jdnssec-tools/src/main/java/com/verisignlabs/dnssec/security/SignUtils.java

1555 lines
50 KiB
Java

// Copyright (C) 2001-2003, 2022 Verisign, Inc.
//
// This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
// modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
// License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
// version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
//
// This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
// Lesser General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
// License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
// Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307
// USA
package com.verisignlabs.dnssec.security;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.security.SignatureException;
import java.security.interfaces.DSAParams;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.HashSet;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.ListIterator;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.logging.Logger;
import org.xbill.DNS.DClass;
import org.xbill.DNS.DNSKEYRecord;
import org.xbill.DNS.DNSOutput;
import org.xbill.DNS.DNSSEC;
import org.xbill.DNS.DSRecord;
import org.xbill.DNS.NSEC3PARAMRecord;
import org.xbill.DNS.NSEC3Record;
import org.xbill.DNS.NSECRecord;
import org.xbill.DNS.Name;
import org.xbill.DNS.RRSIGRecord;
import org.xbill.DNS.RRset;
import org.xbill.DNS.Record;
import org.xbill.DNS.SOARecord;
import org.xbill.DNS.Type;
import org.xbill.DNS.utils.base64;
/**
* This class contains a bunch of utility methods that are generally useful in
* signing zones.
*
* @author David Blacka
*/
public class SignUtils {
private static final int ASN1_INT = 0x02;
private static final int ASN1_SEQ = 0x30;
public static final int RR_NORMAL = 0;
public static final int RR_DELEGATION = 1;
public static final int RR_GLUE = 2;
public static final int RR_INVALID = 3;
public static final int RR_DNAME = 4;
private static Logger log;
static {
log = Logger.getLogger(SignUtils.class.toString());
}
public static void setLog(Logger v) {
log = v;
}
/**
* Generate from some basic information a prototype RRSIG RR containing
* everything but the actual signature itself.
*
* @param rrset
* the RRset being signed.
* @param key
* the public DNSKEY RR counterpart to the key being used to sign
* the
* RRset
* @param start
* the RRSIG inception time.
* @param expire
* the RRSIG expiration time.
* @param sig_ttl
* the TTL of the resulting RRSIG record.
*
* @return a prototype signature based on the RRset and key information.
*/
public static RRSIGRecord generatePreRRSIG(RRset rrset, DNSKEYRecord key, Instant start,
Instant expire, long sig_ttl) {
return new RRSIGRecord(rrset.getName(), rrset.getDClass(), sig_ttl, rrset.getType(),
key.getAlgorithm(), (int) rrset.getTTL(), expire, start,
key.getFootprint(), key.getName(), null);
}
/**
* Generate from some basic information a prototype RRSIG RR containing
* everything but the actual signature itself.
*
* @param rec
* the DNS record being signed (forming an entire RRset).
* @param key
* the public DNSKEY RR counterpart to the key signing the
* record.
* @param start
* the RRSIG inception time.
* @param expire
* the RRSIG expiration time.
* @param sig_ttl
* the TTL of the result RRSIG record.
*
* @return a prototype signature based on the Record and key information.
*/
public static RRSIGRecord generatePreRRSIG(Record rec, DNSKEYRecord key, Instant start,
Instant expire, long sig_ttl) {
return new RRSIGRecord(rec.getName(), rec.getDClass(), sig_ttl, rec.getType(),
key.getAlgorithm(), rec.getTTL(), expire, start,
key.getFootprint(), key.getName(), null);
}
/**
* Generate the binary image of the prototype RRSIG RR.
*
* @param presig
* the RRSIG RR prototype.
* @return the RDATA portion of the prototype RRSIG record. This forms the
* first part of the data to be signed.
*/
private static byte[] generatePreSigRdata(RRSIGRecord presig) {
// Generate the binary image;
DNSOutput image = new DNSOutput();
// precalc some things
long start_time = presig.getTimeSigned().getEpochSecond();
long expire_time = presig.getExpire().getEpochSecond();
Name signer = presig.getSigner();
// first write out the partial SIG record (this is the SIG RDATA
// minus the actual signature.
image.writeU16(presig.getTypeCovered());
image.writeU8(presig.getAlgorithm());
image.writeU8(presig.getLabels());
image.writeU32((int) presig.getOrigTTL());
image.writeU32(expire_time);
image.writeU32(start_time);
image.writeU16(presig.getFootprint());
image.writeByteArray(signer.toWireCanonical());
return image.toByteArray();
}
/**
* Calculate the canonical wire line format of the RRset.
*
* @param rrset
* the RRset to convert.
* @param ttl
* the TTL to use when canonicalizing -- this is generally the
* TTL of the signature if there is a pre-existing signature. If
* not it is just the ttl of the rrset itself.
* @param labels
* the labels field of the signature, or 0.
* @return the canonical wire line format of the rrset. This is the second
* part of data to be signed.
*/
public static byte[] generateCanonicalRRsetData(RRset rrset, long ttl, int labels) {
DNSOutput image = new DNSOutput();
if (ttl == 0) {
ttl = rrset.getTTL();
}
Name n = rrset.getName();
if (labels == 0) {
labels = n.labels();
} else {
// correct for Name()'s conception of label count.
labels++;
}
boolean wildcardName = false;
if (n.labels() != labels) {
n = n.wild(n.labels() - labels);
wildcardName = true;
log.fine("Detected wildcard expansion: " + rrset.getName() + " changed to " + n);
}
// now convert the wire format records in the RRset into a
// list of byte arrays.
ArrayList<byte[]> canonical_rrs = new ArrayList<byte[]>();
for (Record r : rrset.rrs()) {
if (r.getTTL() != ttl || wildcardName) {
// If necessary, we need to create a new record with a new ttl
// or ownername.
