We now compile, although we probably don't really work

This commit is contained in:
David Blacka 2009-04-19 15:42:05 -04:00
parent a852ce1790
commit c43169bc24

View File

@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
/*
* $Id$
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2009 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
@ -39,12 +37,9 @@ import org.xbill.DNS.*;
/**
* This is a collection of routines encompassing the logic of validating
* different message types.
*
* @author davidb
* @version $Revision$
*/
public class ValUtils
{
*/
public class ValUtils {
// These are response subtypes. They are necessary for determining the
// validation strategy. They have no bearing on the iterative resolution
@ -74,33 +69,29 @@ public class ValUtils
/** A local copy of the verifier object. */
private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier;
public ValUtils(DnsSecVerifier verifier)
{
public ValUtils(DnsSecVerifier verifier) {
mVerifier = verifier;
}
/**
* Given a response, classify ANSWER responses into a subtype.
*
* @param m The response to classify.
* @param m
* The response to classify.
*
* @return A subtype ranging from UNKNOWN to NAMEERROR.
*/
public static int classifyResponse(SMessage m)
{
public static int classifyResponse(SMessage m) {
// Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
// chain ending in NXDOMAIN.
if (m.getRcode() == Rcode.NXDOMAIN
&& m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0)
{
if (m.getRcode() == Rcode.NXDOMAIN && m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0) {
return NAMEERROR;
}
// Next is NODATA
// st_log.debug("classifyResponse: ancount = " +
// m.getCount(Section.ANSWER));
if (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0)
{
if (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0) {
return NODATA;
}
@ -108,10 +99,10 @@ public class ValUtils
// responses because CNAME answers require extra processing.
int qtype = m.getQuestion().getType();
// We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because ANY responses
// We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because ANY
// responses
// are validated differently.
if (qtype == Type.ANY)
{
if (qtype == Type.ANY) {
return ANY;
}
@ -119,13 +110,12 @@ public class ValUtils
// Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless
// qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response.
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
if (rrsets[i].getType() == qtype) return POSITIVE;
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.CNAME) return CNAME;
}
// st_log.warn("Failed to classify response message:\n" + m);
// st_log.warn("Failed to classify response message:\n" + m);
return UNKNOWN;
}
@ -134,62 +124,55 @@ public class ValUtils
* to determine if the response is, in fact, signed at all, and, if so, what
* is the name of the most pertinent keyset.
*
* @param m The response to analyze.
* @param request The request that generated the response.
* @param m
* The response to analyze.
* @param request
* The request that generated the response.
* @return a signer name, if the response is signed (even partially), or
* null if the response isn't signed.
*/
public Name findSigner(SMessage m)
{
public Name findSigner(SMessage m) {
int subtype = classifyResponse(m);
Name qname = m.getQName();
SRRset[] rrsets;
switch (subtype)
{
case POSITIVE :
case CNAME :
case ANY :
switch (subtype) {
case POSITIVE:
case CNAME:
case ANY:
// Check to see if the ANSWER section RRset
rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
if (rrsets[i].getName().equals(qname))
{
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
if (rrsets[i].getName().equals(qname)) {
return rrsets[i].getSignerName();
}
}
return null;
case NAMEERROR :
case NODATA :
case NAMEERROR:
case NODATA:
// Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs
rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC
|| rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3)
{
|| rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) {
return rrsets[i].getSignerName();
}
}
return null;
default :
// log.debug("findSigner: could not find signer name "
// + "for unknown type response.");
default:
// log.debug("findSigner: could not find signer name "
// + "for unknown type response.");
return null;
}
}
public boolean dssetIsUsable(SRRset ds_rrset)
{
for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
{
public boolean dssetIsUsable(SRRset ds_rrset) {
for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();) {
DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next();
if (supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID())
&& mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm()))
{
&& mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm())) {
return true;
}
}
@ -201,10 +184,11 @@ public class ValUtils
* Given a DS rrset and a DNSKEY rrset, match the DS to a DNSKEY and verify
* the DNSKEY rrset with that key.
*
* @param dnskey_rrset The DNSKEY rrset to match against. The security
* status of this rrset will be updated on a successful
* verification.
