davidb
/
captive-validator
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

work in progress -- doesn't all compile yet, but it is starting to take shape

This commit is contained in:
David Blacka 2009-04-19 13:56:34 -04:00
commit 4273d3cfb8
12 changed files with 4057 additions and 0 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
.gitignore vendored Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
build
.classpath
.project

334
build.xml Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<project default="compile" basedir=".">
<!-- defaults -->
<property name="build.deprecation" value="off" />
<property name="build.debug" value="off" />
<!-- import local build options -->
<property file="build.properties" />
<!-- import current version string -->
<property file="VERSION" />
<!-- the base location to put build targets -->
<property name="build.dir" value="build" />
<!-- where to put compiled class files -->
<property name="build.dest" value="${build.dir}/classes" />
<!-- where to put generated jar files -->
<property name="build.lib.dest" value="${build.dir}/lib" />
<!-- where to put generated javadocs -->
<property name="javadoc.dest" value="${build.dir}/doc" />
<!-- where to find the java source -->
<property name="build.src" value="src" />
<!-- where to find external jar files -->
<property name="lib.dir" value="lib" />
<!-- where the unit tests reside -->
<property name="test.dir" value="test" />
<property name="test.reports" value="${test.dir}/reports" />
<!-- PREPARE targets -->
<target name="prepare-env">
<!-- see if the 'test' directory exists -->
<available file="${test.dir}" type="dir" property="test.present" />
<!-- set the standard classpath -->
<path id="project.classpath">
<pathelement location="${build.dest}" />
<fileset dir="${lib.dir}" includes="*.jar,*.zip" />
</path>
<property name="project.classpath" refid="project.classpath" />
</target>
<target name="prepare-src" depends="prepare-env">
<mkdir dir="${build.dest}" />
<mkdir dir="${build.lib.dest}" />
</target>
<target name="prepare-test" depends="prepare-src" if="test.present">
<mkdir dir="${test.dir}/${build.dest}" />
<mkdir dir="${test.reports}" />
<path id="test.classpath">
<pathelement location="${test.dir}/${build.dest}" />
<pathelement path="${project.classpath}" />
<fileset dir="${test.dir}/${lib.dir}" includes="*jar,*.zip" />
</path>
<property name="test.classpath" refid="test.classpath" />
</target>
<!-- BUILD targets -->
<target name="dnsjava">
<javac srcdir="dnsjava"
destdir="${build.dest}"
deprecation="${build.deprecation}"
debug="${build.debug}"
target="1.4"
source="1.4"
includes="org/xbill/DNS/" />
<jar destfile="${build.lib.dest}/dnsjava-unbound.jar"
basedir="${build.dest}"
includes="org/xbill/DNS/" />
</target>
<target name="unbound-proto" depends="prepare-src, dnsjava" >
<javac srcdir="${build.src}"
destdir="${build.dest}"
deprecation="${build.deprecation}"
debug="${build.debug}"
target="1.4"
source="1.4"
classpathref="project.classpath"
includes="se/rfc/unbound/" />
</target>
<target name="unbound-proto-jar" depends="unbound-proto">
<jar jarfile="${build.lib.dest}/unbound-prototype.jar"
basedir="${build.dest}"
includes="se/rfc/unbound/" />
</target>
<!-- DOC targets -->
<target name="javadoc-unbound-proto" depends="prepare-src">
<mkdir dir="${javadoc.dest}" />
<javadoc packagenames="se.rfc.unbound.*"
sourcepath="${build.src}"
overview=""
classpath="${project.classpath}"
destdir="${javadoc.dest}"
verbose="false"
version="true"
author="true"
use="true"
windowtitle="Unbound Prototype API Documentation">
</javadoc>
</target>
<!-- TEST targets -->
<target name="build-tests" depends="prepare-test, unbound-proto"
if="test.present">
<javac srcdir="${test.dir}/${build.src}"
destdir="${test.dir}/${build.dest}"
deprecation="${build.deprecation}"
debug="${build.debug}"
target="1.4"
source="1.4"
classpathref="test.classpath"
includes="se/rfc/unbound/" />
</target>
<target name="run-tests" depends="build-tests" if="test.present">
<junit printsummary="yes"
fork="yes"
dir="${test.dir}"
timeout="12000">
<classpath>
<pathelement path="${test.classpath}" />
</classpath>
<formatter type="plain" />
<batchtest todir="${test.reports}">
<fileset dir="${test.dir}/${build.dest}">
<include name="se/rfc/unbound/**/*Test.class" />
</fileset>
</batchtest>
</junit>
</target>
<!-- DIST targets -->
<property name="unbound-proto-distname"
value="unbound-prototype-${version}" />
<target name="unbound-proto-dist"
depends="compile">
<tar tarfile="${unbound-proto-distname}.tar.gz"
compression="gzip">
<tarfileset mode="755"
dir="."
prefix="${unbound-proto-distname}">
<include name="bin/*.sh" />
<exclude name="bin/_*.sh" />
</tarfileset>
<tarfileset dir="."
prefix="${unbound-proto-distname}">
<include name="lib/*.jar" />
<include name="etc/*.properties" />
<include name="etc/named.ca" />
<include name="etc/trust_anchors" />
<include name="etc/*_trust_anchors" />
<include name="VERSION" />
<include name="README" />
<include name="licenses/**" />
<exclude name="bin/**" />
</tarfileset>
<tarfileset dir="${build.lib.dest}"
prefix="${unbound-proto-distname}/lib">
<include name="*.jar" />
</tarfileset>
</tar>
</target>
<target name="unbound-proto-src-dist">
<tar tarfile="${unbound-proto-distname}-src.tar.gz"
compression="gzip">
<tarfileset mode="755"
dir="."
prefix="${unbound-proto-distname}">
<include name="bin/*.sh" />
</tarfileset>
<tarfileset dir="."
prefix="${unbound-proto-distname}">
<include name="src/**/*.java" />
<include name="dnsjava/**" />
<include name="lib/*.jar" />
<include name="etc/*.properties" />
<include name="etc/named.ca" />
<include name="etc/trust_anchors" />
<include name="licenses/**" />
<include name="VERSION" />
<include name="README" />
<include name="build.xml" />
<exclude name="bin/**" />
</tarfileset>
</tar>
</target>
<target name="sign-dist"
depends="unbound-proto-dist, unbound-proto-src-dist">
<exec executable="gpg">
<arg value="-a" />
<arg value="-s" />
<arg value="--detach-sig" />
<arg path="${unbound-proto-distname}.tar.gz" />
</exec>
<exec executable="gpg">
<arg value="-a" />
<arg value="-s" />
<arg value="--detach-sig" />
<arg path="${unbound-proto-distname}-src.tar.gz" />
</exec>
</target>
<target name="flatten-jar-libs">
<mkdir dir="${build.dir}/jar" />
<unjar dest="${build.dir}/jar/">
<fileset dir="lib" includes="*.jar" />
</unjar>
</target>
<target name="unbound-resolver-jar" depends="compile, flatten-jar-libs">
<!-- this attempts to make a single runnable jar file for the
validating iterative resolver version of this project -->
<jar destfile="unbound-resolver.jar">
<fileset dir="${build.dest}"
includes="se/rfc/unbound/,org/xbill/DNS/" />
<fileset dir="${build.dir}/jar"
includes="**" />
<manifest>
<attribute name="Main-Class" value="se.rfc.unbound.server.Server" />
</manifest>
</jar>
</target>
<target name="unbound-digtest-jar" depends="compile, flatten-jar-libs">
<jar destfile="unbound-digtest.jar">
<fileset dir="${build.dest}"
includes="se/rfc/unbound/,org/xbill/DNS/" />
<fileset dir="${build.dir}/jar"
includes="**" />
<manifest>
<attribute name="Main-Class" value="se.rfc.unbound.cl.DigTest" />
</manifest>
</jar>
</target>
<!-- CLEAN targets -->
<target name="clean-unbound-proto" depends="prepare-env">
<delete dir="${build.dest}" />
<delete dir="${build.dir}/jar" />
<delete file="${build.lib.dest}/*.jar" />
</target>
<target name="clean-unbound-tests" depends="prepare-env"
if="test.present">
<delete dir="${test.dir}/${build.dest}" />
<delete dir="${test.reports}" />
</target>
<target name="clean-dist" depends="prepare-env">
<delete>
<fileset dir="." includes="*.tar.gz" />
</delete>
</target>
<!-- MASTER targets -->
<target name="compile"
depends="usage, unbound-proto-jar">
</target>
<target name="docs"
depends="javadoc-unbound-proto">
</target>
<target name="test"
depends="run-tests"
if="test.present">
</target>
<target name="dist"
depends="usage, unbound-proto-dist, unbound-proto-src-dist">
</target>
<target name="clean"
depends="usage, clean-unbound-proto, clean-unbound-tests, clean-dist">
</target>
<!-- USAGE target -->
<target name="usage" depends="prepare-env">
<echo message=" " />
<echo message="Unbound Prototype v. ${version} Build System" />
<echo message="--------------------------------------" />
<echo message="Available Targets:" />
<echo message=" compile (default) - compiles the source code" />
<echo message=" test - run the unit tests" />
<echo message=" dist - create the distribution files" />
<echo message=" clean - delete class files" />
<echo message=" usage - this help message" />
<echo message=" " />
</target>
</project>

BIN
lib/dnsjava-2.0.6-vrsn-2.jar Normal file
View File

Binary file not shown.

716
src/se/rfc/unbound/CaptiveValidator.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,716 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2009 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.util.*;
import org.xbill.DNS.*;
/**
* This resolver module implements a "captive" DNSSEC validator. The captive
* validator does not have direct access to the Internet and DNS system --
* instead it attempts to validate DNS messages using only configured context.
* This is useful for determining if responses coming from a given authoritative
* server will validate independent of the normal chain of trust.
*/
public class CaptiveValidator {
// A data structure holding all all of our trusted keys.
private TrustAnchorStore mTrustedKeys;
// The local validation utilities.
private ValUtils mValUtils;
// The local verification utility.
private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier;
public CaptiveValidator() {
mVerifier = new DnsSecVerifier();
mValUtils = new ValUtils(mVerifier);
mTrustedKeys = new TrustAnchorStore();
}
// ---------------- Module Initialization -------------------
/**
* Initialize the module.
*/
public void init(Properties config) throws Exception {
mVerifier.init(config);
String s = config.getProperty("dns.trust_anchor_file");
if (s != null) {
try {
loadTrustAnchors(s);
} catch (IOException e) {
System.err.println("Error loading trust anchors: " + e);
}
}
}
/**
* Load the trust anchor file into the trust anchor store. The trust anchors
* are currently stored in a zone file format list of DNSKEY or DS records.
*
* @param filename
* The trust anchor file.
* @throws IOException
*/
private void loadTrustAnchors(String filename) throws IOException {
System.err.println("reading trust anchor file file: " + filename);
// First read in the whole trust anchor file.
Master master = new Master(filename, Name.root, 0);
ArrayList records = new ArrayList();
Record r = null;
while ((r = master.nextRecord()) != null) {
records.add(r);
}
// Record.compareTo() should sort them into DNSSEC canonical order.
// Don't care about canonical order per se, but do want them to be
// formable into RRsets.