// In the TTL case, this avoids changing the ttl in the
// response.
r = Record.newRecord(n, r.getType(), r.getDClass(), ttl, r.rdataToWireCanonical());
}
byte[] wire_fmt = r.toWireCanonical();
canonical_rrs.add(wire_fmt);
}
// put the records into the correct ordering.
// Calculate the offset where the RDATA begins (we have to skip
// past the length byte)
int offset = rrset.getName().toWireCanonical().length + 10;
ByteArrayComparator bac = new ByteArrayComparator(offset, false);
Collections.sort(canonical_rrs, bac);
for (byte[] wire_fmt_rec : canonical_rrs) {
image.writeByteArray(wire_fmt_rec);
}
return image.toByteArray();
}
/**
* Given an RRset and the prototype signature, generate the canonical data
* that is to be signed.
*
* @param rrset
* the RRset to be signed.
* @param presig
* a prototype SIG RR created using the same RRset.
* @return a block of data ready to be signed.
*/
public static byte[] generateSigData(RRset rrset, RRSIGRecord presig)
throws IOException {
byte[] rrset_data = generateCanonicalRRsetData(rrset, presig.getOrigTTL(),
presig.getLabels());
return generateSigData(rrset_data, presig);
}
/**
* Given an RRset and the prototype signature, generate the canonical data
* that is to be signed.
*
* @param rrset_data
* the RRset converted into canonical wire line format (as per
* the
* canonicalization rules in RFC 2535).
* @param presig
* the prototype signature based on the same RRset represented
* in
* <code>rrset_data</code>.
* @return a block of data ready to be signed.
*/
public static byte[] generateSigData(byte[] rrset_data, RRSIGRecord presig)
throws IOException {
byte[] sig_rdata = generatePreSigRdata(presig);
ByteArrayOutputStream image = new ByteArrayOutputStream(sig_rdata.length
+ rrset_data.length);
image.write(sig_rdata);
image.write(rrset_data);
return image.toByteArray();
}
/**
* Given the actual signature and the prototype signature, combine them and
* return the fully formed RRSIGRecord.
*
* @param signature
* the cryptographic signature, in DNSSEC format.
* @param presig
* the prototype RRSIG RR to add the signature to.
* @return the fully formed RRSIG RR.
*/
public static RRSIGRecord generateRRSIG(byte[] signature, RRSIGRecord presig) {
return new RRSIGRecord(presig.getName(), presig.getDClass(), presig.getTTL(),
presig.getTypeCovered(), presig.getAlgorithm(),
presig.getOrigTTL(), presig.getExpire(),
presig.getTimeSigned(), presig.getFootprint(),
presig.getSigner(), signature);
}
/**
* Converts from a RFC 2536 formatted DSA signature to a JCE (ASN.1) formatted
* signature.
*
* <p>
* ASN.1 format = ASN1_SEQ . seq_length . ASN1_INT . Rlength . R . ANS1_INT .
* Slength . S
* </p>
*
* The integers R and S may have a leading null byte to force the integer
* positive.
*
* @param signature
* the RFC 2536 formatted DSA signature.
* @return The ASN.1 formatted DSA signature.
* @throws SignatureException
* if there was something wrong with the RFC 2536
* formatted
* signature.
*/
public static byte[] convertDSASignature(byte[] signature) throws SignatureException {
if (signature.length != 41)
throw new SignatureException("RFC 2536 signature not expected length.");
byte r_pad = 0;
byte s_pad = 0;
// handle initial null byte padding.
if (signature[1] < 0)
r_pad++;
if (signature[21] < 0)
s_pad++;
// ASN.1 length = R length + S length + (2 + 2 + 2), where each 2
// is for a ASN.1 type-length byte pair of which there are three
// (SEQ, INT, INT).
byte sig_length = (byte) (40 + r_pad + s_pad + 6);
byte sig[] = new byte[sig_length];
byte pos = 0;
sig[pos++] = ASN1_SEQ;
sig[pos++] = (byte) (sig_length - 2); // all but the SEQ type+length.
sig[pos++] = ASN1_INT;
sig[pos++] = (byte) (20 + r_pad);
// copy the value of R, leaving a null byte if necessary
if (r_pad == 1)
sig[pos++] = 0;
System.arraycopy(signature, 1, sig, pos, 20);
pos += 20;
sig[pos++] = ASN1_INT;
sig[pos++] = (byte) (20 + s_pad);
// copy the value of S, leaving a null byte if necessary
if (s_pad == 1)
sig[pos++] = 0;
System.arraycopy(signature, 21, sig, pos, 20);
return sig;
}
/**
* Converts from a JCE (ASN.1) formatted DSA signature to a RFC 2536 compliant
* signature.
*
* <p>
* rfc2536 format = T . R . S
* </p>
*
* where T is a number between 0 and 8, which is based on the DSA key length,
* and R & S are formatted to be exactly 20 bytes each (no leading null
* bytes).
*
* @param params
* the DSA parameters associated with the DSA key used to
* generate
* the signature.
* @param signature
* the ASN.1 formatted DSA signature.
* @return a RFC 2536 formatted DSA signature.
* @throws SignatureException
* if something is wrong with the ASN.1 format.
*/
public static byte[] convertDSASignature(DSAParams params, byte[] signature)
throws SignatureException {
if (signature[0] != ASN1_SEQ || signature[2] != ASN1_INT) {
throw new SignatureException("Invalid ASN.1 signature format: expected SEQ, INT");
}
byte r_pad = (byte) (signature[3] - 20);
if (signature[24 + r_pad] != ASN1_INT) {
throw new SignatureException(
"Invalid ASN.1 signature format: expected SEQ, INT, INT");
}
log.finer("(start) ASN.1 DSA Sig:\n" + base64.toString(signature));
byte s_pad = (byte) (signature[25 + r_pad] - 20);
byte[] sig = new byte[41]; // all rfc2536 signatures are 41 bytes.