* @param ds_rrset The DS rrset to match with. This rrset must already be
* @param dnskey_rrset
* The DNSKEY rrset to match against. The security status of this
* rrset will be updated on a successful verification.
* @param ds_rrset
* The DS rrset to match with. This rrset must already be
* trusted.
*
* @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted
@ -216,128 +200,124 @@ public class ValUtils
* this sort of thing is checked before fetching the matching DNSKEY
* rrset.
*/
// public KeyEntry verifyNewDNSKEYs(SRRset dnskey_rrset, SRRset ds_rrset)
// {
// if (!dnskey_rrset.getName().equals(ds_rrset.getName()))
// {
//// log.debug("DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name!");
// return KeyEntry
// .newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass());
// }
//
// // as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
// // equivalent to no DS rrset.
// boolean hasUsefulDS = false;
//
// for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
// {
// DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next();
//
// // Check to see if we can understand this DS.
// if (!supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID())
// || !mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm()))
// {
// continue;
// }
//
// // Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and algorithm, we
// // cannot return INSECURE (with a "null" KeyEntry).
// hasUsefulDS = true;
//
// DNSKEY : for (Iterator j = dnskey_rrset.rrs(); j.hasNext();)
// {
// DNSKEYRecord dnskey = (DNSKEYRecord) j.next();
//
// // Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria.
// if (ds.getFootprint() != dnskey.getFootprint()
// || ds.getAlgorithm() != dnskey.getAlgorithm())
// {
// continue;
// }
//
// // Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the same DS hash
// // algorithm.
// byte[] key_hash = calculateDSHash(dnskey, ds.getDigestID());
// byte[] ds_hash = ds.getDigest();
//
// // see if there is a length mismatch (unlikely)
// if (key_hash.length != ds_hash.length)
// {
// continue DNSKEY;
// }
//
// for (int k = 0; k < key_hash.length; k++)
// {
// if (key_hash[k] != ds_hash[k]) continue DNSKEY;
// }
//
// // Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY verifies
// // *with this key*.
// byte res = mVerifier.verify(dnskey_rrset, dnskey);
// if (res == SecurityStatus.SECURE)
// {
//// log.trace("DS matched DNSKEY.");
// dnskey_rrset.setSecurityStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
// return KeyEntry.newKeyEntry(dnskey_rrset);
// }
// // If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one!
// }
// }
//
// // None of the DS's worked out.
//
// // If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK.
// if (!hasUsefulDS)
// {
//// log.debug("No usuable DS records were found -- treating as insecure.");
// return KeyEntry.newNullKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset
// .getDClass(), ds_rrset.getTTL());
// }
// // If any were understandable, then it is bad.
//// log.debug("Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
// return KeyEntry.newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass());
// }
// public KeyEntry verifyNewDNSKEYs(SRRset dnskey_rrset, SRRset ds_rrset)
// {
// if (!dnskey_rrset.getName().equals(ds_rrset.getName()))
// {
// // log.debug("DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name!");
// return KeyEntry
// .newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass());
// }
//
// // as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be
// // equivalent to no DS rrset.
// boolean hasUsefulDS = false;
//
// for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();)
// {
// DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next();
//
// // Check to see if we can understand this DS.
// if (!supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID())
// || !mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm()))
// {
// continue;
// }
//
// // Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and algorithm, we
// // cannot return INSECURE (with a "null" KeyEntry).
// hasUsefulDS = true;
//
// DNSKEY : for (Iterator j = dnskey_rrset.rrs(); j.hasNext();)
// {
// DNSKEYRecord dnskey = (DNSKEYRecord) j.next();
//
// // Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria.
// if (ds.getFootprint() != dnskey.getFootprint()
// || ds.getAlgorithm() != dnskey.getAlgorithm())
// {
// continue;
// }
//
// // Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the same DS hash
// // algorithm.