Collections.sort(records);
SRRset cur_rrset = new SRRset();
for (Iterator i = records.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
r = (Record) i.next();
// Skip RR types that cannot be used as trust anchors.
if (r.getType() != Type.DNSKEY && r.getType() != Type.DS) continue;
// If our cur_rrset is empty, we can just add it.
if (cur_rrset.size() == 0) {
cur_rrset.addRR(r);
continue;
}
// If this record matches our current RRset, we can just add it.
if (cur_rrset.getName().equals(r.getName())
&& cur_rrset.getType() == r.getType()
&& cur_rrset.getDClass() == r.getDClass()) {
cur_rrset.addRR(r);
continue;
}
// Otherwise, we add the rrset to our set of trust anchors.
mTrustedKeys.store(cur_rrset);
cur_rrset = new SRRset();
cur_rrset.addRR(r);
}
// add the last rrset (if it was not empty)
if (cur_rrset.size() > 0) {
mTrustedKeys.store(cur_rrset);
}
}
// ----------------- Validation Support ----------------------
private SRRset findKeys(SMessage message) {
Name qname = message.getQName();
int qclass = message.getQClass();
return mTrustedKeys.find(qname, qclass);
}
/**
* Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation
* process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was
* on in the original request, the response was already validated, or the
* response is a kind of message that is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL,
* REFUSED, etc.)
*
* @param message
* The message to check.
* @param origRequest
* The original request received from the client.
*
* @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not
* mean we can actually validate this response).
*/
private boolean needsValidation(SMessage message) {
// FIXME: add check to see if message qname is at or below any of our
// configured trust anchors.
int rcode = message.getRcode();
if (rcode != Rcode.NOERROR && rcode != Rcode.NXDOMAIN) {
// log.debug("cannot validate non-answer.");
// log.trace("non-answer: " + response);
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the
* question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. This generally
* consists of verifying the answer RRset and the authority RRsets.
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param response
* The response to validate.
* @param request
* The request that generated this response.
* @param key_rrset
* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that matches the signer of the
* answer.
*/
private void validatePositiveResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
Name qname = message.getQName();
int qtype = message.getQType();
SMessage m = message;
// validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
Name wc = null;
boolean wcNSEC_ok = false;
boolean dname = false;
List nsec3s = null;
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
// Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME.
// Because of the normalization routines in NameserverClient, there
// will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME (unless
// qtype=DNAME).
if (dname && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.CNAME) {
dname = false;
continue;
}
// Verify the answer rrset.
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
// If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this message is
// BAD.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.debug("Positive response has failed ANSWER rrset: "
// + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
// Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard expansion.
// If so, an additional check will need to be made in the authority
// section.
wc = ValUtils.rrsetWildcard(rrsets[i]);
// Notice a DNAME that should be followed by an unsigned CNAME.
if (qtype != Type.DNAME && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.DNAME) {
dname = true;
}
}
// validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be the
// NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem)
rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
// If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, we have
// a
// bad message.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
// + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
// If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a (just
// verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove that qname
// doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard was used.
if (wc != null && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC) {
NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname,
key_rrset.getName())) {
Name nsec_wc = ValUtils.nsecWildcard(qname, nsec);
if (!wc.equals(nsec_wc)) {
// log.debug("Postive wildcard response wasn't generated "
// + "by the correct wildcard");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
wcNSEC_ok = true;
}
}
// Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and we have
// NSEC3 records, collect them.
if (wc != null && rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) {
if (nsec3s == null) nsec3s = new ArrayList();
nsec3s.add(rrsets[i].first());
}
}
// If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
// proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
// records.
if (wc != null && !wcNSEC_ok && nsec3s != null) {
if (NSEC3ValUtils.proveWildcard(nsec3s, qname, key_rrset.getName(),
wc)) {
wcNSEC_ok = true;
}
}
// If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
// response, fail.
if (wc != null && !wcNSEC_ok) {
// log.debug("positive response was wildcard expansion and "
// + "did not prove original data did not exist");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
// log.trace("Successfully validated postive response");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
}
/**
* Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a
* qtype==ANY question, with answers. This consists of simply verifying all
* present answer/auth RRsets, with no checking that all types are present.
*
* NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records
* here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the
* upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead
* treating them as referrals.
*
* NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon
* clarification.
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param message
* The response to validate.
* @param key_rrset
* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that matches the signer of the
* answer.
*/
private void validateAnyResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
int qtype = message.getQType();
if (qtype != Type.ANY)
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"ANY validation called on non-ANY response.");
SMessage m = message;
// validate the ANSWER section.
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
// If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this message is
// BAD.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.debug("Postive response has failed ANSWER rrset: "
// + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
}
// validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will be the NS rrset
// (which could be missing, no problem)
rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
// If anything in the authority section fails to be secure, we have
// a
// bad message.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.debug("Postive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
// + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
}
// log.trace("Successfully validated postive ANY response");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
}
/**
* Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a
* NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of verifying
* the authority section rrsets and making certain that the authority
* section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname does exist and the qtype
* doesn't.
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param response
* The response to validate.
* @param request
* The request that generated this response.
* @param key_rrset
* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response.
*/
private void validateNodataResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
Name qname = message.getQName();
int qtype = message.getQType();
SMessage m = message;
// Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to
// validate. (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here --
// instead they are broken down into individual CNAME/DNAME/final answer
// responses.)
// validate the AUTHORITY section
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
boolean hasValidNSEC = false; // If true, then the NODATA has been
// proven.
Name ce = null; // for wildcard nodata responses. This is the proven
// closest encloser.
NSECRecord wc = null; // for wildcard nodata responses. This is the
// wildcard NSEC.
List nsec3s = null; // A collection of NSEC3 RRs found in the authority
// section.
Name nsec3Signer = null; // The RRSIG signer field for the NSEC3 RRs.
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.debug("NODATA response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
// + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
// If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove NODATA.
// This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case.
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC) {
NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNodata(nsec, qname, qtype)) {
hasValidNSEC = true;
if (nsec.getName().isWild()) wc = nsec;
} else if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(
nsec,
qname,
rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
ce = ValUtils.closestEncloser(qname, nsec);
}
}
// Collect any NSEC3 records present.
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) {
if (nsec3s == null) nsec3s = new ArrayList();
nsec3s.add(rrsets[i].first());
nsec3Signer = rrsets[i].getSignerName();
}
}
// check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof.
// The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists (and
// also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC showing the
// matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser.
if (ce != null || wc != null) {
try {
Name wc_name = new Name("*", ce);
if (!wc_name.equals(wc.getName())) {
hasValidNSEC = false;
}
} catch (TextParseException e) {
// log.error(e);
}
}
NSEC3ValUtils.stripUnknownAlgNSEC3s(nsec3s);
if (!hasValidNSEC && nsec3s != null && nsec3s.size() > 0) {
// try to prove NODATA with our NSEC3 record(s)
hasValidNSEC = NSEC3ValUtils.proveNodata(nsec3s, qname, qtype,
nsec3Signer);
}
if (!hasValidNSEC) {
// log.debug("NODATA response failed to prove NODATA "
// + "status with NSEC/NSEC3");
// log.trace("Failed NODATA:\n" + m);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
// log.trace("sucessfully validated NODATA response.");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
}
/**
* Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN
* Rcode. This consists of verifying the authority section rrsets and making
* certain that the authority section NSEC proves that the qname doesn't
* exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist..
*
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
*
* @param response
* The response to validate.
* @param request
* The request that generated this response.
* @param key_rrset
* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response.
*/
private void validateNameErrorResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
Name qname = message.getQName();
SMessage m = message;
// FIXME: should we check to see if there is anything in the answer
// section? if so, what should the result be?
// Validate the authority section -- all RRsets in the authority section
// must be signed and valid.
// In addition, the NSEC record(s) must prove the NXDOMAIN condition.
boolean hasValidNSEC = false;
boolean hasValidWCNSEC = false;
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
List nsec3s = null;
Name nsec3Signer = null;
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.debug("NameError response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
// + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC) {
NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname,
rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
hasValidNSEC = true;
}
if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNoWC(nsec, qname,
rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
hasValidWCNSEC = true;
}
}
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) {
if (nsec3s == null) nsec3s = new ArrayList();
nsec3s.add(rrsets[i].first());
nsec3Signer = rrsets[i].getSignerName();
}
}
NSEC3ValUtils.stripUnknownAlgNSEC3s(nsec3s);
if (nsec3s != null && nsec3s.size() > 0) {
// log.debug("Validating nxdomain: using NSEC3 records");
// Attempt to prove name error with nsec3 records.
if (NSEC3ValUtils.allNSEC3sIgnoreable(nsec3s, key_rrset, mVerifier)) {
// log.debug("all NSEC3s were validated but ignored.");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.INSECURE);
return;
}
hasValidNSEC = NSEC3ValUtils.proveNameError(nsec3s, qname,
nsec3Signer);
// Note that we assume that the NSEC3ValUtils proofs encompass the
// wildcard part of the proof.
hasValidWCNSEC = hasValidNSEC;
}
// If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus.
if (!hasValidNSEC) {
// log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: "
// + "qname does not exist");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
if (!hasValidWCNSEC) {
// log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: "
// + "covering wildcard does not exist");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
// Otherwise, we consider the message secure.
// log.trace("successfully validated NAME ERROR response.");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
}
// /**
// * This state is used for validating CNAME-type responses -- i.e., responses
// * that have CNAME chains.
// *
// * It primarily is responsible for breaking down the response into a series
// * of separately validated queries & responses.
// *
// * @param event
// * @param state
// * @return
// */
// private boolean processCNAME(DNSEvent event, ValEventState state) {
// Request req = event.getRequest();
//
// Name qname = req.getQName();
// int qtype = req.getQType();
// int qclass = req.getQClass();
//
// SMessage m = event.getResponse().getSMessage();
//
// if (state.cnameSname == null) state.cnameSname = qname;
//
// // We break the chain down by re-querying for the specific CNAME or
// // DNAME
// // (or final answer).
// SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
//
// while (state.cnameIndex < rrsets.length) {
// SRRset rrset = rrsets[state.cnameIndex++];
// Name rname = rrset.getName();
// int rtype = rrset.getType();
//
// // Skip DNAMEs -- prefer to query for the generated CNAME,
// if (rtype == Type.DNAME && qtype != Type.DNAME) continue;
//
// // Set the SNAME if we are dealing with a CNAME
// if (rtype == Type.CNAME) {
// CNAMERecord cname = (CNAMERecord) rrset.first();
// state.cnameSname = cname.getTarget();
// }
//
// // Note if the current rrset is the answer. In that case, we want to
// // set
// // the final state differently.
// // For non-answers, the response ultimately comes back here.
// int final_state = ValEventState.CNAME_RESP_STATE;
// if (isAnswerRRset(rrset.getName(), rtype, state.cnameSname, qtype,
// Section.ANSWER)) {
// // If this is an answer, however, break out of this loop.
// final_state = ValEventState.CNAME_ANS_RESP_STATE;
// }
//
// // Generate the sub-query.
// Request localRequest = generateLocalRequest(rname, rtype, qclass);
// DNSEvent localEvent = generateLocalEvent(event, localRequest,
// ValEventState.INIT_STATE,
// final_state);
//
// // ...and send it along.
// processLocalRequest(localEvent);
// return false;
// }
//
// // Something odd has happened if we get here.