// Calculate T:
sig[0] = (byte) ((params.getP().bitLength() - 512) / 64);
// copy R value
if (r_pad >= 0) {
System.arraycopy(signature, 4 + r_pad, sig, 1, 20);
} else {
// R is shorter than 20 bytes, so right justify the number
// (r_pad is negative here, remember?).
Arrays.fill(sig, 1, 1 - r_pad, (byte) 0);
System.arraycopy(signature, 4, sig, 1 - r_pad, 20 + r_pad);
}
// copy S value
if (s_pad >= 0) {
System.arraycopy(signature, 26 + r_pad + s_pad, sig, 21, 20);
} else {
// S is shorter than 20 bytes, so right justify the number
// (s_pad is negative here).
Arrays.fill(sig, 21, 21 - s_pad, (byte) 0);
System.arraycopy(signature, 26 + r_pad, sig, 21 - s_pad, 20 + s_pad);
}
if (r_pad < 0 || s_pad < 0) {
log.finer("(finish ***) RFC 2536 DSA Sig:\n" + base64.toString(sig));
} else {
log.finer("(finish) RFC 2536 DSA Sig:\n" + base64.toString(sig));
}
return sig;
}
// Given one of the ECDSA algorithms determine the "length", which is the
// length, in bytes, of both 'r' and 's' in the ECDSA signature.
private static int ecdsaLength(int algorithm) throws SignatureException {
switch (algorithm) {
case DNSSEC.Algorithm.ECDSAP256SHA256:
return 32;
case DNSSEC.Algorithm.ECDSAP384SHA384:
return 48;
default:
throw new SignatureException("Algorithm " + algorithm +
" is not a supported ECDSA signature algorithm.");
}
}
/**
* Convert a JCE standard ECDSA signature (which is a ASN.1 encoding) into a
* standard DNS signature.
*
* The format of the ASN.1 signature is
*
* ASN1_SEQ . seq_length . ASN1_INT . r_length . R . ANS1_INT . s_length . S
*
* where R and S may have a leading zero byte if without it the values would
* be negative.
*
* The format of the DNSSEC signature is just R . S where R and S are both
* exactly "length" bytes.
*
* @param signature
* The output of a ECDSA signature object.
* @return signature data formatted for use in DNSSEC.
* @throws SignatureException if the ASN.1 encoding appears to be corrupt.
*/
public static byte[] convertECDSASignature(int algorithm, byte[] signature)
throws SignatureException {
int exp_length = ecdsaLength(algorithm);
byte[] sig = new byte[exp_length * 2];
if (signature[0] != ASN1_SEQ || signature[2] != ASN1_INT) {
throw new SignatureException("Invalid ASN.1 signature format: expected SEQ, INT");
}
int r_len = signature[3];
int r_pos = 4;
if (signature[r_pos + r_len] != ASN1_INT) {
throw new SignatureException("Invalid ASN.1 signature format: expected SEQ, INT, INT");
}
int s_pos = r_pos + r_len + 2;
int s_len = signature[r_pos + r_len + 1];
// Adjust for leading zeros on both R and S
if (signature[r_pos] == 0) {
r_pos++;
r_len--;
}
if (signature[s_pos] == 0) {
s_pos++;
s_len--;
}
System.arraycopy(signature, r_pos, sig, 0 + (exp_length - r_len), r_len);
System.arraycopy(signature, s_pos, sig, exp_length + (exp_length - s_len), s_len);
return sig;
}
/**
* Convert a DNS standard ECDSA signature (defined in RFC 6605) into a
* JCE standard ECDSA signature, which is encoded in ASN.1.
*
* The format of the ASN.1 signature is
*
* ASN1_SEQ . seq_length . ASN1_INT . r_length . R . ANS1_INT . s_length . S
*
* where R and S may have a leading zero byte if without it the values would
* be negative.
*
* The format of the DNSSEC signature is just R . S where R and S are both
* exactly "length" bytes.
*
* @param signature
* The binary signature data from an RRSIG record.
* @return signature data that may be used in a JCE Signature object for
* verification purposes.
*/
public static byte[] convertECDSASignature(byte[] signature) {
byte r_src_pos, r_src_len, r_pad, s_src_pos, s_src_len, s_pad, len;
r_src_len = s_src_len = (byte) (signature.length / 2);
r_src_pos = 0;
r_pad = 0;
s_src_pos = (byte) (r_src_pos + r_src_len);
s_pad = 0;
len = (byte) (6 + r_src_len + s_src_len);
// leading zeroes are forbidden
while (signature[r_src_pos] == 0 && r_src_len > 0) {
r_src_pos++;
r_src_len--;
len--;
}
while (signature[s_src_pos] == 0 && s_src_len > 0) {
s_src_pos++;
s_src_len--;
len--;
}
// except when they are mandatory
if (r_src_len > 0 && signature[r_src_pos] < 0) {
r_pad = 1;
len++;
}
if (s_src_len > 0 && signature[s_src_pos] < 0) {
s_pad = 1;
len++;
}
byte[] sig = new byte[len];
byte pos = 0;
sig[pos++] = ASN1_SEQ;
sig[pos++] = (byte) (len - 2);
sig[pos++] = ASN1_INT;
sig[pos++] = (byte) (r_src_len + r_pad);
pos += r_pad;
System.arraycopy(signature, r_src_pos, sig, pos, r_src_len);
pos += r_src_len;
sig[pos++] = ASN1_INT;
sig[pos++] = (byte) (s_src_len + s_pad);
pos += s_pad;
System.arraycopy(signature, s_src_pos, sig, pos, s_src_len);
return sig;
}
/**
* This is a convenience routine to help us classify records/RRsets.