// byte[] key_hash = calculateDSHash(dnskey, ds.getDigestID());
// byte[] ds_hash = ds.getDigest();
//
// // see if there is a length mismatch (unlikely)
// if (key_hash.length != ds_hash.length)
// {
// continue DNSKEY;
// }
//
// for (int k = 0; k < key_hash.length; k++)
// {
// if (key_hash[k] != ds_hash[k]) continue DNSKEY;
// }
//
// // Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY verifies
// // *with this key*.
// byte res = mVerifier.verify(dnskey_rrset, dnskey);
// if (res == SecurityStatus.SECURE)
// {
// // log.trace("DS matched DNSKEY.");
// dnskey_rrset.setSecurityStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE);
// return KeyEntry.newKeyEntry(dnskey_rrset);
// }
// // If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one!
// }
// }
//
// // None of the DS's worked out.
//
// // If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK.
// if (!hasUsefulDS)
// {
// //
// log.debug("No usuable DS records were found -- treating as insecure.");
// return KeyEntry.newNullKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset
// .getDClass(), ds_rrset.getTTL());
// }
// // If any were understandable, then it is bad.
// // log.debug("Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY.");
// return KeyEntry.newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass());
// }
/**
* Given a DNSKEY record, generate the DS record from it.
*
* @param keyrec the DNSKEY record in question.
* @param ds_alg The DS digest algorithm in use.
* @param keyrec
* the DNSKEY record in question.
* @param ds_alg
* The DS digest algorithm in use.
* @return the corresponding {@link org.xbill.DNS.DSRecord}
*/
public static byte[] calculateDSHash(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int ds_alg)
{
public static byte[] calculateDSHash(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int ds_alg) {
DNSOutput os = new DNSOutput();
os.writeByteArray(keyrec.getName().toWireCanonical());
os.writeByteArray(keyrec.rdataToWireCanonical());
try
{
try {
MessageDigest md = null;
switch (ds_alg)
{
case DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID :
switch (ds_alg) {
case DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID:
md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
return md.digest(os.toByteArray());
case DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID:
md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA256");
return md.digest(os.toByteArray());
default :
// st_log.warn("Unknown DS algorithm: " + ds_alg);
default:
// st_log.warn("Unknown DS algorithm: " + ds_alg);
return null;
}
}
catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e)
{
// st_log.error("Error using DS algorithm: " + ds_alg, e);
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
// st_log.error("Error using DS algorithm: " + ds_alg, e);
return null;
}
}
public static boolean supportsDigestID(int digest_id)
{
public static boolean supportsDigestID(int digest_id) {
if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID) return true;
if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID) return true;
return false;
@ -346,21 +326,20 @@ public class ValUtils
/**
* Check to see if a type is a special DNSSEC type.
*
* @param type The type.
* @param type
* The type.
*
* @return true if the type is one of the special DNSSEC types.
*/
public static boolean isDNSSECType(int type)
{
switch (type)
{
case Type.DNSKEY :
case Type.NSEC :
case Type.DS :
case Type.RRSIG :
case Type.NSEC3 :
public static boolean isDNSSECType(int type) {
switch (type) {
case Type.DNSKEY:
case Type.NSEC:
case Type.DS:
case Type.RRSIG:
case Type.NSEC3:
return true;
default :
default:
return false;
}
}
@ -369,16 +348,16 @@ public class ValUtils
* Set the security status of a particular RRset. This will only upgrade the
* security status.
*
* @param rrset The SRRset to update.
* @param security The security status.
* @param rrset
* The SRRset to update.
* @param security
* The security status.
*/
public static void setRRsetSecurity(SRRset rrset, byte security)
{
public static void setRRsetSecurity(SRRset rrset, byte security) {
if (rrset == null) return;
int cur_sec = rrset.getSecurityStatus();
if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec)
{
if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec) {
rrset.setSecurityStatus(security);
}
}
@ -389,30 +368,27 @@ public class ValUtils
* less) and all of the RRsets.
