse(message, key_rrset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ValUtils.NAMEERROR:
|
|
// log.trace("Validating a nxdomain response");
|
|
validateNameErrorResponse(message, key_rrset);
|
|
break;
|
|
case ValUtils.CNAME:
|
|
// log.trace("Validating a cname response");
|
|
// forward on to the special CNAME state for this.
|
|
// state.state = ValEventState.CNAME_STATE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case ValUtils.ANY:
|
|
// log.trace("Validating a postive ANY response");
|
|
validateAnyResponse(message, key_rrset);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
// log.error("unhandled response subtype: " + subtype);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return message.getSecurityStatus().getStatus();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
}
|