*
* It characterizes a record/RRset as one of the following classes:<br/>
* <dl>
*
* <dt>NORMAL</dt>
* <dd>This record/set is properly within the zone an subject to all NXT and
* SIG processing.</dd>
*
* <dt>DELEGATION</dt>
* <dd>This is a zone delegation point (or cut). It is used in NXT processing
* but is not signed.</dd>
*
* <dt>GLUE</dt>
* <dd>This is a glue record and therefore not properly within the zone. It is
* not included in NXT or SIG processing. Normally glue records are A records,
* but this routine calls anything that is below a zone delegation glue.</dd>
*
* <dt>INVALID</dt>
* <dd>This record doesn't even belong in the zone.</dd>
*
* </dl>
* <br/>
*
* This method must be called successively on records in the canonical name
* ordering, and the caller must maintain the last_cut parameter.
*
* @param zonename
* the name of the zone that is being processed.
* @param name
* the name of the record/set under consideration.
* @param type
* the type of the record/set under consideration.
* @param last_cut
* the name of the last DELEGATION record/set that was
* encountered
* while iterating over the zone in canonical order.
*/
public static int recordSecType(Name zonename, Name name, int type, Name last_cut,
Name last_dname) {
// records not even in the zone itself are invalid.
if (!name.subdomain(zonename))
return RR_INVALID;
// all records a the zone apex are normal, by definition.
if (name.equals(zonename))
return RR_NORMAL;
if (last_cut != null && name.subdomain(last_cut)) {
// if we are at the same level as a delegation point, but not one of a set of
// types allowed at
// a delegation point (NS, DS, NSEC), this is glue.
if (name.equals(last_cut)) {
if (type != Type.NS && type != Type.DS && type != Type.NXT && type != Type.NSEC) {
return RR_GLUE;
}
}
// if we are below the delegation point, this is glue.
else {
return RR_GLUE;
}
}
// if we are below a DNAME, then the RR is invalid.
if (last_dname != null && name.subdomain(last_dname)
&& name.labels() > last_dname.labels()) {
return RR_INVALID;
}
// since we are not at zone level, any NS records are delegations
if (type == Type.NS)
return RR_DELEGATION;
// and everything else is normal
return RR_NORMAL;
}
/**
* Given a canonical ordered list of records from a single zone, order the raw
* records into a list of RRsets.
*
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record} objects, in DNSSEC
* canonical order.
* @return a List of {@link org.xbill.DNS.RRset} objects.
*/
public static List<RRset> assembleIntoRRsets(List<Record> records) {
RRset rrset = new RRset();
ArrayList<RRset> rrsets = new ArrayList<RRset>();
for (Record r : records) {
// First record
if (rrset.size() == 0) {
rrset.addRR(r);
continue;
}
// Current record is part of the current RRset.
if (rrset.getName().equals(r.getName())
&& rrset.getDClass() == r.getDClass()
&& ((r.getType() == Type.RRSIG && rrset.getType() == ((RRSIGRecord) r).getTypeCovered())
|| rrset.getType() == r.getType())) {
rrset.addRR(r);
continue;
}
// otherwise, we have completed the RRset
rrsets.add(rrset);
// set up for the next set.
rrset = new RRset();
rrset.addRR(r);
}
// add the last rrset.
rrsets.add(rrset);
return rrsets;
}
/**
* A little private class to hold information about a given node.
*/
private static class NodeInfo {
public Name name;
public int type;
public long ttl;
public int dclass;
public Set<Integer> typemap;
public boolean isSecureNode; // opt-in support.
public boolean hasOptInSpan; // opt-in support.
public int nsecIndex;
public NodeInfo(Record r, int nodeType) {
this.name = r.getName();
this.type = nodeType;
this.ttl = r.getTTL();
this.dclass = r.getDClass();
this.typemap = new HashSet<Integer>();
this.isSecureNode = false;
this.hasOptInSpan = false;
addType(r.getType());
}
public void addType(int type) {
this.typemap.add(Integer.valueOf(type));
// Opt-In support.
if (type != Type.NS && type != Type.NSEC && type != Type.RRSIG
&& type != Type.NSEC3) {
isSecureNode = true;
}
}
public boolean hasType(int type) {
return this.typemap.contains(type);
}
public String toString() {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer(name.toString());
if (isSecureNode)
sb.append("(S)");
if (hasOptInSpan)
sb.append("(O)");
return sb.toString();
}
public int[] getTypes() {
Object[] a = typemap.toArray();
int[] res = new int[a.length];
for (int i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
res[i] = ((Integer) a[i]).intValue();
}
return res;
}
}
/**
* Given a canonical (by name) ordered list of records in a zone, generate the
* NSEC records in place.
*
* Note that the list that the records are stored in must support the
* listIterator.add() operation.
*
* @param zonename
* the name of the zone (used to distinguish between zone apex
* NS
* RRsets and delegations).
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record} objects in DNSSEC
* canonical
* order.
*/
public static void generateNSECRecords(Name zonename, List<Record> records) {
// This works by iterating over a known sorted list of records.