*
* @param m
* @param security KeyEntry ke;
* @param security
* KeyEntry ke;
*
* SMessage m = response.getSMessage(); SRRset ans_rrset =
* m.findAnswerRRset(qname, qtype, qclass);
*
* ke = verifySRRset(ans_rrset, key_rrset); if
* (ans_rrset.getSecurityStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) { return; }
* key_rrset = ke.getRRset();
* (ans_rrset.getSecurityStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
* return; } key_rrset = ke.getRRset();
*/
public static void setMessageSecurity(SMessage m, byte security)
{
public static void setMessageSecurity(SMessage m, byte security) {
if (m == null) return;
int cur_sec = m.getStatus();
if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec)
{
if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec) {
m.setStatus(security);
}
for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section <= Section.ADDITIONAL; section++)
{
for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section <= Section.ADDITIONAL; section++) {
SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++)
{
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
setRRsetSecurity(rrsets[i], security);
}
}
@ -423,32 +399,34 @@ public class ValUtils
* it. This will return the status (either BOGUS or SECURE) and set that
* status in rrset.
*
* @param rrset The SRRset to verify.
* @param key_rrset The set of keys to verify against.
* @param rrset
* The SRRset to verify.
* @param key_rrset
* The set of keys to verify against.
* @return The status (BOGUS or SECURE).
*/
public byte verifySRRset(SRRset rrset, SRRset key_rrset)
{
String rrset_name = rrset.getName() + "/" + Type.string(rrset.getType())
+ "/" + DClass.string(rrset.getDClass());
public byte verifySRRset(SRRset rrset, SRRset key_rrset) {
String rrset_name = rrset.getName() + "/"
+ Type.string(rrset.getType()) + "/"
+ DClass.string(rrset.getDClass());
if (rrset.getSecurityStatus() == SecurityStatus.SECURE)
{
// log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name
// + "> previously found to be SECURE");
if (rrset.getSecurityStatus() == SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name
// + "> previously found to be SECURE");
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
byte status = mVerifier.verify(rrset, key_rrset);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE)
{
// log.debug("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + "> found to be BAD");
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// log.debug("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name +
// "> found to be BAD");
status = SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
// else
// {
// log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + "> found to be SECURE");
// }
// else
// {
// log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name +
// "> found to be SECURE");
// }
rrset.setSecurityStatus(status);
return status;
@ -457,61 +435,76 @@ public class ValUtils
/**
* Determine if a given type map has a given typ.
*
* @param types The type map from the NSEC record.
* @param type The type to look for.
* @param types
* The type map from the NSEC record.
* @param type
* The type to look for.
* @return true if the type is present in the type map, false otherwise.
*/
public static boolean typeMapHasType(int[] types, int type)
{
for (int i = 0; i < types.length; i++)
{
public static boolean typeMapHasType(int[] types, int type) {
for (int i = 0; i < types.length; i++) {
if (types[i] == type) return true;
}
return false;
}
public static RRSIGRecord rrsetFirstSig(RRset rrset) {
for (Iterator i = rrset.sigs(); i.hasNext(); ) {
for (Iterator i = rrset.sigs(); i.hasNext();) {
return (RRSIGRecord) i.next();
}
return null;
}
/**
* Finds the longest common name between two domain names.
*
* @param domain1
* @param domain2
* @return
*/
public static Name longestCommonName(Name domain1, Name domain2) {
if (domain1 == null || domain2 == null) return null;
// for now, do this in a a fairly brute force way
// FIXME: convert this to direct operations on the byte[]
int this_labels = domain1.labels();
int name_labels = domain2.labels();
int d1_labels = domain1.labels();
int d2_labels = domain2.labels();
int l = (this_labels < name_labels) ? this_labels : name_labels;
for (int i = l; i > 0; i--)
{
Name n = new Name(domain2, name_labels - i);
if (n.equals(name, offset(this_labels - i)))
{
return n;
int l = (d1_labels < d2_labels) ? d1_labels : d2_labels;
for (int i = l; i > 0; i--) {
Name n1 = new Name(domain1, d1_labels - i);
Name n2 = new Name(domain2, d2_labels - i);
if (n1.equals(n2)) {
return n1;
}
}
return root;
return Name.root;
}
public static boolean strictSubdomain(Name child, Name parent) {
int clabels = child.labels();
int plabels = parent.labels();
if (plabels >= clabels) return false;
Name n = new Name(child, clabels - plabels);
return parent.equals(n);
}
/**
* Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the rrset name was
* the result of a wildcard expansion.