// log.warn("processCNAME: encountered unknown issue handling a CNAME chain.");
// return false;
// }
//
// private boolean processCNAMEResponse(DNSEvent event, ValEventState state) {
// DNSEvent forEvent = event.forEvent();
// ValEventState forState = getModuleState(forEvent);
//
// SMessage resp = event.getResponse().getSMessage();
// if (resp.getStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// forEvent.getResponse().getSMessage().setStatus(resp.getStatus());
// forState.state = forState.finalState;
// handleResponse(forEvent, forState);
// return false;
// }
//
// forState.state = ValEventState.CNAME_STATE;
// handleResponse(forEvent, forState);
// return false;
// }
//
// private boolean processCNAMEAnswer(DNSEvent event, ValEventState state) {
// DNSEvent forEvent = event.forEvent();
// ValEventState forState = getModuleState(forEvent);
//
// SMessage resp = event.getResponse().getSMessage();
// SMessage forResp = forEvent.getResponse().getSMessage();
//
// forResp.setStatus(resp.getStatus());
//
// forState.state = forState.finalState;
// handleResponse(forEvent, forState);
// return false;
// }
public byte validateMessage(SMessage message) {
SRRset key_rrset = findKeys(message);
if (key_rrset == null) {
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
int subtype = ValUtils.classifyResponse(message);
switch (subtype) {
case ValUtils.POSITIVE:
// log.trace("Validating a positive response");
validatePositiveResponse(message, key_rrset);
break;
case ValUtils.NODATA:
// log.trace("Validating a nodata response");
validateNodataResponse(message, key_rrset);
break;
case ValUtils.NAMEERROR:
// log.trace("Validating a nxdomain response");
validateNameErrorResponse(message, key_rrset);
break;
case ValUtils.CNAME:
// log.trace("Validating a cname response");
// forward on to the special CNAME state for this.
// state.state = ValEventState.CNAME_STATE;
break;
case ValUtils.ANY:
// log.trace("Validating a postive ANY response");
validateAnyResponse(message, key_rrset);
break;
default:
// log.error("unhandled response subtype: " + subtype);
}
return message.getSecurityStatus().getStatus();
}
}

499
src/se/rfc/unbound/DnsSecVerifier.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
/*
* $Id$
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound.validator;
import java.util.*;
import java.io.*;
import java.security.*;
import org.apache.log4j.Logger;
import org.xbill.DNS.*;
import org.xbill.DNS.security.*;
import se.rfc.unbound.SecurityStatus;
import se.rfc.unbound.Util;
/**
* A class for performing basic DNSSEC verification. The DNSJAVA package
* contains a similar class. This is a reimplementation that allows us to have
* finer control over the validation process.
*
* @author davidb
* @version $Revision$
*/
public class DnsSecVerifier
{
public static final int UNKNOWN = 0;
public static final int RSA = 1;
public static final int DSA = 2;
/**
* This is a mapping of DNSSEC algorithm numbers/private identifiers to JCA
* algorithm identifiers.
*/
private HashMap mAlgorithmMap;
private Logger log = Logger.getLogger(this.getClass());
private static class AlgEntry
{
public String jcaName;
public boolean isDSA;
public int dnssecAlg;
public AlgEntry(String name, int dnssecAlg, boolean isDSA)
{
jcaName = name;
this.dnssecAlg = dnssecAlg;
this.isDSA = isDSA;
}
}
public DnsSecVerifier()
{
mAlgorithmMap = new HashMap();
// set the default algorithm map.
mAlgorithmMap.put(new Integer(DNSSEC.RSAMD5), new AlgEntry("MD5withRSA",
DNSSEC.RSAMD5, false));
mAlgorithmMap.put(new Integer(DNSSEC.DSA), new AlgEntry("SHA1withDSA", DNSSEC.DSA,
true));
mAlgorithmMap.put(new Integer(DNSSEC.RSASHA1), new AlgEntry(
"SHA1withRSA", DNSSEC.RSASHA1, false));
}
private boolean isDSA(int algorithm)
{
// shortcut the standard algorithms
if (algorithm == DNSSEC.DSA) return true;
if (algorithm == DNSSEC.RSASHA1) return false;
if (algorithm == DNSSEC.RSAMD5) return false;
AlgEntry entry = (AlgEntry) mAlgorithmMap.get(new Integer(algorithm));
if (entry != null) return entry.isDSA;
return false;
}
public void init(Properties config)
{
if (config == null) return;
// Algorithm configuration
// For now, we just accept new identifiers for existing algoirthms.
// FIXME: handle private identifiers.
List aliases = Util.parseConfigPrefix(config, "dns.algorithm.");
for (Iterator i = aliases.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
{
Util.ConfigEntry entry = (Util.ConfigEntry) i.next();
Integer alg_alias = new Integer(Util.parseInt(entry.key, -1));
Integer alg_orig = new Integer(Util.parseInt(entry.value, -1));
if (!mAlgorithmMap.containsKey(alg_orig))
{
log.warn("Unable to alias " + alg_alias + " to unknown algorithm "
+ alg_orig);
continue;
}
if (mAlgorithmMap.containsKey(alg_alias))
{
log.warn("Algorithm alias " + alg_alias
+ " is already defined and cannot be redefined");
continue;
}
mAlgorithmMap.put(alg_alias, mAlgorithmMap.get(alg_orig));
}
// for debugging purposes, log the entire algorithm map table.
for (Iterator i = mAlgorithmMap.keySet().iterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Integer alg = (Integer) i.next();
AlgEntry entry = (AlgEntry) mAlgorithmMap.get(alg);
if (entry == null)
log.warn("DNSSEC alg " + alg + " has a null entry!");
else
log.debug("DNSSEC alg " + alg + " maps to " + entry.jcaName
+ " (" + entry.dnssecAlg + ")");
}
}
/**
* Find the matching DNSKEY(s) to an RRSIG within a DNSKEY rrset. Normally
* this will only return one DNSKEY. It can return more than one, since
* KeyID/Footprints are not guaranteed to be unique.
*
* @param dnskey_rrset The DNSKEY rrset to search.
* @param signature The RRSIG to match against.
* @return A List contains a one or more DNSKEYRecord objects, or null if a
* matching DNSKEY could not be found.
*/
private List findKey(RRset dnskey_rrset, RRSIGRecord signature)
{
if (!signature.getSigner().equals(dnskey_rrset.getName()))
{
log.trace("findKey: could not find appropriate key because "
+ "incorrect keyset was supplied. Wanted: " + signature.getSigner()
+ ", got: " + dnskey_rrset.getName());
return null;
}
int keyid = signature.getFootprint();
int alg = signature.getAlgorithm();
List res = new ArrayList(dnskey_rrset.size());
for (Iterator i = dnskey_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
DNSKEYRecord r = (DNSKEYRecord) i.next();
if (r.getAlgorithm() == alg && r.getFootprint() == keyid)
{
res.add(r);
}
}
if (res.size() == 0)
{
log.trace("findKey: could not find a key matching "
+ "the algorithm and footprint in supplied keyset. ");
return null;
}
return res;
}
/**
* Check to see if a signature looks valid (i.e., matches the rrset in
* question, in the validity period, etc.)
*
* @param rrset The rrset that the signature belongs to.
* @param sigrec The signature record to check.
* @return A value of DNSSEC.Secure if it looks OK, DNSSEC.Faile if it looks
* bad.
*/
private byte checkSignature(RRset rrset, RRSIGRecord sigrec)
{
if (rrset == null || sigrec == null) return DNSSEC.Failed;
if (!rrset.getName().equals(sigrec.getName()))
{
log.debug("Signature name does not match RRset name");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
if (rrset.getType() != sigrec.getTypeCovered())
{
log.debug("Signature type does not match RRset type");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
Date now = new Date();
Date start = sigrec.getTimeSigned();
Date expire = sigrec.getExpire();
if (now.before(start))
{
log.debug("Signature is not yet valid");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
if (now.after(expire))
{
log.debug("Signature has expired (now = " + now + ", sig expires = "
+ expire);
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
public PublicKey parseDNSKEY(DNSKEYRecord key)
{
AlgEntry ae = (AlgEntry) mAlgorithmMap
.get(new Integer(key.getAlgorithm()));
if (key.getAlgorithm() != ae.dnssecAlg)
{
// Recast the DNSKEYRecord in question as one using the offical
// algorithm, to work around the lack of alias support in the underlying
// KEYConverter class from DNSjava
key = new DNSKEYRecord(key.getName(), key.getDClass(), key.getTTL(),
key.getFlags(), key.getProtocol(), ae.dnssecAlg, key.getKey());
}
return KEYConverter.parseRecord(key);
}
/**
* Actually cryptographically verify a signature over the rrset. The RRSIG
* record must match the rrset being verified (see checkSignature).
*
* @param rrset The rrset to verify.
* @param sigrec The signature to verify with.
* @param key The (public) key associated with the RRSIG record.
* @return A security status code: SECURE if it worked, BOGUS if not,
* UNCHECKED if we just couldn't actually do the function.
*/
public byte verifySignature(RRset rrset, RRSIGRecord sigrec,
DNSKEYRecord key)
{
try
{
PublicKey pk = parseDNSKEY(key);
if (pk == null)
{
log.warn("Could not convert DNSKEY record to a JCA public key: "
+ key);
return SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED;
}
byte[] data = SignUtils.generateSigData(rrset, sigrec);
Signature signer = getSignature(sigrec.getAlgorithm());
if (signer == null)
{
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
signer.initVerify(pk);
signer.update(data);
byte[] sig = sigrec.getSignature();
if (isDSA(sigrec.getAlgorithm()))
{
sig = SignUtils.convertDSASignature(sig);
}
if (!signer.verify(sig))
{
log.info("Signature failed to verify cryptographically");
log.debug("Failed signature: " + sigrec);
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
log.trace("Signature verified: " + sigrec);
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
catch (IOException e)
{
log.error("I/O error", e);
}
catch (GeneralSecurityException e)
{
log.error("Security error", e);
}
// FIXME: Since I'm not sure what would cause an exception here (failure
// to have the required crypto?)
// We default to UNCHECKED instead of BOGUS. This could be wrong.
return SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED;
}
/**
* Verify an RRset against a particular signature.
*
* @return DNSSEC.Secure if the signature verfied, DNSSEC.Failed if it did
* not verify (for any reason), and DNSSEC.Insecure if verification
* could not be completed (usually because the public key was not
* available).
*/
public byte verifySignature(RRset rrset, RRSIGRecord sigrec, RRset key_rrset)
{
byte result = checkSignature(rrset, sigrec);
if (result != SecurityStatus.SECURE) return result;
List keys = findKey(key_rrset, sigrec);
if (keys == null)
{
log.trace("could not find appropriate key");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
byte status = SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED;
for (Iterator i = keys.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
{
DNSKEYRecord key = (DNSKEYRecord) i.next();
status = verifySignature(rrset, sigrec, key);
if (status == SecurityStatus.SECURE) break;
}
return status;
}
/**
* Verifies an RRset. This routine does not modify the RRset. This RRset is
* presumed to be verifiable, and the correct DNSKEY rrset is presumed to
* have been found.
*
* @return SecurityStatus.SECURE if the rrest verified positively,
* SecurityStatus.BOGUS otherwise.
*/
public byte verify(RRset rrset, RRset key_rrset)
{
Iterator i = rrset.sigs();
if (!i.hasNext())
{
log.info("RRset failed to verify due to lack of signatures");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
while (i.hasNext())
{
RRSIGRecord sigrec = (RRSIGRecord) i.next();
byte res = verifySignature(rrset, sigrec, key_rrset);
if (res == SecurityStatus.SECURE) return res;
}
log.info("RRset failed to verify: all signatures were BOGUS");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
/**
* Verify an RRset against a single DNSKEY. Use this when you must be
* certain that an RRset signed and verifies with a particular DNSKEY (as
* opposed to a particular DNSKEY rrset).
*
* @param rrset The rrset to verify.
* @param dnskey The DNSKEY to verify with.
* @return SecurityStatus.SECURE if the rrset verified, BOGUS otherwise.