NodeInfo last_node = null;
NodeInfo current_node = null;
Name last_cut = null;
Name last_dname = null;
int backup;
long nsec_ttl = 0;
// First find the SOA record -- it should be near the beginning -- and get
// the soa minimum
for (Record r : records) {
if (r.getType() == Type.SOA) {
SOARecord soa = (SOARecord) r;
nsec_ttl = Math.min(soa.getMinimum(), soa.getTTL());
break;
}
}
if (nsec_ttl == 0) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Zone did not contain a SOA record");
}
for (ListIterator<Record> i = records.listIterator(); i.hasNext();) {
Record r = i.next();
Name r_name = r.getName();
int r_type = r.getType();
int r_sectype = recordSecType(zonename, r_name, r_type, last_cut, last_dname);
// skip irrelevant records
if (r_sectype == RR_INVALID || r_sectype == RR_GLUE)
continue;
// note our last delegation point so we can recognize glue.
if (r_sectype == RR_DELEGATION)
last_cut = r_name;
// if this is a DNAME, note it so we can recognize junk
if (r_type == Type.DNAME)
last_dname = r_name;
// first node -- initialize
if (current_node == null) {
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
current_node.addType(Type.RRSIG);
current_node.addType(Type.NSEC);
continue;
}
// record name hasn't changed, so we are still on the same node.
if (r_name.equals(current_node.name)) {
current_node.addType(r_type);
continue;
}
if (last_node != null) {
NSECRecord nsec = new NSECRecord(last_node.name, last_node.dclass, nsec_ttl,
current_node.name, last_node.getTypes());
// Note: we have to add this through the iterator, otherwise
// the next access via the iterator will generate a
// ConcurrencyModificationException.
backup = i.nextIndex() - last_node.nsecIndex;
for (int j = 0; j < backup; j++)
i.previous();
i.add(nsec);
for (int j = 0; j < backup; j++)
i.next();
log.finer("Generated: " + nsec);
}
last_node = current_node;
current_node.nsecIndex = i.previousIndex();
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
current_node.addType(Type.RRSIG);
current_node.addType(Type.NSEC);
}
// Generate next to last NSEC
if (last_node != null) {
NSECRecord nsec = new NSECRecord(last_node.name, last_node.dclass, nsec_ttl,
current_node.name, last_node.getTypes());
records.add(last_node.nsecIndex - 1, nsec);
log.finer("Generated: " + nsec);
}
// Generate last NSEC
NSECRecord nsec = new NSECRecord(current_node.name, current_node.dclass, nsec_ttl,
zonename, current_node.getTypes());
records.add(nsec);
log.finer("Generated: " + nsec);
}
/**
* Given a canonical (by name) ordered list of records in a zone, generate the
* NSEC3 records in place.
*
* Note that the list that the records are stored in must support the
* listIterator.add() operation.
*
* @param zonename
* the name of the zone (used to distinguish between zone
* apex NS
* RRsets and delegations).
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record} objects in
* DNSSEC canonical
* order.
* @param salt
* The NSEC3 salt to use (may be null or empty for no
* salt).
* @param iterations
* The number of hash iterations to use.
* @param nsec3param_ttl
* The TTL to use for the generated NSEC3PARAM records
* (NSEC3 records
* will use the SOA minimum)
* @throws NoSuchAlgorithmException
*/
public static void generateNSEC3Records(Name zonename, List<Record> records,
byte[] salt, int iterations, long nsec3param_ttl)
throws NoSuchAlgorithmException {
List<ProtoNSEC3> proto_nsec3s = new ArrayList<ProtoNSEC3>();
NodeInfo current_node = null;
NodeInfo last_node = null;
// For detecting glue.
Name last_cut = null;
// For detecting junk below a DNAME
Name last_dname = null;
long nsec3_ttl = 0;
for (Record r : records) {
Name r_name = r.getName();
int r_type = r.getType();
// Classify this record so we know if we can skip it.
int r_sectype = recordSecType(zonename, r_name, r_type, last_cut, last_dname);
// skip irrelevant records
if (r_sectype == RR_INVALID || r_sectype == RR_GLUE)
continue;
// note our last delegation point so we can recognize glue.
if (r_sectype == RR_DELEGATION)
last_cut = r_name;
// note our last DNAME point, so we can recognize junk.
if (r_type == Type.DNAME)
last_dname = r_name;
if (r_type == Type.SOA) {
SOARecord soa = (SOARecord) r;
nsec3_ttl = Math.min(soa.getMinimum(), soa.getTTL());
if (nsec3param_ttl < 0) {
nsec3param_ttl = nsec3_ttl;
}
}
// For the first iteration, we create our current node.
if (current_node == null) {
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
continue;
}
// If we are at the same name, we are on the same node.
if (r_name.equals(current_node.name)) {
current_node.addType(r_type);
continue;
}
// At this point, r represents the start of a new node.
// So we move current_node to last_node and generate a new current node.
// But first, we need to do something with the last node.
generateNSEC3ForNode(last_node, zonename, salt, iterations, false, proto_nsec3s);
last_node = current_node;
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
}
// process last two nodes.
generateNSEC3ForNode(last_node, zonename, salt, iterations, false, proto_nsec3s);
generateNSEC3ForNode(current_node, zonename, salt, iterations, false, proto_nsec3s);
List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = finishNSEC3s(proto_nsec3s, nsec3_ttl);
records.addAll(nsec3s);
NSEC3PARAMRecord nsec3param = new NSEC3PARAMRecord(zonename, DClass.IN,
nsec3param_ttl,
NSEC3Record.SHA1_DIGEST_ID,
(byte) 0, iterations, salt);
records.add(nsec3param);
}
/**
* Given a canonical (by name) ordered list of records in a zone, generate the
* NSEC3 records in place using Opt-Out NSEC3 records. This means that
* non-apex NS RRs (and glue below those delegations) will, by default, not be
* included in the NSEC3 chain.
*
* Note that the list that the records are stored in must support the
* listIterator.add() operation.
*
* @param zonename
* the name of the zone (used to distinguish between zone
* apex NS
* RRsets and delegations).
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record} objects in
* DNSSEC canonical
* order.