*
* @param rrset The rrset to examine.
* @param rrset
* The rrset to examine.
* @return true if the rrset is a wildcard expansion. This will return false
* for all unsigned rrsets.
*/
public static boolean rrsetIsWildcardExpansion(RRset rrset)
{
public static boolean rrsetIsWildcardExpansion(RRset rrset) {
if (rrset == null) return false;
RRSIGRecord rrsig = rrsetFirstSig(rrset);
if (rrset.getName().labels() - 1 > rrsig.getLabels())
{
if (rrset.getName().labels() - 1 > rrsig.getLabels()) {
return true;
}
@ -523,12 +516,12 @@ public class ValUtils
* the result of a wildcard expansion. If so, return the name of the
* generating wildcard.
*
* @param rrset The rrset to chedck.
* @param rrset
* The rrset to chedck.
* @return the wildcard name, if the rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
* null if not.
*/
public static Name rrsetWildcard(RRset rrset)
{
public static Name rrsetWildcard(RRset rrset) {
if (rrset == null) return null;
RRSIGRecord rrsig = rrsetFirstSig(rrset);
@ -536,29 +529,23 @@ public class ValUtils
// then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
// Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label.
int label_diff = (rrset.getName().labels() - 1) - rrsig.getLabels();
if (label_diff > 0)
{
if (label_diff > 0) {
return rrset.getName().wild(label_diff);
}
return null;
}
public static Name closestEncloser(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec)
{
Name n1 = domain.longestCommonName(nsec.getName());
Name n2 = domain.longestCommonName(nsec.getNext());
public static Name closestEncloser(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec) {
Name n1 = longestCommonName(domain, nsec.getName());
Name n2 = longestCommonName(domain, nsec.getNext());
return (n1.labels() > n2.labels()) ? n1 : n2;
}
public static Name nsecWildcard(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec)
{
try
{
public static Name nsecWildcard(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec) {
try {
return new Name("*", closestEncloser(domain, nsec));
}
catch (TextParseException e)
{
} catch (TextParseException e) {
// this should never happen.
return null;
}
@ -568,39 +555,41 @@ public class ValUtils
* Determine if the given NSEC proves a NameError (NXDOMAIN) for a given
* qname.
*
* @param nsec The NSEC to check.
* @param qname The qname to check against.
* @param signerName The signer name of the NSEC record, which is used as
* the zone name, for a more precise (but perhaps more brittle)
* check for the last NSEC in a zone.
* @param nsec
* The NSEC to check.
* @param qname
* The qname to check against.
* @param signerName
* The signer name of the NSEC record, which is used as the zone
* name, for a more precise (but perhaps more brittle) check for
* the last NSEC in a zone.
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNameError(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
Name signerName)
{
Name signerName) {
Name owner = nsec.getName();
Name next = nsec.getNext();
// If NSEC owner == qname, then this NSEC proves that qname exists.
if (qname.equals(owner))
{
if (qname.equals(owner)) {
return false;
}
// If NSEC is a parent of qname, we need to check the type map
// If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then this NSEC
// If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then this
// NSEC
// is being misused.
if (qname.subdomain(owner)
&& (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.DNAME) || (typeMapHasType(nsec
.getTypes(),
Type.NS) && !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA))))
{
&& (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.DNAME) || (typeMapHasType(
nsec.getTypes(),
Type.NS) && !typeMapHasType(
nsec.getTypes(),
Type.SOA)))) {
return false;
}
if (qname.compareTo(owner) > 0 && (qname.compareTo(next) < 0)
|| signerName.equals(next))
{
|| signerName.equals(next)) {
return true;
}
return false;
@ -610,27 +599,26 @@ public class ValUtils
* Determine if a NSEC record proves the non-existence of a wildcard that
* could have produced qname.
*
* @param nsec The nsec to check.
* @param qname The qname to check against.
* @param signerName The signer name for the NSEC rrset, used as the zone
* name.
* @param nsec
* The nsec to check.
* @param qname
* The qname to check against.
* @param signerName
* The signer name for the NSEC rrset, used as the zone name.