*/
public byte verify(RRset rrset, DNSKEYRecord dnskey)
{
// Iterate over RRSIGS
Iterator i = rrset.sigs();
if (!i.hasNext())
{
log.info("RRset failed to verify due to lack of signatures");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
while (i.hasNext())
{
RRSIGRecord sigrec = (RRSIGRecord) i.next();
// Skip RRSIGs that do not match our given key's footprint.
if (sigrec.getFootprint() != dnskey.getFootprint()) continue;
byte res = verifySignature(rrset, sigrec, dnskey);
if (res == SecurityStatus.SECURE) return res;
}
log.info("RRset failed to verify: all signatures were BOGUS");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
public boolean supportsAlgorithm(int algorithm)
{
return mAlgorithmMap.containsKey(new Integer(algorithm));
}
public boolean supportsAlgorithm(Name private_id)
{
return mAlgorithmMap.containsKey(private_id);
}
public int baseAlgorithm(int algorithm)
{
switch (algorithm)
{
case DNSSEC.RSAMD5:
case DNSSEC.RSASHA1:
return RSA;
case DNSSEC.DSA:
return DSA;
}
AlgEntry entry = (AlgEntry) mAlgorithmMap.get(new Integer(algorithm));
if (entry == null) return UNKNOWN;
if (entry.isDSA) return DSA;
return RSA;
}
/** @return the appropriate Signature object for this keypair. */
private Signature getSignature(int algorithm)
{
Signature s = null;
try
{
AlgEntry entry = (AlgEntry) mAlgorithmMap.get(new Integer(algorithm));
if (entry == null)
{
log.info("DNSSEC algorithm " + algorithm + " not recognized.");
return null;
}
// TODO: should we cache the instance?
s = Signature.getInstance(entry.jcaName);
}
catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
{
log.error("error getting Signature object", e);
}
return s;
}
// TODO: enable private algorithm support in dnsjava.
// Right now, this cannot be used because the DNSKEYRecord object doesn't
// give us
// the private key name.
// private Signature getSignature(Name private_alg)
// {
// Signature s = null;
//
// try
// {
// String alg_id = (String) mAlgorithmMap.get(private_alg);
// if (alg_id == null)
// {
// log.debug("DNSSEC private algorithm '" + private_alg
// + "' not recognized.");
// return null;
// }
//
// s = Signature.getInstance(alg_id);
// }
// catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
// {
// log.error("error getting Signature object", e);
// }
//
// return s;
// }
}

868
src/se/rfc/unbound/NSEC3ValUtils.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,868 @@
/*
* $Id$
*
* Copyright (c) 2006 VeriSign. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in
* binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of
* conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
* materials provided with the distribution. 3. The name of the author may not
* be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN
* NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.util.*;
import org.apache.log4j.Logger;
import org.xbill.DNS.*;
import org.xbill.DNS.utils.base32;
import se.rfc.unbound.validator.DnsSecVerifier;
import se.rfc.unbound.validator.SignUtils;
import se.rfc.unbound.validator.SignUtils.ByteArrayComparator;
public class NSEC3ValUtils
{
// FIXME: should probably refactor to handle different NSEC3 parameters more
// efficiently.
// Given a list of NSEC3 RRs, they should be grouped according to
// parameters. The idea is to hash and compare for each group independently,
// instead of having to skip NSEC3 RRs with the wrong parameters.
// The logger to use in static methods.
private static Logger st_log = Logger.getLogger(NSEC3ValUtils.class);
private static Name asterisk_label = Name.fromConstantString("*");
/**
* This is a class to encapsulate a unique set of NSEC3 parameters:
* algorithm, iterations, and salt.
*/
private static class NSEC3Parameters
{
public byte alg;
public byte[] salt;
public int iterations;
public NSEC3Parameters(NSEC3Record r)
{
alg = r.getHashAlgorithm();
salt = r.getSalt();
iterations = r.getIterations();
}
public boolean match(NSEC3Record r, ByteArrayComparator bac)
{
if (r.getHashAlgorithm() != alg) return false;
if (r.getIterations() != iterations) return false;
if (salt == null && r.getSalt() != null) return false;
if (bac == null) bac = new ByteArrayComparator();
return bac.compare(r.getSalt(), salt) == 0;
}
}
/**
* This is just a simple class to enapsulate the response to a closest
* encloser proof.
*/
private static class CEResponse
{
public Name closestEncloser;
public NSEC3Record ce_nsec3;
public NSEC3Record nc_nsec3;
public CEResponse(Name ce, NSEC3Record nsec3)
{
this.closestEncloser = ce;
this.ce_nsec3 = nsec3;
}
}
public static boolean supportsHashAlgorithm(int alg)
{
if (alg == NSEC3Record.SHA1_DIGEST_ID) return true;
return false;
}
public static void stripUnknownAlgNSEC3s(List nsec3s)
{
if (nsec3s == null) return;
for (ListIterator i = nsec3s.listIterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
NSEC3Record nsec3 = (NSEC3Record) i.next();
if (!supportsHashAlgorithm(nsec3.getHashAlgorithm()))
{
i.remove();
}
}
}
/**
* Given a list of NSEC3Records that are part of a message, determine the
* NSEC3 parameters (hash algorithm, iterations, and salt) present. If there
* is more than one distinct grouping, return null;
*
* @param nsec3s A list of NSEC3Record object.
* @return A set containing a number of objects (NSEC3Parameter objects)
* that correspond to each distinct set of parameters, or null if
* the nsec3s list was empty.
*/
public static NSEC3Parameters nsec3Parameters(List nsec3s)
{
if (nsec3s == null || nsec3s.size() == 0) return null;
NSEC3Parameters params = new NSEC3Parameters((NSEC3Record) nsec3s.get(0));
ByteArrayComparator bac = new ByteArrayComparator();
for (Iterator i = nsec3s.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
{
if (! params.match((NSEC3Record) i.next(), bac))
{
return null;
}
}
return params;
}
/**
* In a list of NSEC3Record object pulled from a given message, find the
* NSEC3 that directly matches a given name, without hashing.
*
* @param n The name in question.
* @param nsec3s A list of NSEC3Records from a given message.
* @return The matching NSEC3Record, or null if there wasn't one.
*/
// private static NSEC3Record findDirectMatchingNSEC3(Name n, List nsec3s)
// {
// if (n == null || nsec3s == null) return null;
//
// for (Iterator i = nsec3s.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
// {
// NSEC3Record nsec3 = (NSEC3Record) i.next();
// if (n.equals(nsec3.getName())) return nsec3;
// }
//
// return null;
// }
/**
* Given a hash and an a zone name, construct an NSEC3 ownername.
*
* @param hash The hash of an original name.
* @param zonename The zone to use in constructing the NSEC3 name.
* @return The NSEC3 name.
*/
private static Name hashName(byte[] hash, Name zonename)
{
try
{
return new Name(base32.toString(hash).toLowerCase(), zonename);
}
catch (TextParseException e)
{
// Note, this should never happen.
return null;
}
}
/**
* Given a set of NSEC3 parameters, hash a name.
*
* @param name The name to hash.
* @param params The parameters to hash with.
* @return The hash.
*/
private static byte[] hash(Name name, NSEC3Parameters params)
{
try
{
return NSEC3Record.hash(name,
params.alg,
params.iterations,
params.salt);
}
catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
{
st_log.debug("Did not recognize hash algorithm: " + params.alg);
return null;
}
}
/**
* Given the name of a closest encloser, return the name *.closest_encloser.
*
* @param closestEncloser The name to start with.
* @return The wildcard name.
*/
private static Name ceWildcard(Name closestEncloser)
{
try
{
Name wc = Name.concatenate(asterisk_label, closestEncloser);
return wc;
}
catch (NameTooLongException e)
{
return null;
}
}
/**
* Given a qname and its proven closest encloser, calculate the "next
* closest" name. Basically, this is the name that is one label longer than
* the closest encloser that is still a subdomain of qname.
*
* @param qname The qname.
* @param closestEncloser The closest encloser name.
* @return The next closer name.
*/
private static Name nextClosest(Name qname, Name closestEncloser)
{
int strip = qname.labels() - closestEncloser.labels() - 1;
return (strip > 0) ? new Name(qname, strip) : qname;
}
/**
* Find the NSEC3Record that matches a hash of a name.
*
* @param hash The pre-calculated hash of a name.
* @param zonename The name of the zone that the NSEC3s are from.
* @param nsec3s A list of NSEC3Records from a given message.
* @param params The parameters used for calculating the hash.
* @param bac An already allocated ByteArrayComparator, for reuse. This may
* be null.
*
* @return The matching NSEC3Record, if one is present.
*/
private static NSEC3Record findMatchingNSEC3(byte[] hash, Name zonename,
List nsec3s, NSEC3Parameters params, ByteArrayComparator bac)
{
Name n = hashName(hash, zonename);
for (Iterator i = nsec3s.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
{
NSEC3Record nsec3 = (NSEC3Record) i.next();
// Skip nsec3 records that are using different parameters.
if (!params.match(nsec3, bac)) continue;
if (n.equals(nsec3.getName())) return nsec3;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Given a hash and a candidate NSEC3Record, determine if that NSEC3Record
* covers the hash. Covers specifically means that the hash is in between
* the owner and next hashes and does not equal either.
*
* @param nsec3 The candidate NSEC3Record.
* @param hash The precalculated hash.
* @param bac An already allocated comparator. This may be null.
* @return True if the NSEC3Record covers the hash.
*/
private static boolean nsec3Covers(NSEC3Record nsec3, byte[] hash,
ByteArrayComparator bac)
{
byte[] owner = nsec3.getOwner();
byte[] next = nsec3.getNext();
// This is the "normal case: owner < next and owner < hash < next
if (bac.compare(owner, hash) < 0 && bac.compare(hash, next) < 0)
return true;
// this is the end of zone case: next < owner && hash > owner || hash <
// next
if (bac.compare(next, owner) <= 0
&& (bac.compare(hash, next) < 0 || bac.compare(owner, hash) < 0))
return true;
// Otherwise, the NSEC3 does not cover the hash.
return false;
}
/**
* Given a pre-hashed name, find a covering NSEC3 from among a list of
* NSEC3s.
*
* @param hash The hash to consider.
* @param zonename The name of the zone.
* @param nsec3s The list of NSEC3s present in a message.
* @param params The NSEC3 parameters used to generate the hash -- NSEC3s
* that do not use those parameters will be skipped.
*
* @return A covering NSEC3 if one is present, null otherwise.
*/
private static NSEC3Record findCoveringNSEC3(byte[] hash, Name zonename,
List nsec3s, NSEC3Parameters params, ByteArrayComparator bac)
{
ByteArrayComparator comparator = new ByteArrayComparator();
for (Iterator i = nsec3s.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
{
NSEC3Record nsec3 = (NSEC3Record) i.next();
if (!params.match(nsec3, bac)) continue;
if (nsec3Covers(nsec3, hash, comparator)) return nsec3;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Given a name and a list of NSEC3s, find the candidate closest encloser.
* This will be the first ancestor of 'name' (including itself) to have a
* matching NSEC3 RR.
*
* @param name The name the start with.
* @param zonename The name of the zone that the NSEC3s came from.
* @param nsec3s The list of NSEC3s.
* @param nsec3params The NSEC3 parameters.
* @param bac A pre-allocated comparator. May be null.
*
* @return A CEResponse containing the closest encloser name and the NSEC3
* RR that matched it, or null if there wasn't one.
*/
private static CEResponse findClosestEncloser(Name name, Name zonename,
List nsec3s, NSEC3Parameters params, ByteArrayComparator bac)
{
Name n = name;
NSEC3Record nsec3;
// This scans from longest name to shortest, so the first match we find is
// the only viable candidate.