* @param includedNames
* A list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Name} objects. These
* names will be
* included in the NSEC3 chain (if they exist in the zone)
* regardless.
* @param salt
* The NSEC3 salt to use (may be null or empty for no
* salt).
* @param iterations
* The number of hash iterations to use.
* @param nsec3param_ttl
* The TTL to use for the generated NSEC3PARAM records
* (NSEC3 records
* will use the SOA minimum)
* @throws NoSuchAlgorithmException
*/
public static void generateOptOutNSEC3Records(Name zonename, List<Record> records,
List<Name> includedNames, byte[] salt,
int iterations, long nsec3param_ttl)
throws NoSuchAlgorithmException {
List<ProtoNSEC3> proto_nsec3s = new ArrayList<ProtoNSEC3>();
NodeInfo current_node = null;
NodeInfo last_node = null;
// For detecting glue.
Name last_cut = null;
// For detecting out-of-zone records below a DNAME
Name last_dname = null;
long nsec3_ttl = 0;
HashSet<Name> includeSet = null;
if (includedNames != null) {
includeSet = new HashSet<Name>(includedNames);
}
for (Record r : records) {
Name r_name = r.getName();
int r_type = r.getType();
// Classify this record so we know if we can skip it.
int r_sectype = recordSecType(zonename, r_name, r_type, last_cut, last_dname);
// skip irrelevant records
if (r_sectype == RR_INVALID || r_sectype == RR_GLUE)
continue;
// note our last delegation point so we can recognize glue.
if (r_sectype == RR_DELEGATION)
last_cut = r_name;
if (r_type == Type.DNAME)
last_dname = r_name;
if (r_type == Type.SOA) {
SOARecord soa = (SOARecord) r;
nsec3_ttl = Math.min(soa.getMinimum(), soa.getTTL());
if (nsec3param_ttl < 0) {
nsec3param_ttl = nsec3_ttl;
}
}
// For the first iteration, we create our current node.
if (current_node == null) {
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
continue;
}
// If we are at the same name, we are on the same node.
if (r_name.equals(current_node.name)) {
current_node.addType(r_type);
continue;
}
if (includeSet != null && includeSet.contains(current_node.name)) {
current_node.isSecureNode = true;
}
// At this point, r represents the start of a new node.
// So we move current_node to last_node and generate a new current node.
// But first, we need to do something with the last node.
generateNSEC3ForNode(last_node, zonename, salt, iterations, true, proto_nsec3s);
if (current_node.isSecureNode) {
last_node = current_node;
} else {
last_node.hasOptInSpan = true;
}
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
}
// process last two nodes.
generateNSEC3ForNode(last_node, zonename, salt, iterations, true, proto_nsec3s);
generateNSEC3ForNode(current_node, zonename, salt, iterations, true, proto_nsec3s);
List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = finishNSEC3s(proto_nsec3s, nsec3_ttl);
records.addAll(nsec3s);
NSEC3PARAMRecord nsec3param = new NSEC3PARAMRecord(zonename, DClass.IN,
nsec3param_ttl,
NSEC3Record.SHA1_DIGEST_ID,
(byte) 0, iterations, salt);
records.add(nsec3param);
}
/**
* For a given node (representing all of the RRsets at a given name), generate
* all of the necessary NSEC3 records for it. That is, generate the NSEC3 for
* the node itself, and for any potential empty non-terminals.
*
* @param node
* The node in question.
* @param zonename
* The zonename.
* @param salt
* The salt to use for the NSEC3 RRs
* @param iterations
* The iterations to use for the NSEC3 RRs.
* @param optIn
* If true, the NSEC3 will have the Opt-Out flag set.
* @param nsec3s
* The current list of NSEC3s -- this will be updated.
* @throws NoSuchAlgorithmException
*/
private static void generateNSEC3ForNode(NodeInfo node, Name zonename, byte[] salt,
int iterations, boolean optIn, List<ProtoNSEC3> nsec3s)
throws NoSuchAlgorithmException {
if (node == null)
return;
if (optIn && !node.isSecureNode)
return;
// Add our default types.
if (node.type == RR_NORMAL || (node.type == RR_DELEGATION && node.hasType(Type.DS))) {
node.addType(Type.RRSIG);
}
if (node.name.equals(zonename))
node.addType(Type.NSEC3PARAM);
// Check for ENTs -- note this will generate duplicate ENTs because it
// doesn't use any context.
int ldiff = node.name.labels() - zonename.labels();
for (int i = 1; i < ldiff; i++) {
Name n = new Name(node.name, i);
log.fine("Generating ENT NSEC3 for " + n);
ProtoNSEC3 nsec3 = generateNSEC3(n, zonename, node.ttl, salt, iterations, optIn,
null);
nsec3s.add(nsec3);
}
ProtoNSEC3 nsec3 = generateNSEC3(node.name, zonename, node.ttl, salt, iterations,
optIn, node.getTypes());
nsec3s.add(nsec3);
}
/**
* Create a "prototype" NSEC3 record. Basically, a mutable NSEC3 record.
*
* @param name
* The original ownername to use.
* @param zonename
* The zonename to use.
* @param ttl
* The TTL to use.
* @param salt
* The salt to use.
* @param iterations
* The number of hash iterations to use.
* @param optIn
* The value of the Opt-Out flag.
* @param types
* The typecodes present at this name.
* @return A mutable NSEC3 record.