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNoWC(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
Name signerName)
{
Name signerName) {
Name owner = nsec.getName();
Name next = nsec.getNext();
int qname_labels = qname.labels();
int signer_labels = signerName.labels();
for (int i = qname_labels - signer_labels; i > 0; i--)
{
for (int i = qname_labels - signer_labels; i > 0; i--) {
Name wc_name = qname.wild(i);
if (wc_name.compareTo(owner) > 0
&& (wc_name.compareTo(next) < 0 || signerName.equals(next)))
{
&& (wc_name.compareTo(next) < 0 || signerName.equals(next))) {
return true;
}
}
@ -645,31 +633,34 @@ public class ValUtils
* must still be provided proof that qname did not directly exist and that
* the wildcard is, in fact, *.closest_encloser.
*
* @param nsec The NSEC to check
* @param qname The query name to check against.
* @param qtype The query type to check against.
* @param nsec
* The NSEC to check
* @param qname
* The query name to check against.
* @param qtype
* The query type to check against.
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNodata(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
int qtype)
{
if (!nsec.getName().equals(qname))
{
int qtype) {
if (!nsec.getName().equals(qname)) {
// wildcard checking.
// If this is a wildcard NSEC, make sure that a) it was possible to have
// If this is a wildcard NSEC, make sure that a) it was possible to
// have
// generated qname from the wildcard and b) the type map does not
// contain qtype. Note that this does NOT prove that this wildcard was
// contain qtype. Note that this does NOT prove that this wildcard
// was
// the applicable wildcard.
if (nsec.getName().isWild())
{
if (nsec.getName().isWild()) {
// the is the purported closest encloser.
Name ce = new Name(nsec.getName(), 1);
// The qname must be a strict subdomain of the closest encloser, and
// The qname must be a strict subdomain of the closest encloser,
// and
// the qtype must be absent from the type map.
if (!qname.strictSubdomain(ce) || typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype))
{
if (!strictSubdomain(qname, ce)
|| typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) {
return false;
}
return true;
@ -677,57 +668,55 @@ public class ValUtils
// empty-non-terminal checking.
// If the nsec is proving that qname is an ENT, the nsec owner will be
// If the nsec is proving that qname is an ENT, the nsec owner will
// be
// less than qname, and the next name will be a child domain of the
// qname.
if (nsec.getNext().strictSubdomain(qname)
&& qname.compareTo(nsec.getName()) > 0)
{
if (strictSubdomain(nsec.getNext(), qname)
&& qname.compareTo(nsec.getName()) > 0) {
return true;
}
// Otherwise, this NSEC does not prove ENT, so it does not prove NODATA.
// Otherwise, this NSEC does not prove ENT, so it does not prove
// NODATA.
return false;
}
// If the qtype exists, then we should have gotten it.
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype))
{
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) {
return false;
}
// if the name is a CNAME node, then we should have gotten the CNAME
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.CNAME))
{
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.CNAME)) {
return false;
}
// If an NS set exists at this name, and NOT a SOA (so this is a zone cut,
// not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a referral (or we just got
// If an NS set exists at this name, and NOT a SOA (so this is a zone
// cut,
// not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a referral (or we just
// got
// the wrong NSEC).
if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS)
&& !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA))
{
&& !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
public static int nsecProvesNoDS(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname)
{
public static int nsecProvesNoDS(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname) {
// Could check to make sure the qname is a subdomain of nsec
int[] types = nsec.getTypes();
if (typeMapHasType(types, Type.SOA) || typeMapHasType(types, Type.DS))
{
if (typeMapHasType(types, Type.SOA) || typeMapHasType(types, Type.DS)) {
// SOA present means that this is the NSEC from the child, not the
// parent (so it is the wrong one)
// DS present means that there should have been a positive response to
// DS present means that there should have been a positive response
// to
// the DS query, so there is something wrong.
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
if (!typeMapHasType(types, Type.NS))
{
if (!typeMapHasType(types, Type.NS)) {
// If there is no NS at this point at all, then this doesn't prove
// anything one way or the other.
return SecurityStatus.INSECURE;