// FIXME: modify so that the NSEC3 matching the zone apex need not be
// present.
while (n.labels() >= zonename.labels())
{
nsec3 = findMatchingNSEC3(hash(n, params), zonename, nsec3s, params, bac);
if (nsec3 != null) return new CEResponse(n, nsec3);
n = new Name(n, 1);
}
return null;
}
/**
* Given a List of nsec3 RRs, find and prove the closest encloser to qname.
*
* @param qname The qname in question.
* @param zonename The name of the zone that the NSEC3 RRs come from.
* @param nsec3s The list of NSEC3s found the this response (already
* verified).
* @param params The NSEC3 parameters found in the response.
* @param bac A pre-allocated comparator. May be null.
* @param proveDoesNotExist If true, then if the closest encloser turns out
* to be qname, then null is returned.
* @return null if the proof isn't completed. Otherwise, return a CEResponse
* object which contains the closest encloser name and the NSEC3
* that matches it.
*/
private static CEResponse proveClosestEncloser(Name qname, Name zonename,
List nsec3s, NSEC3Parameters params, ByteArrayComparator bac,
boolean proveDoesNotExist)
{
CEResponse candidate = findClosestEncloser(qname,
zonename,
nsec3s,
params,
bac);
if (candidate == null)
{
st_log.debug("proveClosestEncloser: could not find a "
+ "candidate for the closest encloser.");
return null;
}
if (candidate.closestEncloser.equals(qname))
{
if (proveDoesNotExist)
{
st_log.debug("proveClosestEncloser: proved that qname existed!");
return null;
}
// otherwise, we need to nothing else to prove that qname is its own
// closest encloser.
return candidate;
}
// If the closest encloser is actually a delegation, then the response
// should have been a referral. If it is a DNAME, then it should have been
// a DNAME response.
if (candidate.ce_nsec3.hasType(Type.NS)
&& !candidate.ce_nsec3.hasType(Type.SOA))
{
st_log.debug("proveClosestEncloser: closest encloser "
+ "was a delegation!");
return null;
}
if (candidate.ce_nsec3.hasType(Type.DNAME))
{
st_log.debug("proveClosestEncloser: closest encloser was a DNAME!");
return null;
}
// Otherwise, we need to show that the next closer name is covered.
Name nextClosest = nextClosest(qname, candidate.closestEncloser);
byte[] nc_hash = hash(nextClosest, params);
candidate.nc_nsec3 = findCoveringNSEC3(nc_hash,
zonename,
nsec3s,
params,
bac);
if (candidate.nc_nsec3 == null)
{
st_log.debug("Could not find proof that the "
+ "closest encloser was the closest encloser");
return null;
}
return candidate;
}
private static int maxIterations(int baseAlg, int keysize)
{
switch (baseAlg)
{
case DnsSecVerifier.RSA:
if (keysize == 0) return 2500; // the max at 4096
if (keysize > 2048) return 2500;
if (keysize > 1024) return 500;
if (keysize > 0) return 150;
break;
case DnsSecVerifier.DSA:
if (keysize == 0) return 5000; // the max at 2048;
if (keysize > 1024) return 5000;
if (keysize > 0) return 1500;
break;
}
return -1;
}
private static boolean validIterations(NSEC3Parameters nsec3params,
RRset dnskey_rrset, DnsSecVerifier verifier)
{
// for now, we return the maximum iterations based simply on the key
// algorithms that may have been used to sign the NSEC3 RRsets.
int max_iterations = 0;
for (Iterator i = dnskey_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
DNSKEYRecord dnskey = (DNSKEYRecord) i.next();
int baseAlg = verifier.baseAlgorithm(dnskey.getAlgorithm());
int iters = maxIterations(baseAlg, 0);
max_iterations = max_iterations < iters ? iters : max_iterations;
}
if (nsec3params.iterations > max_iterations) return false;
return true;
}
/**
* Determine if all of the NSEC3s in a response are legally ignoreable
* (i.e., their presence should lead to an INSECURE result). Currently, this
* is solely based on iterations.
*
* @param nsec3s The list of NSEC3s. If there is more than one set of NSEC3
* parameters present, this test will not be performed.
* @param dnskey_rrset The set of validating DNSKEYs.
* @param verifier The verifier used to verify the NSEC3 RRsets. This is
* solely used to map algorithm aliases.
* @return true if all of the NSEC3s can be legally ignored, false if not.
*/
public static boolean allNSEC3sIgnoreable(List nsec3s, RRset dnskey_rrset, DnsSecVerifier verifier)
{
NSEC3Parameters params = nsec3Parameters(nsec3s);
if (params == null) return false;
return !validIterations(params, dnskey_rrset, verifier);
}
/**
* Determine if the set of NSEC3 records provided with a response prove NAME
* ERROR. This means that the NSEC3s prove a) the closest encloser exists,
* b) the direct child of the closest encloser towards qname doesn't exist,
* and c) *.closest encloser does not exist.
*
* @param nsec3s The list of NSEC3s.
* @param qname The query name to check against.
* @param zonename This is the name of the zone that the NSEC3s belong to.
* This may be discovered in any number of ways. A good one is to
* use the signerName from the NSEC3 record's RRSIG.
* @return SecurityStatus.SECURE of the Name Error is proven by the NSEC3
* RRs, BOGUS if not, INSECURE if all of the NSEC3s could be validly
* ignored.
*/
public static boolean proveNameError(List nsec3s, Name qname, Name zonename)
{
if (nsec3s == null || nsec3s.size() == 0) return false;
NSEC3Parameters nsec3params = nsec3Parameters(nsec3s);
if (nsec3params == null)
{
st_log.debug("Could not find a single set of " +
"NSEC3 parameters (multiple parameters present).");
return false;
}
ByteArrayComparator bac = new ByteArrayComparator();
// First locate and prove the closest encloser to qname. We will use the
// variant that fails if the closest encloser turns out to be qname.
CEResponse ce = proveClosestEncloser(qname,
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac,
true);
if (ce == null)
{
st_log.debug("proveNameError: failed to prove a closest encloser.");
return false;
}
// At this point, we know that qname does not exist. Now we need to prove
// that the wildcard does not exist.
Name wc = ceWildcard(ce.closestEncloser);
byte[] wc_hash = hash(wc, nsec3params);
NSEC3Record nsec3 = findCoveringNSEC3(wc_hash,
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac);
if (nsec3 == null)
{
st_log.debug("proveNameError: could not prove that the "
+ "applicable wildcard did not exist.");
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Determine if the set of NSEC3 records provided with a response prove NAME
* ERROR when qtype = NSEC3. This is a special case, and (currently anyway)
* it suffices to simply prove that the NSEC3 RRset itself does not exist,
* without proving that no wildcard could have generated it, etc..
*
* @param nsec3s The list of NSEC3s.
* @param qname The query name to check against.
* @param zonename This is the name of the zone that the NSEC3s belong to.
* This may be discovered in any number of ways. A good one is to
* use the signerName from the NSEC3 record's RRSIG.
* @return true of the Name Error is proven by the NSEC3 RRs, false if not.
*/
// public static boolean proveNSEC3NameError(List nsec3s, Name qname,
// Name zonename)
// {
// if (nsec3s == null || nsec3s.size() == 0) return false;
//
// for (Iterator i = nsec3s.iterator(); i.hasNext(); )
// {
// NSEC3Record nsec3 = (NSEC3Record) i.next();
//
// // Convert owner and next into Names.
// Name owner = nsec3.getName();
// Name next = null;
// try
// {
// next = new Name(base32.toString(nsec3.getNext()), zonename);
// }
// catch (TextParseException e)
// {
// continue;
// }
//
// // Now see if qname is covered by the NSEC3.
//
// // normal case, owner < qname < next.
// if (owner.compareTo(next) < 0 && owner.compareTo(qname) < 0 &&
// next.compareTo(qname) > 0)
// {
// st_log.debug("proveNSEC3NameError: found a covering NSEC3: " + nsec3);
// return true;
// }
// // end-of-zone case: next < owner and qname > owner || qname < next.
// if (owner.compareTo(next) > 0 && (owner.compareTo(qname) < 0 ||
// next.compareTo(qname) > 0))
// {
// st_log.debug("proveNSEC3NameError: found a covering NSEC3: " + nsec3);
// return true;
// }
// }
//
// st_log.debug("proveNSEC3NameError: did not find a covering NSEC3");
// return false;
// }
/**
* Determine if the NSEC3s provided in a response prove the NOERROR/NODATA
* status. There are a number of different variants to this:
*
* 1) Normal NODATA -- qname is matched to an NSEC3 record, type is not
* present.
*
* 2) ENT NODATA -- because there must be NSEC3 record for
* empty-non-terminals, this is the same as #1.
*
* 3) NSEC3 ownername NODATA -- qname matched an existing, lone NSEC3
* ownername, but qtype was not NSEC3. NOTE: as of nsec-05, this case no
* longer exists.
*
* 4) Wildcard NODATA -- A wildcard matched the name, but not the type.
*
* 5) Opt-In DS NODATA -- the qname is covered by an opt-in span and qtype ==
* DS. (or maybe some future record with the same parent-side-only property)
*
* @param nsec3s The NSEC3Records to consider.
* @param qname The qname in question.
* @param qtype The qtype in question.
* @param zonename The name of the zone that the NSEC3s came from.
* @return true if the NSEC3s prove the proposition.
*/
public static boolean proveNodata(List nsec3s, Name qname, int qtype,
Name zonename)
{
if (nsec3s == null || nsec3s.size() == 0) return false;
NSEC3Parameters nsec3params = nsec3Parameters(nsec3s);
if (nsec3params == null)
{
st_log.debug("could not find a single set of "
+ "NSEC3 parameters (multiple parameters present)");
return false;
}
ByteArrayComparator bac = new ByteArrayComparator();
NSEC3Record nsec3 = findMatchingNSEC3(hash(qname, nsec3params),
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac);
// Cases 1 & 2.
if (nsec3 != null)
{
if (nsec3.hasType(qtype))
{
st_log.debug("proveNodata: Matching NSEC3 proved that type existed!");
return false;
}
if (nsec3.hasType(Type.CNAME))
{
st_log.debug("proveNodata: Matching NSEC3 proved "
+ "that a CNAME existed!");
return false;
}
return true;
}
// For cases 3 - 5, we need the proven closest encloser, and it can't
// match qname. Although, at this point, we know that it won't since we
// just checked that.
CEResponse ce = proveClosestEncloser(qname,
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac,
true);
// At this point, not finding a match or a proven closest encloser is a
// problem.
if (ce == null)
{
st_log.debug("proveNodata: did not match qname, "
+ "nor found a proven closest encloser.");
return false;
}
// Case 3: REMOVED
// Case 4:
Name wc = ceWildcard(ce.closestEncloser);
nsec3 = findMatchingNSEC3(hash(wc, nsec3params),
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac);
if (nsec3 != null)
{
if (nsec3.hasType(qtype))
{
st_log.debug("proveNodata: matching wildcard had qtype!");
return false;
}
return true;
}
// Case 5.
if (qtype != Type.DS)
{
st_log.debug("proveNodata: could not find matching NSEC3, "
+ "nor matching wildcard, and qtype is not DS -- no more options.");
return false;
}
// We need to make sure that the covering NSEC3 is opt-in.
if (!ce.nc_nsec3.getOptInFlag())
{
st_log.debug("proveNodata: covering NSEC3 was not "
+ "opt-in in an opt-in DS NOERROR/NODATA case.");
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Prove that a positive wildcard match was appropriate (no direct match
* RRset).
*
* @param nsec3s The NSEC3 records to work with.