*
* @throws NoSuchAlgorithmException
*/
private static ProtoNSEC3 generateNSEC3(Name name, Name zonename, long ttl,
byte[] salt, int iterations, boolean optIn,
int[] types) throws NoSuchAlgorithmException {
byte[] hash = nsec3hash(name, NSEC3Record.SHA1_DIGEST_ID, iterations, salt);
byte flags = (byte) (optIn ? 0x01 : 0x00);
ProtoNSEC3 r = new ProtoNSEC3(hash, name, zonename, DClass.IN, ttl,
NSEC3Record.SHA1_DIGEST_ID, flags, iterations, salt,
null, types);
log.finer("Generated: " + r);
return r;
}
/**
* Given a list of {@link ProtoNSEC3} object (mutable NSEC3 RRs), convert the
* list into the set of actual {@link org.xbill.DNS.NSEC3Record} objects. This
* will remove duplicates and finalize the records.
*
* @param nsec3s
* The list of ProtoNSEC3 objects
* @param ttl
* The TTL to assign to the finished NSEC3 records. In general,
* this
* should match the SOA minimum value for the zone.
* @return The list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.NSEC3Record} objects.
*/
private static List<NSEC3Record> finishNSEC3s(List<ProtoNSEC3> nsec3s, long ttl) {
if (nsec3s == null)
return null;
Collections.sort(nsec3s, new ProtoNSEC3.Comparator());
ProtoNSEC3 prev_nsec3 = null;
ProtoNSEC3 cur_nsec3 = null;
byte[] first_nsec3_hash = null;
for (ListIterator<ProtoNSEC3> i = nsec3s.listIterator(); i.hasNext();) {
cur_nsec3 = i.next();
// check to see if cur is a duplicate (by name)
if (prev_nsec3 != null
&& Arrays.equals(prev_nsec3.getOwner(), cur_nsec3.getOwner())) {
log.fine("found duplicate NSEC3 (by name) -- merging type maps: "
+ prev_nsec3.getTypemap() + " and " + cur_nsec3.getTypemap());
i.remove();
prev_nsec3.mergeTypes(cur_nsec3.getTypemap());
log.fine("merged type map: " + prev_nsec3.getTypemap());
continue;
}
byte[] next = cur_nsec3.getOwner();
if (prev_nsec3 == null) {
prev_nsec3 = cur_nsec3;
first_nsec3_hash = next;
continue;
}
prev_nsec3.setNext(next);
prev_nsec3 = cur_nsec3;
}
// Handle last NSEC3.
if (prev_nsec3.getNext() == null) {
// if prev_nsec3's next field hasn't been set, then it is the last
// record (i.e., all remaining records were duplicates.)
prev_nsec3.setNext(first_nsec3_hash);
} else {
// otherwise, cur_nsec3 is the last record.
cur_nsec3.setNext(first_nsec3_hash);
}
// Convert our ProtoNSEC3s to actual (immutable) NSEC3Record objects.
List<NSEC3Record> res = new ArrayList<NSEC3Record>(nsec3s.size());
for (ProtoNSEC3 p : nsec3s) {
p.setTTL(ttl);
res.add(p.getNSEC3Record());
}
return res;
}
/**
* Given a canonical (by name) ordered list of records in a zone, generate the
* NSEC records in place.
*
* Note that the list that the records are stored in must support the
* <code>listIterator.add</code> operation.
*
* @param zonename
* the name of the zone apex, used to distinguish between
* authoritative and delegation NS RRsets.
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record}s in DNSSEC
* canonical order.
* @param includeNames
* a list of names that should be in the NXT chain
* regardless. This
* may be null.
* @param beConservative
* if true, then Opt-In NXTs will only be generated where
* there is
* actually a span of insecure delegations.
*/
public static void generateOptInNSECRecords(Name zonename, List<Record> records,
List<Name> includeNames,
boolean beConservative) {
// This works by iterating over a known sorted list of records.
NodeInfo last_node = null;
NodeInfo current_node = null;
Name last_cut = null;
Name last_dname = null;
int backup;
HashSet<Name> includeSet = null;
if (includeNames != null) {
includeSet = new HashSet<Name>(includeNames);
}
for (ListIterator<Record> i = records.listIterator(); i.hasNext();) {
Record r = i.next();
Name r_name = r.getName();
int r_type = r.getType();
int r_sectype = recordSecType(zonename, r_name, r_type, last_cut, last_dname);
// skip irrelevant records
if (r_sectype == RR_INVALID || r_sectype == RR_GLUE)
continue;
// note our last delegation point so we can recognize glue.
if (r_sectype == RR_DELEGATION)
last_cut = r_name;
if (r_type == Type.DNAME)
last_dname = r_name;
// first node -- initialize
if (current_node == null) {
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
current_node.addType(Type.RRSIG);
continue;
}
// record name hasn't changed, so we are still on the same node.
if (r_name.equals(current_node.name)) {
current_node.addType(r_type);
continue;
}
// If the name is in the set of included names, mark it as
// secure.
if (includeSet != null && includeSet.contains(current_node.name)) {
current_node.isSecureNode = true;
}
if (last_node != null && current_node.isSecureNode) {
// generate a NSEC record.
if (beConservative && !last_node.hasOptInSpan) {
last_node.addType(Type.NSEC);
}
NSECRecord nsec = new NSECRecord(last_node.name, last_node.dclass, last_node.ttl,
current_node.name, last_node.getTypes());
// Note: we have to add this through the iterator, otherwise
// the next access via the iterator will generate a
// ConcurrencyModificationException.
backup = i.nextIndex() - last_node.nsecIndex;
for (int j = 0; j < backup; j++)
i.previous();
i.add(nsec);
for (int j = 0; j < backup; j++)
i.next();
log.finer("Generated: " + nsec);
}
if (current_node.isSecureNode) {
last_node = current_node;
} else if (last_node != null) {
// last_node does not change -- last_node is essentially the
// last *secure* node, and current_node is not secure.
// However, we need to note the passing of the insecure node.
last_node.hasOptInSpan = true;
}
current_node.nsecIndex = i.previousIndex();
current_node = new NodeInfo(r, r_sectype);
current_node.addType(Type.RRSIG);
}
// Generate next to last NSEC
if (last_node != null && current_node.isSecureNode) {
// generate a NSEC record.
if (beConservative && !last_node.hasOptInSpan) {
last_node.addType(Type.NSEC);
}
NSECRecord nsec = new NSECRecord(last_node.name, last_node.dclass, last_node.ttl,
current_node.name, last_node.getTypes());
records.add(last_node.nsecIndex - 1, nsec);
log.finer("Generated: " + nsec);
}
// Generate last NSEC
NSECRecord nsec;
if (current_node.isSecureNode) {
if (beConservative) {
current_node.addType(Type.NSEC);
}
nsec = new NSECRecord(current_node.name, current_node.dclass, current_node.ttl,
zonename, current_node.getTypes());
// we can just tack this on the end as we are working on the
// last node.
records.add(nsec);
} else {
nsec = new NSECRecord(last_node.name, last_node.dclass, last_node.ttl, zonename,
last_node.getTypes());
// We need to tack this on after the last secure node, not the
// end of the whole list.
records.add(last_node.nsecIndex, nsec);
}
log.finer("Generated: " + nsec);
}
/**
* Given a zone with DNSKEY records at delegation points, convert those KEY
* records into their corresponding DS records in place.
*
* @param zonename
* the name of the zone, used to reliably distinguish the zone
* apex
* from other records.
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record} objects.
* @param digest_alg
* The digest algorithm to use.
*/
public static void generateDSRecords(Name zonename, List<Record> records, int digest_alg) {
for (ListIterator<Record> i = records.listIterator(); i.hasNext();) {
Record r = i.next();
if (r == null)
continue; // this should never be true.
Name r_name = r.getName();
if (r_name == null)
continue; // this should never be true.
// Convert non-zone level KEY records into DS records.
if (r.getType() == Type.DNSKEY && !r_name.equals(zonename)) {
DSRecord ds = calculateDSRecord((DNSKEYRecord) r, digest_alg, r.getTTL());
i.set(ds);
}
}
}
/**
* Given a zone, remove all records that are generated.
*
* @param zonename
* the name of the zone.
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record} objects.
*/
public static void removeGeneratedRecords(Name zonename, List<Record> records) {
for (Iterator<Record> i = records.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
Record r = (Record) i.next();
if (r.getType() == Type.RRSIG || r.getType() == Type.NSEC
|| r.getType() == Type.NSEC3 || r.getType() == Type.NSEC3PARAM) {
i.remove();
}
}
}
/**
* Remove duplicate records from a list of records. This routine presumes the
* list of records is in a canonical sorted order, at least on name and RR
* type.
*
* @param records
* a list of {@link org.xbill.DNS.Record} object, in sorted
* order.
*/
public static void removeDuplicateRecords(List<Record> records) {
Record lastrec = null;
for (Iterator<Record> i = records.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
Record r = i.next();
if (lastrec == null) {
lastrec = r;
continue;
}
if (lastrec.equals(r)) {
i.remove();
continue;
}
lastrec = r;
}
}
/**
* Given a DNSKEY record, generate the DS record from it.
*
* @param keyrec
* the KEY record in question.
* @param digest_alg
* The digest algorithm (SHA-1, SHA-256, etc.).
* @param ttl
* the desired TTL for the generated DS record. If zero, or
* negative,
* the original KEY RR's TTL will be used.
* @return the corresponding {@link org.xbill.DNS.DSRecord}
*/
public static DSRecord calculateDSRecord(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int digest_alg, long ttl) {
if (keyrec == null)
return null;
if (ttl <= 0)
ttl = keyrec.getTTL();
DNSOutput os = new DNSOutput();
os.writeByteArray(keyrec.getName().toWireCanonical());
os.writeByteArray(keyrec.rdataToWireCanonical());
try {
byte[] digest;
MessageDigest md;
switch (digest_alg) {
case DNSSEC.Digest.SHA1:
md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
digest = md.digest(os.toByteArray());
break;
case DNSSEC.Digest.SHA256:
md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
digest = md.digest(os.toByteArray());
break;
default:
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Unknown digest id: " + digest_alg);
}
return new DSRecord(keyrec.getName(), keyrec.getDClass(), ttl,
keyrec.getFootprint(), keyrec.getAlgorithm(), digest_alg,
digest);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
log.severe(e.toString());
return null;
}
}
/**
* Calculate an NSEC3 hash based on a DNS name and NSEC3 hash parameters.
*
* @param n
* The name to hash.
* @param hash_algorithm
* The hash algorithm to use.
* @param iterations
* The number of iterations to do.
* @param salt
* The salt to use.
* @return The calculated hash as a byte array.
* @throws NoSuchAlgorithmException
* If the hash algorithm is unrecognized.
*/
public static byte[] nsec3hash(Name n, int hash_algorithm, int iterations, byte[] salt)
throws NoSuchAlgorithmException {
MessageDigest md;
switch (hash_algorithm) {
case NSEC3Record.SHA1_DIGEST_ID:
md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA1");
break;
default:
throw new NoSuchAlgorithmException("Unknown NSEC3 algorithm identifier: "
+ hash_algorithm);
}
// Construct our wire form.
byte[] wire_name = n.toWireCanonical();
byte[] res = wire_name; // for the first iteration.
for (int i = 0; i <= iterations; i++) {
// Concatenate the salt, if it exists.
if (salt != null) {
byte[] concat = new byte[res.length + salt.length];
System.arraycopy(res, 0, concat, 0, res.length);
System.arraycopy(salt, 0, concat, res.length, salt.length);
res = concat;
}
res = md.digest(res);
}
return res;
}
}