* @param qname The qname that was matched to the wildard
* @param zonename The name of the zone that the NSEC3s come from.
* @param wildcard The purported wildcard that matched.
* @return true if the NSEC3 records prove this case.
*/
public static boolean proveWildcard(List nsec3s, Name qname, Name zonename,
Name wildcard)
{
if (nsec3s == null || nsec3s.size() == 0) return false;
if (qname == null || wildcard == null) return false;
NSEC3Parameters nsec3params = nsec3Parameters(nsec3s);
if (nsec3params == null)
{
st_log.debug("couldn't find a single set of NSEC3 parameters (multiple parameters present).");
return false;
}
ByteArrayComparator bac = new ByteArrayComparator();
// We know what the (purported) closest encloser is by just looking at the
// supposed generating wildcard.
CEResponse candidate = new CEResponse(new Name(wildcard, 1), null);
// Now we still need to prove that the original data did not exist.
// Otherwise, we need to show that the next closer name is covered.
Name nextClosest = nextClosest(qname, candidate.closestEncloser);
candidate.nc_nsec3 = findCoveringNSEC3(hash(nextClosest, nsec3params),
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac);
if (candidate.nc_nsec3 == null)
{
st_log.debug("proveWildcard: did not find a covering NSEC3 "
+ "that covered the next closer name to " + qname + " from "
+ candidate.closestEncloser + " (derived from wildcard " + wildcard
+ ")");
return false;
}
return true;
}
/**
* Prove that a DS response either had no DS, or wasn't a delegation point.
*
* Fundamentally there are two cases here: normal NODATA and Opt-In NODATA.
*
* @param nsec3s The NSEC3 RRs to examine.
* @param qname The name of the DS in question.
* @param zonename The name of the zone that the NSEC3 RRs come from.
*
* @return SecurityStatus.SECURE if it was proven that there is no DS in a
* secure (i.e., not opt-in) way, SecurityStatus.INSECURE if there
* was no DS in an insecure (i.e., opt-in) way,
* SecurityStatus.INDETERMINATE if it was clear that this wasn't a
* delegation point, and SecurityStatus.BOGUS if the proofs don't
* work out.
*/
public static int proveNoDS(List nsec3s, Name qname, Name zonename)
{
if (nsec3s == null || nsec3s.size() == 0) return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
NSEC3Parameters nsec3params = nsec3Parameters(nsec3s);
if (nsec3params == null)
{
st_log.debug("couldn't find a single set of " +
"NSEC3 parameters (multiple parameters present).");
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
ByteArrayComparator bac = new ByteArrayComparator();
// Look for a matching NSEC3 to qname -- this is the normal NODATA case.
NSEC3Record nsec3 = findMatchingNSEC3(hash(qname, nsec3params),
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac);
if (nsec3 != null)
{
// If the matching NSEC3 has the SOA bit set, it is from the wrong zone
// (the child instead of the parent). If it has the DS bit set, then we
// were lied to.
if (nsec3.hasType(Type.SOA) || nsec3.hasType(Type.DS))
{
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
// If the NSEC3 RR doesn't have the NS bit set, then this wasn't a
// delegation point.
if (!nsec3.hasType(Type.NS)) return SecurityStatus.INDETERMINATE;
// Otherwise, this proves no DS.
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
// Otherwise, we are probably in the opt-in case.
CEResponse ce = proveClosestEncloser(qname,
zonename,
nsec3s,
nsec3params,
bac,
true);
if (ce == null)
{
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
// If we had the closest encloser proof, then we need to check that the
// covering NSEC3 was opt-in -- the proveClosestEncloser step already
// checked to see if the closest encloser was a delegation or DNAME.
if (ce.nc_nsec3.getOptInFlag())
{
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
}

398
src/se/rfc/unbound/SMessage.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
/*
* $Id$
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in
* binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of
* conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
* materials provided with the distribution. 3. The name of the author may not
* be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN
* NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound;
import java.util.*;
import org.xbill.DNS.*;
/**
* This class represents a DNS message with resolver/validator state.
*/
public class SMessage
{
private Header mHeader;
private Record mQuestion;
private OPTRecord mOPTRecord;
private List[] mSection;
private SecurityStatus mSecurityStatus;
private static SRRset[] empty_srrset_array = new SRRset[0];
public SMessage(Header h)
{
mSection = new List[3];
mHeader = h;
mSecurityStatus = new SecurityStatus();
}
public SMessage(int id)
{
this(new Header(id));
}
public SMessage()
{
this(new Header(0));
}
public SMessage(Message m)
{
this(m.getHeader());
mQuestion = m.getQuestion();
mOPTRecord = m.getOPT();
for (int i = Section.ANSWER; i <= Section.ADDITIONAL; i++)
{
RRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(i);
for (int j = 0; j < rrsets.length; j++)
{
addRRset(rrsets[j], i);
}
}
}
public Header getHeader()
{
return mHeader;
}
public void setHeader(Header h)
{
mHeader = h;
}
public void setQuestion(Record r)
{
mQuestion = r;
}
public Record getQuestion()
{
return mQuestion;
}
public Name getQName() {
return getQuestion().getName();
}
public int getQType() {
return getQuestion().getType();
}
public int getQClass() {
return getQuestion().getDClass();
}
public void setOPT(OPTRecord r)
{
mOPTRecord = r;
}
public OPTRecord getOPT()
{
return mOPTRecord;
}
public List getSectionList(int section)
{
if (section <= Section.QUESTION || section > Section.ADDITIONAL)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid section.");
if (mSection[section - 1] == null)
{
mSection[section - 1] = new LinkedList();
}
return mSection[section - 1];
}
public void addRRset(SRRset srrset, int section)
{
if (section <= Section.QUESTION || section > Section.ADDITIONAL)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid section");
if (srrset.getType() == Type.OPT)
{
mOPTRecord = (OPTRecord) srrset.first();
return;
}
List sectionList = getSectionList(section);
sectionList.add(srrset);
}
public void addRRset(RRset rrset, int section)
{
if (rrset instanceof SRRset)
{
addRRset((SRRset) rrset, section);
return;
}
SRRset srrset = new SRRset(rrset);
addRRset(srrset, section);
}
public void prependRRsets(List rrsets, int section)
{
if (section <= Section.QUESTION || section > Section.ADDITIONAL)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid section");
List sectionList = getSectionList(section);
sectionList.addAll(0, rrsets);
}
public SRRset[] getSectionRRsets(int section)
{
List slist = getSectionList(section);
return (SRRset[]) slist.toArray(empty_srrset_array);
}
public SRRset[] getSectionRRsets(int section, int qtype)
{
List slist = getSectionList(section);
if (slist.size() == 0) return new SRRset[0];
ArrayList result = new ArrayList(slist.size());
for (Iterator i = slist.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
{
SRRset rrset = (SRRset) i.next();
if (rrset.getType() == qtype) result.add(rrset);
}
return (SRRset[]) result.toArray(empty_srrset_array);
}
public void deleteRRset(SRRset rrset, int section)
{
List slist = getSectionList(section);
if (slist.size() == 0) return;
slist.remove(rrset);
}
public void clear(int section)
{
if (section < Section.QUESTION || section > Section.ADDITIONAL)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid section.");
if (section == Section.QUESTION)
{
mQuestion = null;
return;
}
if (section == Section.ADDITIONAL)
{
mOPTRecord = null;
}
mSection[section - 1] = null;
}
public void clear()
{
for (int s = Section.QUESTION; s <= Section.ADDITIONAL; s++)
{
clear(s);
}
}
public int getRcode()
{
// FIXME: might want to do what Message does and handle extended rcodes.
return mHeader.getRcode();
}
public int getStatus()
{
return mSecurityStatus.getStatus();
}
public void setStatus(byte status)
{
mSecurityStatus.setStatus(status);
}
public SecurityStatus getSecurityStatus()
{
return mSecurityStatus;
}
public void setSecurityStatus(SecurityStatus s)
{
if (s == null) return;
mSecurityStatus = s;
}
public Message getMessage()
{
// Generate our new message.
Message m = new Message(mHeader.getID());
// Convert the header
// We do this for two reasons: 1) setCount() is package scope, so we can't
// do that, and 2) setting the header on a message after creating the
// message frequently gets stuff out of sync, leading to malformed wire
// format messages.
Header h = m.getHeader();
h.setOpcode(mHeader.getOpcode());
h.setRcode(mHeader.getRcode());
for (int i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
if (Flags.isFlag(i)) h.setFlag(i, mHeader.getFlag(i));
}
// Add all the records. -- this will set the counts correctly in the
// message header.
if (mQuestion != null)
{
m.addRecord(mQuestion, Section.QUESTION);
}
for (int sec = Section.ANSWER; sec <= Section.ADDITIONAL; sec++)
{
List slist = getSectionList(sec);
for (Iterator i = slist.iterator(); i.hasNext();)
{
SRRset rrset = (SRRset) i.next();
for (Iterator j = rrset.rrs(); j.hasNext();)
{
m.addRecord((Record) j.next(), sec);
}
for (Iterator j = rrset.sigs(); j.hasNext();)
{
m.addRecord((Record) j.next(), sec);
}
}
}
if (mOPTRecord != null)
{
m.addRecord(mOPTRecord, Section.ADDITIONAL);
}
return m;
}
public int getCount(int section)
{
if (section == Section.QUESTION)
{
return mQuestion == null ? 0 : 1;
}
List sectionList = getSectionList(section);
if (sectionList == null) return 0;
if (sectionList.size() == 0) return 0;
int count = 0;
for (Iterator i = sectionList.iterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
SRRset sr = (SRRset) i.next();
count += sr.totalSize();
}
return count;
}
public String toString()
{
return getMessage().toString();
}
/**
* Find a specific (S)RRset in a given section.
*
* @param name the name of the RRset.
* @param type the type of the RRset.
* @param dclass the class of the RRset.
* @param section the section to look in (ANSWER -> ADDITIONAL)
*
* @return The SRRset if found, null otherwise.
*/
public SRRset findRRset(Name name, int type, int dclass, int section)
{
if (section <= Section.QUESTION || section > Section.ADDITIONAL)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Invalid section.");
SRRset[] rrsets = getSectionRRsets(section);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
if (rrsets[i].getName().equals(name) && rrsets[i].getType() == type
&& rrsets[i].getDClass() == dclass)
{
return rrsets[i];
}
}
return null;
}
/**
* Find an "answer" RRset. This will look for RRsets in the ANSWER section
* that match the <qname,qtype,qclass>, taking into consideration CNAMEs.
*
* @param qname The starting search name.
* @param qtype The search type.
* @param qclass The search class.
*
* @return a SRRset matching the query. This SRRset may have a different
* name from qname, due to following a CNAME chain.
*/
public SRRset findAnswerRRset(Name qname, int qtype, int qclass)
{
SRRset[] srrsets = getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
for (int i = 0; i < srrsets.length; i++)
{
if (srrsets[i].getName().equals(qname)
&& srrsets[i].getType() == Type.CNAME)
{
CNAMERecord cname = (CNAMERecord) srrsets[i].first();
qname = cname.getTarget();
continue;
}
if (srrsets[i].getName().equals(qname) && srrsets[i].getType() == qtype
&& srrsets[i].getDClass() == qclass)
{
return srrsets[i];
}
}
return null;
}
}

169
src/se/rfc/unbound/SRRset.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in
* binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of
* conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
* materials provided with the distribution. 3. The name of the author may not
* be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN
* NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound;
import java.util.*;
import org.xbill.DNS.*;
/**
* A version of the RRset class overrides the standard security status.
*/
public class SRRset extends RRset
{
private SecurityStatus mSecurityStatus;
/** Create a new, blank SRRset. */
public SRRset()
{
super();
mSecurityStatus = new SecurityStatus();
}
/**
* Create a new SRRset from an existing RRset. This SRRset will contain that
* same internal Record objects as the original RRset.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked") // org.xbill.DNS.RRset isn't typesafe-aware.
public SRRset(RRset r)
{
this();
for (Iterator i = r.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
addRR((Record) i.next());
}
for (Iterator i = r.sigs(); i.hasNext();)
{
addRR((Record) i.next());
}
}
/**
* Clone this SRRset, giving the copy a new TTL. The copy is independent
* from the original except for the security status.
*
* @param withNewTTL The new TTL to apply to the RRset. This applies to
* contained RRsig records as well.
* @return The cloned SRRset.
*/
public SRRset cloneSRRset(long withNewTTL)
{
SRRset nr = new SRRset();
for (Iterator i = rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
nr.addRR(((Record) i.next()).withTTL(withNewTTL));
}
for (Iterator i = sigs(); i.hasNext();)
{
nr.addRR(((Record) i.next()).withTTL(withNewTTL));
}
nr.mSecurityStatus = mSecurityStatus;
return nr;
}
public SRRset cloneSRRsetNoSigs()
{
SRRset nr = new SRRset();
for (Iterator i = rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
// NOTE: should this clone the records as well?
nr.addRR((Record) i.next());
}
// Do not copy the SecurityStatus reference
return nr;
}
/**
* Return the current security status (generally: UNCHECKED, BOGUS, or
* SECURE).
*/
public int getSecurity()
{
return getSecurityStatus();
}
/**
* Return the current security status (generally: UNCHECKED, BOGUS, or
* SECURE).
*/
public int getSecurityStatus()
{
return mSecurityStatus.getStatus();
}
/**
* Set the current security status for this SRRset. This status will be
* shared amongst all copies of this SRRset (created with cloneSRRset())
*/
public void setSecurityStatus(int status)
{
mSecurityStatus.setStatus(status);
}
/**
* @return The total number of records (data + sigs) in the SRRset.
*/
public int getNumRecords()
{
return totalSize();
}
/**
* @return true if this RRset has RRSIG records that cover data records.
* (i.e., RRSIG SRRsets return false)
*/
public boolean isSigned()
{
if (getType() == Type.RRSIG) return false;
return firstSig() != null;
}
/**
* @return The "signer" name for this SRRset, if signed, or null if not.
*/
public Name getSignerName()
{
RRSIGRecord sig = (RRSIGRecord) firstSig();
if (sig == null) return null;
return sig.getSigner();
}
public void setTTL(long ttl)
{
if (ttl < 0)
{
throw new IllegalArgumentException("ttl can't be less than zero, stupid! was " + ttl);
}
super.setTTL(ttl);
}
}

112
src/se/rfc/unbound/SecurityStatus.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
/*
* $Id$
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in
* binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of
* conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
* materials provided with the distribution. 3. The name of the author may not
* be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN
* NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound;
/**
* Codes for DNSSEC security statuses.
*
* @author davidb
*/
public class SecurityStatus
{
/**
* UNCHECKED means that object has yet to be validated.
*/
public static final byte UNCHECKED = 0;
/**
* BOGUS means that the object (RRset or message) failed to validate
* (according to local policy), but should have validated.
*/
public static final byte BOGUS = 1;
/**
* BAD is a synonym for BOGUS.
*/
public static final byte BAD = BOGUS;
/**
* INDTERMINATE means that the object is insecure, but not authoritatively
* so. Generally this means that the RRset is not below a configured trust
* anchor.
*/
public static final byte INDETERMINATE = 2;
/**
* INSECURE means that the object is authoritatively known to be insecure.
* Generally this means that this RRset is below a trust anchor, but also
* below a verified, insecure delegation.
*/
public static final byte INSECURE = 3;
/**
* SECURE means that the object (RRset or message) validated according to
* local policy.
*/
public static final byte SECURE = 4;
private byte status;
public static String string(int status)
{
switch (status)
{
case BOGUS :
return "Bogus";
case SECURE :
return "Secure";
case INSECURE :
return "Insecure";
case INDETERMINATE :
return "Indeterminate";
case UNCHECKED :
return "Unchecked";
default :
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
public SecurityStatus()
{
status = UNCHECKED;
}
public SecurityStatus(byte status)
{
setStatus(status);
}
public byte getStatus()
{
return status;
}
public void setStatus(byte status)
{
this.status = status;
}
}

90
src/se/rfc/unbound/TrustAnchorStore.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2009 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
import org.xbill.DNS.Name;
import se.rfc.unbound.SRRset;
import se.rfc.unbound.SecurityStatus;
/**
*
*/
public class TrustAnchorStore
{
private Map mMap;
public TrustAnchorStore()
{
mMap = null;
}
private String key(Name n, int dclass)
{
return "T" + dclass + "/" + Util.nameToString(n);
}
public void store(SRRset rrset)
{
if (mMap == null)
{
mMap = new HashMap();
}
String k = key(rrset.getName(), rrset.getDClass());
rrset.setSecurityStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
mMap.put(k, rrset);
}
private SRRset lookup(String key)
{
if (mMap == null) return null;
return (SRRset) mMap.get(key);
}
public SRRset find(Name n, int dclass)
{
if (mMap == null) return null;
while (n.labels() > 0)
{
String k = key(n, dclass);
SRRset r = lookup(k);
if (r != null) return r;
n = new Name(n, 1);
}
return null;
}
}

149
src/se/rfc/unbound/Util.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
/*
* $Id$
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 2. Redistributions in
* binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of
* conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
* materials provided with the distribution. 3. The name of the author may not
* be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN
* NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound;
import java.util.*;
import org.xbill.DNS.Flags;
import org.xbill.DNS.Header;
import org.xbill.DNS.Name;
/**
* Some basic utility functions.
*
* @author davidb
* @version $Revision$
*/
public class Util
{
/**
* Convert a DNS name into a string suitable for use as a cache key.
*
* @param name The name to convert.
* @return A string representing the name. This isn't ever meant to be
* converted back into a DNS name.
*/
public static String nameToString(Name name)
{
if (name.equals(Name.root)) return ".";
String n = name.toString().toLowerCase();
if (n.endsWith(".")) n = n.substring(0, n.length() - 1);
return n;
}
// public static SMessage errorMessage(Request request, int rcode)
// {
// SMessage m = new SMessage(request.getID());
// Header h = m.getHeader();
// h.setRcode(rcode);
// h.setFlag(Flags.QR);
// m.setQuestion(request.getQuestion());
// m.setOPT(request.getOPT());
//
// return m;
// }
//
// public static SMessage errorMessage(SMessage message, int rcode)
// {
// Header h = message.getHeader();
// SMessage m = new SMessage(h.getID());
// h = m.getHeader();
// h.setRcode(rcode);
// h.setFlag(Flags.QR);
// m.setQuestion(message.getQuestion());
// m.setOPT(message.getOPT());
//
// return m;
// }
public static int parseInt(String s, int def)
{
if (s == null) return def;
try
{
return Integer.parseInt(s);
}
catch (NumberFormatException e)
{
return def;
}
}
public static long parseLong(String s, long def)
{
if (s == null) return def;
try
{
return Long.parseLong(s);
}
catch (NumberFormatException e)
{
return def;
}
}
public static class ConfigEntry
{
public String key;
public String value;
public ConfigEntry(String key, String value)
{
this.key = key; this.value = value;
}
}
public static List parseConfigPrefix(Properties config, String prefix)
{
if (! prefix.endsWith("."))
{
prefix = prefix + ".";
}
List res = new ArrayList();
for (Iterator i = config.entrySet().iterator(); i.hasNext(); )
{
Map.Entry entry = (Map.Entry) i.next();
String key = (String) entry.getKey();
if (key.startsWith(prefix))
{
key = key.substring(prefix.length());
res.add(new ConfigEntry(key, (String) entry.getValue()));
}
}
return res;
}
}

719
src/se/rfc/unbound/ValUtils.java Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,719 @@
/*
* $Id$
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
package se.rfc.unbound.validator;
import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.util.Iterator;
import org.apache.log4j.Logger;
import org.xbill.DNS.*;
import se.rfc.unbound.*;
/**
* This is a collection of routines encompassing the logic of validating
* different message types.
*
* @author davidb
* @version $Revision$
*/
public class ValUtils
{
// These are response subtypes. They are necessary for determining the
// validation strategy. They have no bearing on the iterative resolution
// algorithm, so they are confined here.
/** Not subtyped yet. */
public static final int UNTYPED = 0;
/** Not a recognized subtype. */
public static final int UNKNOWN = 1;
/** A postive, direct, response. */
public static final int POSITIVE = 2;
/** A postive response, with a CNAME/DNAME chain. */
public static final int CNAME = 3;
/** A NOERROR/NODATA response. */
public static final int NODATA = 4;
/** A NXDOMAIN response. */
public static final int NAMEERROR = 5;
/** A response to a qtype=ANY query. */
public static final int ANY = 6;
private Logger log = Logger.getLogger(this.getClass());
private static Logger st_log = Logger.getLogger(ValUtils.class);
/** A local copy of the verifier object. */
private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier;
public ValUtils(DnsSecVerifier verifier)
{
mVerifier = verifier;
}
/**
* Given a response, classify ANSWER responses into a subtype.
*
* @param m The response to classify.
*
* @return A subtype ranging from UNKNOWN to NAMEERROR.
*/
public static int classifyResponse(SMessage m)
{
// Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
// chain ending in NXDOMAIN.
if (m.getRcode() == Rcode.NXDOMAIN
&& m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0)
{
return NAMEERROR;
}
// Next is NODATA
// st_log.debug("classifyResponse: ancount = " +
// m.getCount(Section.ANSWER));
if (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0)
{
return NODATA;
}
// We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative
// responses because CNAME answers require extra processing.
int qtype = m.getQuestion().getType();
// We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because ANY responses
// are validated differently.
if (qtype == Type.ANY)
{
return ANY;
}
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
// Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
// qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response.
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
if (rrsets[i].getType() == qtype) return POSITIVE;
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.CNAME) return CNAME;
}
st_log.warn("Failed to classify response message:\n" + m);
return UNKNOWN;
}
/**
* Given a response, determine the name of the "signer". This is primarily
* to determine if the response is, in fact, signed at all, and, if so, what
* is the name of the most pertinent keyset.
*
* @param m The response to analyze.
* @param request The request that generated the response.
* @return a signer name, if the response is signed (even partially), or
* null if the response isn't signed.
*/
public Name findSigner(SMessage m, Request request)
{
int subtype = classifyResponse(m);
Name qname = request.getQName();
SRRset[] rrsets;
switch (subtype)
{
case POSITIVE :
case CNAME :
case ANY :
// Check to see if the ANSWER section RRset
rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
if (rrsets[i].getName().equals(qname))
{
return rrsets[i].getSignerName();
}
}
return null;
case NAMEERROR :
case NODATA :
// Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs
rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC
|| rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3)
{
return rrsets[i].getSignerName();
}
}
return null;
default :
log.debug("findSigner: could not find signer name "
+ "for unknown type response.");
return null;
}
}
public boolean dssetIsUsable(SRRset ds_rrset)
{
for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next();
if (supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID())
&& mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm()))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Given a DS rrset and a DNSKEY rrset, match the DS to a DNSKEY and verify
* the DNSKEY rrset with that key.
*
* @param dnskey_rrset The DNSKEY rrset to match against. The security
* status of this rrset will be updated on a successful
* verification.
* @param ds_rrset The DS rrset to match with. This rrset must already be
* trusted.
*
* @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted
* dnskey_rrset, a "null" key entry indicating that this DS
* rrset/DNSKEY pair indicate an secure end to the island of trust
* (i.e., unknown algorithms), or a "bad" KeyEntry if the dnskey
* rrset fails to verify. Note that the "null" response should
* generally only occur in a private algorithm scenario: normally
* this sort of thing is checked before fetching the matching DNSKEY
* rrset.
*/
public KeyEntry verifyNewDNSKEYs(SRRset dnskey_rrset, SRRset ds_rrset)
{
if (!dnskey_rrset.getName().equals(ds_rrset.getName()))
{
log.debug("DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name!");
return KeyEntry
.newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass());
}
// as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
// equivalent to no DS rrset.
boolean hasUsefulDS = false;
for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next();
// Check to see if we can understand this DS.
if (!supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID())
|| !mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm()))
{
continue;
}
// Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and algorithm, we
// cannot return INSECURE (with a "null" KeyEntry).
hasUsefulDS = true;
DNSKEY : for (Iterator j = dnskey_rrset.rrs(); j.hasNext();)
{
DNSKEYRecord dnskey = (DNSKEYRecord) j.next();
// Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria.
if (ds.getFootprint() != dnskey.getFootprint()
|| ds.getAlgorithm() != dnskey.getAlgorithm())
{
continue;
}
// Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the same DS hash
// algorithm.
byte[] key_hash = calculateDSHash(dnskey, ds.getDigestID());
byte[] ds_hash = ds.getDigest();
// see if there is a length mismatch (unlikely)
if (key_hash.length != ds_hash.length)
{
continue DNSKEY;
}
for (int k = 0; k < key_hash.length; k++)
{
if (key_hash[k] != ds_hash[k]) continue DNSKEY;
}
// Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY verifies
// *with this key*.
byte res = mVerifier.verify(dnskey_rrset, dnskey);
if (res == SecurityStatus.SECURE)
{
log.trace("DS matched DNSKEY.");
dnskey_rrset.setSecurityStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
return KeyEntry.newKeyEntry(dnskey_rrset);
}
// If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one!
}
}
// None of the DS's worked out.
// If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK.
if (!hasUsefulDS)
{
log.debug("No usuable DS records were found -- treating as insecure.");
return KeyEntry.newNullKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset
.getDClass(), ds_rrset.getTTL());
}
// If any were understandable, then it is bad.
log.debug("Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
return KeyEntry.newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass());
}
/**
* Given a DNSKEY record, generate the DS record from it.
*
* @param keyrec the DNSKEY record in question.
* @param ds_alg The DS digest algorithm in use.
* @return the corresponding {@link org.xbill.DNS.DSRecord}
*/
public static byte[] calculateDSHash(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int ds_alg)
{
DNSOutput os = new DNSOutput();
os.writeByteArray(keyrec.getName().toWireCanonical());
os.writeByteArray(keyrec.rdataToWireCanonical());
try
{
MessageDigest md = null;
switch (ds_alg)
{
case DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID :
md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
return md.digest(os.toByteArray());
case DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID:
SHA256 sha = new SHA256();
sha.setData(os.toByteArray());
return sha.getDigest();
default :
st_log.warn("Unknown DS algorithm: " + ds_alg);
return null;
}
}
catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
{
st_log.error("Error using DS algorithm: " + ds_alg, e);
return null;
}
}
public static boolean supportsDigestID(int digest_id)
{
if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID) return true;
if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID) return true;
return false;
}
/**
* Check to see if a type is a special DNSSEC type.
*
* @param type The type.
*
* @return true if the type is one of the special DNSSEC types.
*/
public static boolean isDNSSECType(int type)
{
switch (type)
{
case Type.DNSKEY :
case Type.NSEC :
case Type.DS :
case Type.RRSIG :
case Type.NSEC3 :
return true;
default :
return false;
}
}
/**
* Set the security status of a particular RRset. This will only upgrade the
* security status.
*
* @param rrset The SRRset to update.
* @param security The security status.
*/
public static void setRRsetSecurity(SRRset rrset, int security)
{
if (rrset == null) return;
int cur_sec = rrset.getSecurityStatus();
if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec)
{
rrset.setSecurityStatus(security);
}
}
/**
* Set the security status of a message and all of its RRsets. This will
* only upgrade the status of the message (i.e., set to more secure, not
* less) and all of the RRsets.
*
* @param m
* @param security KeyEntry ke;
*
* SMessage m = response.getSMessage(); SRRset ans_rrset =
* m.findAnswerRRset(qname, qtype, qclass);
*
* ke = verifySRRset(ans_rrset, key_rrset); if
* (ans_rrset.getSecurityStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) { return; }
* key_rrset = ke.getRRset();
*/
public static void setMessageSecurity(SMessage m, int security)
{
if (m == null) return;
int cur_sec = m.getStatus();
if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec)
{
m.setStatus(security);
}
for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section <= Section.ADDITIONAL; section++)
{
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
setRRsetSecurity(rrsets[i], security);
}
}
}
/**
* Given an SRRset that is signed by a DNSKEY found in the key_rrset, verify
* it. This will return the status (either BOGUS or SECURE) and set that
* status in rrset.
*
* @param rrset The SRRset to verify.
* @param key_rrset The set of keys to verify against.
* @return The status (BOGUS or SECURE).
*/
public byte verifySRRset(SRRset rrset, SRRset key_rrset)
{
String rrset_name = rrset.getName() + "/" + Type.string(rrset.getType())
+ "/" + DClass.string(rrset.getDClass());
if (rrset.getSecurityStatus() == SecurityStatus.SECURE)
{
log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name
+ "> previously found to be SECURE");
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
byte status = mVerifier.verify(rrset, key_rrset);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE)
{
log.debug("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + "> found to be BAD");
status = SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
else
{
log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + "> found to be SECURE");
}
rrset.setSecurityStatus(status);
return status;
}
/**
* Determine if a given type map has a given typ.
*
* @param types The type map from the NSEC record.
* @param type The type to look for.
* @return true if the type is present in the type map, false otherwise.
*/
public static boolean typeMapHasType(int[] types, int type)
{
for (int i = 0; i < types.length; i++)
{
if (types[i] == type) return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the rrset name was
* the result of a wildcard expansion.
*
* @param rrset The rrset to examine.
* @return true if the rrset is a wildcard expansion. This will return false
* for all unsigned rrsets.
*/
public static boolean rrsetIsWildcardExpansion(RRset rrset)
{
if (rrset == null) return false;
RRSIGRecord rrsig = (RRSIGRecord) rrset.firstSig();
if (rrset.getName().labels() - 1 > rrsig.getLabels())
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the RRset name was
* the result of a wildcard expansion. If so, return the name of the
* generating wildcard.
*
* @param rrset The rrset to chedck.
* @return the wildcard name, if the rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
* null if not.
*/
public static Name rrsetWildcard(RRset rrset)
{
if (rrset == null) return null;
RRSIGRecord rrsig = (RRSIGRecord) rrset.firstSig();
// if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual labels,
// then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
// Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label.
int label_diff = (rrset.getName().labels() - 1) - rrsig.getLabels();
if (label_diff > 0)
{
return rrset.getName().wild(label_diff);
}
return null;
}
public static Name closestEncloser(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec)
{
Name n1 = domain.longestCommonName(nsec.getName());
Name n2 = domain.longestCommonName(nsec.getNext());
return (n1.labels() > n2.labels()) ? n1 : n2;
}
public static Name nsecWildcard(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec)
{
try
{
return new Name("*", closestEncloser(domain, nsec));
}
catch (TextParseException e)
{
// this should never happen.
return null;
}
}
/**
* Determine if the given NSEC proves a NameError (NXDOMAIN) for a given
* qname.
*
* @param nsec The NSEC to check.
* @param qname The qname to check against.
* @param signerName The signer name of the NSEC record, which is used as
* the zone name, for a more precise (but perhaps more brittle)
* check for the last NSEC in a zone.
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNameError(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
Name signerName)
{
Name owner = nsec.getName();
Name next = nsec.getNext();
// If NSEC owner == qname, then this NSEC proves that qname exists.
if (qname.equals(owner))
{
return false;
}
// If NSEC is a parent of qname, we need to check the type map
// If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then this NSEC
// is being misused.
if (qname.subdomain(owner)
&& (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.DNAME) || (typeMapHasType(nsec
.getTypes(),
Type.NS) && !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA))))
{
return false;
}
if (qname.compareTo(owner) > 0 && (qname.compareTo(next) < 0)
|| signerName.equals(next))
{
return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Determine if a NSEC record proves the non-existence of a wildcard that
* could have produced qname.
*
* @param nsec The nsec to check.
* @param qname The qname to check against.
* @param signerName The signer name for the NSEC rrset, used as the zone
* name.
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNoWC(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
Name signerName)
{
Name owner = nsec.getName();
Name next = nsec.getNext();
int qname_labels = qname.labels();
int signer_labels = signerName.labels();
for (int i = qname_labels - signer_labels; i > 0; i--)
{
Name wc_name = qname.wild(i);
if (wc_name.compareTo(owner) > 0
&& (wc_name.compareTo(next) < 0 || signerName.equals(next)))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/**
* Determine if a NSEC proves the NOERROR/NODATA conditions. This will also
* handle the empty non-terminal (ENT) case and partially handle the
* wildcard case. If the ownername of 'nsec' is a wildcard, the validator
* must still be provided proof that qname did not directly exist and that
* the wildcard is, in fact, *.closest_encloser.
*
* @param nsec The NSEC to check
* @param qname The query name to check against.
* @param qtype The query type to check against.
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNodata(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
int qtype)
{
if (!nsec.getName().equals(qname))
{
// wildcard checking.
// If this is a wildcard NSEC, make sure that a) it was possible to have
// generated qname from the wildcard and b) the type map does not
// contain qtype. Note that this does NOT prove that this wildcard was
// the applicable wildcard.
if (nsec.getName().isWild())
{
// the is the purported closest encloser.
Name ce = new Name(nsec.getName(), 1);
// The qname must be a strict subdomain of the closest encloser, and
// the qtype must be absent from the type map.
if (!qname.strictSubdomain(ce) || typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype))
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
// empty-non-terminal checking.
// If the nsec is proving that qname is an ENT, the nsec owner will be
// less than qname, and the next name will be a child domain of the
// qname.
if (nsec.getNext().strictSubdomain(qname)
&& qname.compareTo(nsec.getName()) > 0)
{
return true;
}
// Otherwise, this NSEC does not prove ENT, so it does not prove NODATA.
return false;
}
// If the qtype exists, then we should have gotten it.
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype))
{
return false;
}
// if the name is a CNAME node, then we should have gotten the CNAME
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.CNAME))
{
return false;
}
// If an NS set exists at this name, and NOT a SOA (so this is a zone cut,
// not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a referral (or we just got
// the wrong NSEC).
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS)
&& !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA))
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
public static int nsecProvesNoDS(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname)
{
// Could check to make sure the qname is a subdomain of nsec
int[] types = nsec.getTypes();
if (typeMapHasType(types, Type.SOA) || typeMapHasType(types, Type.DS))
{
// SOA present means that this is the NSEC from the child, not the
// parent (so it is the wrong one)
// DS present means that there should have been a positive response to
// the DS query, so there is something wrong.
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
if (!typeMapHasType(types, Type.NS))
{
// If there is no NS at this point at all, then this doesn't prove
// anything one way or the other.
return SecurityStatus.INSECURE;
}
// Otherwise, this proves no DS.
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
}