From c43169bc247ec498ede8a8368d0d38775b8ef920 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: David Blacka Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2009 15:42:05 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] We now compile, although we probably don't really work --- src/com/versign/tat/dnssec/ValUtils.java | 1297 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 643 insertions(+), 654 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/com/versign/tat/dnssec/ValUtils.java b/src/com/versign/tat/dnssec/ValUtils.java index 8e5a344..ef12d34 100644 --- a/src/com/versign/tat/dnssec/ValUtils.java +++ b/src/com/versign/tat/dnssec/ValUtils.java @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ /* - * $Id$ - * - * Copyright (c) 2005 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2009 VeriSign, Inc. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -39,701 +37,692 @@ import org.xbill.DNS.*; /** * This is a collection of routines encompassing the logic of validating * different message types. - * - * @author davidb - * @version $Revision$ - */ -public class ValUtils -{ - - // These are response subtypes. They are necessary for determining the - // validation strategy. They have no bearing on the iterative resolution - // algorithm, so they are confined here. - - /** Not subtyped yet. */ - public static final int UNTYPED = 0; - - /** Not a recognized subtype. */ - public static final int UNKNOWN = 1; - - /** A postive, direct, response. */ - public static final int POSITIVE = 2; - - /** A postive response, with a CNAME/DNAME chain. */ - public static final int CNAME = 3; - - /** A NOERROR/NODATA response. */ - public static final int NODATA = 4; - - /** A NXDOMAIN response. */ - public static final int NAMEERROR = 5; - - /** A response to a qtype=ANY query. */ - public static final int ANY = 6; - - /** A local copy of the verifier object. */ - private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier; - - public ValUtils(DnsSecVerifier verifier) - { - mVerifier = verifier; - } - - /** - * Given a response, classify ANSWER responses into a subtype. - * - * @param m The response to classify. - * - * @return A subtype ranging from UNKNOWN to NAMEERROR. - */ - public static int classifyResponse(SMessage m) - { - // Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME - // chain ending in NXDOMAIN. - if (m.getRcode() == Rcode.NXDOMAIN - && m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0) - { - return NAMEERROR; - } +*/ - // Next is NODATA - // st_log.debug("classifyResponse: ancount = " + - // m.getCount(Section.ANSWER)); - if (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0) - { - return NODATA; - } +public class ValUtils { - // We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative - // responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. - int qtype = m.getQuestion().getType(); + // These are response subtypes. They are necessary for determining the + // validation strategy. They have no bearing on the iterative resolution + // algorithm, so they are confined here. - // We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because ANY responses - // are validated differently. - if (qtype == Type.ANY) - { - return ANY; - } + /** Not subtyped yet. */ + public static final int UNTYPED = 0; + + /** Not a recognized subtype. */ + public static final int UNKNOWN = 1; + + /** A postive, direct, response. */ + public static final int POSITIVE = 2; + + /** A postive response, with a CNAME/DNAME chain. */ + public static final int CNAME = 3; + + /** A NOERROR/NODATA response. */ + public static final int NODATA = 4; + + /** A NXDOMAIN response. */ + public static final int NAMEERROR = 5; + + /** A response to a qtype=ANY query. */ + public static final int ANY = 6; - SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER); + /** A local copy of the verifier object. */ + private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier; - // Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless - // qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. - for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) - { - if (rrsets[i].getType() == qtype) return POSITIVE; - if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.CNAME) return CNAME; + public ValUtils(DnsSecVerifier verifier) { + mVerifier = verifier; } -// st_log.warn("Failed to classify response message:\n" + m); - return UNKNOWN; - } - - /** - * Given a response, determine the name of the "signer". This is primarily - * to determine if the response is, in fact, signed at all, and, if so, what - * is the name of the most pertinent keyset. - * - * @param m The response to analyze. - * @param request The request that generated the response. - * @return a signer name, if the response is signed (even partially), or - * null if the response isn't signed. - */ - public Name findSigner(SMessage m) - { - int subtype = classifyResponse(m); - Name qname = m.getQName(); - - SRRset[] rrsets; - - switch (subtype) - { - case POSITIVE : - case CNAME : - case ANY : - // Check to see if the ANSWER section RRset - rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER); - for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) - { - if (rrsets[i].getName().equals(qname)) - { - return rrsets[i].getSignerName(); - } + /** + * Given a response, classify ANSWER responses into a subtype. + * + * @param m + * The response to classify. + * + * @return A subtype ranging from UNKNOWN to NAMEERROR. + */ + public static int classifyResponse(SMessage m) { + // Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME + // chain ending in NXDOMAIN. + if (m.getRcode() == Rcode.NXDOMAIN && m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0) { + return NAMEERROR; } - return null; - case NAMEERROR : - case NODATA : - // Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs - rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY); - for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) - { - if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC - || rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) - { - return rrsets[i].getSignerName(); - } + // Next is NODATA + // st_log.debug("classifyResponse: ancount = " + + // m.getCount(Section.ANSWER)); + if (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0) { + return NODATA; } - return null; - default : -// log.debug("findSigner: could not find signer name " -// + "for unknown type response."); - return null; - } - } - - public boolean dssetIsUsable(SRRset ds_rrset) - { - for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();) - { - DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next(); - if (supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID()) - && mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm())) - { - return true; - } - } - return false; - } - - /** - * Given a DS rrset and a DNSKEY rrset, match the DS to a DNSKEY and verify - * the DNSKEY rrset with that key. - * - * @param dnskey_rrset The DNSKEY rrset to match against. The security - * status of this rrset will be updated on a successful - * verification. - * @param ds_rrset The DS rrset to match with. This rrset must already be - * trusted. - * - * @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted - * dnskey_rrset, a "null" key entry indicating that this DS - * rrset/DNSKEY pair indicate an secure end to the island of trust - * (i.e., unknown algorithms), or a "bad" KeyEntry if the dnskey - * rrset fails to verify. Note that the "null" response should - * generally only occur in a private algorithm scenario: normally - * this sort of thing is checked before fetching the matching DNSKEY - * rrset. - */ -// public KeyEntry verifyNewDNSKEYs(SRRset dnskey_rrset, SRRset ds_rrset) -// { -// if (!dnskey_rrset.getName().equals(ds_rrset.getName())) -// { -//// log.debug("DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name!"); -// return KeyEntry -// .newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass()); -// } -// -// // as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be -// // equivalent to no DS rrset. -// boolean hasUsefulDS = false; -// -// for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();) -// { -// DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next(); -// -// // Check to see if we can understand this DS. -// if (!supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID()) -// || !mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm())) -// { -// continue; -// } -// -// // Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and algorithm, we -// // cannot return INSECURE (with a "null" KeyEntry). -// hasUsefulDS = true; -// -// DNSKEY : for (Iterator j = dnskey_rrset.rrs(); j.hasNext();) -// { -// DNSKEYRecord dnskey = (DNSKEYRecord) j.next(); -// -// // Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. -// if (ds.getFootprint() != dnskey.getFootprint() -// || ds.getAlgorithm() != dnskey.getAlgorithm()) -// { -// continue; -// } -// -// // Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the same DS hash -// // algorithm. -// byte[] key_hash = calculateDSHash(dnskey, ds.getDigestID()); -// byte[] ds_hash = ds.getDigest(); -// -// // see if there is a length mismatch (unlikely) -// if (key_hash.length != ds_hash.length) -// { -// continue DNSKEY; -// } -// -// for (int k = 0; k < key_hash.length; k++) -// { -// if (key_hash[k] != ds_hash[k]) continue DNSKEY; -// } -// -// // Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY verifies -// // *with this key*. -// byte res = mVerifier.verify(dnskey_rrset, dnskey); -// if (res == SecurityStatus.SECURE) -// { -//// log.trace("DS matched DNSKEY."); -// dnskey_rrset.setSecurityStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE); -// return KeyEntry.newKeyEntry(dnskey_rrset); -// } -// // If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! -// } -// } -// -// // None of the DS's worked out. -// -// // If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. -// if (!hasUsefulDS) -// { -//// log.debug("No usuable DS records were found -- treating as insecure."); -// return KeyEntry.newNullKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset -// .getDClass(), ds_rrset.getTTL()); -// } -// // If any were understandable, then it is bad. -//// log.debug("Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY."); -// return KeyEntry.newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass()); -// } - - /** - * Given a DNSKEY record, generate the DS record from it. - * - * @param keyrec the DNSKEY record in question. - * @param ds_alg The DS digest algorithm in use. - * @return the corresponding {@link org.xbill.DNS.DSRecord} - */ - public static byte[] calculateDSHash(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int ds_alg) - { - DNSOutput os = new DNSOutput(); - - os.writeByteArray(keyrec.getName().toWireCanonical()); - os.writeByteArray(keyrec.rdataToWireCanonical()); - - try - { - MessageDigest md = null; - switch (ds_alg) - { - case DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID : - md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA"); - return md.digest(os.toByteArray()); - case DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID: - md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA256"); - return md.digest(os.toByteArray()); - default : -// st_log.warn("Unknown DS algorithm: " + ds_alg); - return null; - } + // We distinguish between CNAME response and other positive/negative + // responses because CNAME answers require extra processing. + int qtype = m.getQuestion().getType(); + + // We distinguish between ANY and CNAME or POSITIVE because ANY + // responses + // are validated differently. + if (qtype == Type.ANY) { + return ANY; + } + + SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER); + + // Note that DNAMEs will be ignored here, unless qtype=DNAME. Unless + // qtype=CNAME, this will yield a CNAME response. + for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) { + if (rrsets[i].getType() == qtype) return POSITIVE; + if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.CNAME) return CNAME; + } + // st_log.warn("Failed to classify response message:\n" + m); + return UNKNOWN; } - catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) - { -// st_log.error("Error using DS algorithm: " + ds_alg, e); - return null; + + /** + * Given a response, determine the name of the "signer". This is primarily + * to determine if the response is, in fact, signed at all, and, if so, what + * is the name of the most pertinent keyset. + * + * @param m + * The response to analyze. + * @param request + * The request that generated the response. + * @return a signer name, if the response is signed (even partially), or + * null if the response isn't signed. + */ + public Name findSigner(SMessage m) { + int subtype = classifyResponse(m); + Name qname = m.getQName(); + + SRRset[] rrsets; + + switch (subtype) { + case POSITIVE: + case CNAME: + case ANY: + // Check to see if the ANSWER section RRset + rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER); + for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) { + if (rrsets[i].getName().equals(qname)) { + return rrsets[i].getSignerName(); + } + } + return null; + + case NAMEERROR: + case NODATA: + // Check to see if the AUTH section NSEC record(s) have rrsigs + rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY); + for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) { + if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC + || rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC3) { + return rrsets[i].getSignerName(); + } + } + return null; + default: + // log.debug("findSigner: could not find signer name " + // + "for unknown type response."); + return null; + } } - } - - public static boolean supportsDigestID(int digest_id) - { - if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID) return true; - if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID) return true; - return false; - } - - /** - * Check to see if a type is a special DNSSEC type. - * - * @param type The type. - * - * @return true if the type is one of the special DNSSEC types. - */ - public static boolean isDNSSECType(int type) - { - switch (type) - { - case Type.DNSKEY : - case Type.NSEC : - case Type.DS : - case Type.RRSIG : - case Type.NSEC3 : - return true; - default : + + public boolean dssetIsUsable(SRRset ds_rrset) { + for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();) { + DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next(); + if (supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID()) + && mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm())) { + return true; + } + } + return false; } - } - - /** - * Set the security status of a particular RRset. This will only upgrade the - * security status. - * - * @param rrset The SRRset to update. - * @param security The security status. - */ - public static void setRRsetSecurity(SRRset rrset, byte security) - { - if (rrset == null) return; - - int cur_sec = rrset.getSecurityStatus(); - if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec) - { - rrset.setSecurityStatus(security); - } - } - - /** - * Set the security status of a message and all of its RRsets. This will - * only upgrade the status of the message (i.e., set to more secure, not - * less) and all of the RRsets. - * - * @param m - * @param security KeyEntry ke; - * - * SMessage m = response.getSMessage(); SRRset ans_rrset = - * m.findAnswerRRset(qname, qtype, qclass); - * - * ke = verifySRRset(ans_rrset, key_rrset); if - * (ans_rrset.getSecurityStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) { return; } - * key_rrset = ke.getRRset(); - */ - public static void setMessageSecurity(SMessage m, byte security) - { - if (m == null) return; - - int cur_sec = m.getStatus(); - if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec) - { - m.setStatus(security); - } - for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section <= Section.ADDITIONAL; section++) - { - SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section); - for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) - { - setRRsetSecurity(rrsets[i], security); - } + /** + * Given a DS rrset and a DNSKEY rrset, match the DS to a DNSKEY and verify + * the DNSKEY rrset with that key. + * + * @param dnskey_rrset + * The DNSKEY rrset to match against. The security status of this + * rrset will be updated on a successful verification. + * @param ds_rrset + * The DS rrset to match with. This rrset must already be + * trusted. + * + * @return a KeyEntry. This will either contain the now trusted + * dnskey_rrset, a "null" key entry indicating that this DS + * rrset/DNSKEY pair indicate an secure end to the island of trust + * (i.e., unknown algorithms), or a "bad" KeyEntry if the dnskey + * rrset fails to verify. Note that the "null" response should + * generally only occur in a private algorithm scenario: normally + * this sort of thing is checked before fetching the matching DNSKEY + * rrset. + */ + // public KeyEntry verifyNewDNSKEYs(SRRset dnskey_rrset, SRRset ds_rrset) + // { + // if (!dnskey_rrset.getName().equals(ds_rrset.getName())) + // { + // // log.debug("DNSKEY RRset did not match DS RRset by name!"); + // return KeyEntry + // .newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass()); + // } + // + // // as long as this is false, we can consider this DS rrset to be + // // equivalent to no DS rrset. + // boolean hasUsefulDS = false; + // + // for (Iterator i = ds_rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();) + // { + // DSRecord ds = (DSRecord) i.next(); + // + // // Check to see if we can understand this DS. + // if (!supportsDigestID(ds.getDigestID()) + // || !mVerifier.supportsAlgorithm(ds.getAlgorithm())) + // { + // continue; + // } + // + // // Once we see a single DS with a known digestID and algorithm, we + // // cannot return INSECURE (with a "null" KeyEntry). + // hasUsefulDS = true; + // + // DNSKEY : for (Iterator j = dnskey_rrset.rrs(); j.hasNext();) + // { + // DNSKEYRecord dnskey = (DNSKEYRecord) j.next(); + // + // // Skip DNSKEYs that don't match the basic criteria. + // if (ds.getFootprint() != dnskey.getFootprint() + // || ds.getAlgorithm() != dnskey.getAlgorithm()) + // { + // continue; + // } + // + // // Convert the candidate DNSKEY into a hash using the same DS hash + // // algorithm. + // byte[] key_hash = calculateDSHash(dnskey, ds.getDigestID()); + // byte[] ds_hash = ds.getDigest(); + // + // // see if there is a length mismatch (unlikely) + // if (key_hash.length != ds_hash.length) + // { + // continue DNSKEY; + // } + // + // for (int k = 0; k < key_hash.length; k++) + // { + // if (key_hash[k] != ds_hash[k]) continue DNSKEY; + // } + // + // // Otherwise, we have a match! Make sure that the DNSKEY verifies + // // *with this key*. + // byte res = mVerifier.verify(dnskey_rrset, dnskey); + // if (res == SecurityStatus.SECURE) + // { + // // log.trace("DS matched DNSKEY."); + // dnskey_rrset.setSecurityStatus(SecurityStatus.SECURE); + // return KeyEntry.newKeyEntry(dnskey_rrset); + // } + // // If it didn't validate with the DNSKEY, try the next one! + // } + // } + // + // // None of the DS's worked out. + // + // // If no DSs were understandable, then this is OK. + // if (!hasUsefulDS) + // { + // // + // log.debug("No usuable DS records were found -- treating as insecure."); + // return KeyEntry.newNullKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset + // .getDClass(), ds_rrset.getTTL()); + // } + // // If any were understandable, then it is bad. + // // log.debug("Failed to match any usable DS to a DNSKEY."); + // return KeyEntry.newBadKeyEntry(ds_rrset.getName(), ds_rrset.getDClass()); + // } + /** + * Given a DNSKEY record, generate the DS record from it. + * + * @param keyrec + * the DNSKEY record in question. + * @param ds_alg + * The DS digest algorithm in use. + * @return the corresponding {@link org.xbill.DNS.DSRecord} + */ + public static byte[] calculateDSHash(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int ds_alg) { + DNSOutput os = new DNSOutput(); + + os.writeByteArray(keyrec.getName().toWireCanonical()); + os.writeByteArray(keyrec.rdataToWireCanonical()); + + try { + MessageDigest md = null; + switch (ds_alg) { + case DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID: + md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA"); + return md.digest(os.toByteArray()); + case DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID: + md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA256"); + return md.digest(os.toByteArray()); + default: + // st_log.warn("Unknown DS algorithm: " + ds_alg); + return null; + } + + } catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) { + // st_log.error("Error using DS algorithm: " + ds_alg, e); + return null; + } } - } - - /** - * Given an SRRset that is signed by a DNSKEY found in the key_rrset, verify - * it. This will return the status (either BOGUS or SECURE) and set that - * status in rrset. - * - * @param rrset The SRRset to verify. - * @param key_rrset The set of keys to verify against. - * @return The status (BOGUS or SECURE). - */ - public byte verifySRRset(SRRset rrset, SRRset key_rrset) - { - String rrset_name = rrset.getName() + "/" + Type.string(rrset.getType()) - + "/" + DClass.string(rrset.getDClass()); - - if (rrset.getSecurityStatus() == SecurityStatus.SECURE) - { -// log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name -// + "> previously found to be SECURE"); - return SecurityStatus.SECURE; + + public static boolean supportsDigestID(int digest_id) { + if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID) return true; + if (digest_id == DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID) return true; + return false; } - byte status = mVerifier.verify(rrset, key_rrset); - if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) - { -// log.debug("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + "> found to be BAD"); - status = SecurityStatus.BOGUS; + /** + * Check to see if a type is a special DNSSEC type. + * + * @param type + * The type. + * + * @return true if the type is one of the special DNSSEC types. + */ + public static boolean isDNSSECType(int type) { + switch (type) { + case Type.DNSKEY: + case Type.NSEC: + case Type.DS: + case Type.RRSIG: + case Type.NSEC3: + return true; + default: + return false; + } } -// else -// { -// log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + "> found to be SECURE"); -// } - - rrset.setSecurityStatus(status); - return status; - } - - /** - * Determine if a given type map has a given typ. - * - * @param types The type map from the NSEC record. - * @param type The type to look for. - * @return true if the type is present in the type map, false otherwise. - */ - public static boolean typeMapHasType(int[] types, int type) - { - for (int i = 0; i < types.length; i++) - { - if (types[i] == type) return true; + + /** + * Set the security status of a particular RRset. This will only upgrade the + * security status. + * + * @param rrset + * The SRRset to update. + * @param security + * The security status. + */ + public static void setRRsetSecurity(SRRset rrset, byte security) { + if (rrset == null) return; + + int cur_sec = rrset.getSecurityStatus(); + if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec) { + rrset.setSecurityStatus(security); + } } - return false; - } - - public static RRSIGRecord rrsetFirstSig(RRset rrset) { - for (Iterator i = rrset.sigs(); i.hasNext(); ) { - return (RRSIGRecord) i.next(); - } - return null; - } - - public static Name longestCommonName(Name domain1, Name domain2) { - if (domain1 == null || domain2 == null) return null; - // for now, do this in a a fairly brute force way - // FIXME: convert this to direct operations on the byte[] - - int this_labels = domain1.labels(); - int name_labels = domain2.labels(); - - int l = (this_labels < name_labels) ? this_labels : name_labels; - for (int i = l; i > 0; i--) - { - Name n = new Name(domain2, name_labels - i); - if (n.equals(name, offset(this_labels - i))) - { - return n; - } + + /** + * Set the security status of a message and all of its RRsets. This will + * only upgrade the status of the message (i.e., set to more secure, not + * less) and all of the RRsets. + * + * @param m + * @param security + * KeyEntry ke; + * + * SMessage m = response.getSMessage(); SRRset ans_rrset = + * m.findAnswerRRset(qname, qtype, qclass); + * + * ke = verifySRRset(ans_rrset, key_rrset); if + * (ans_rrset.getSecurityStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) { + * return; } key_rrset = ke.getRRset(); + */ + public static void setMessageSecurity(SMessage m, byte security) { + if (m == null) return; + + int cur_sec = m.getStatus(); + if (cur_sec == SecurityStatus.UNCHECKED || security > cur_sec) { + m.setStatus(security); + } + + for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section <= Section.ADDITIONAL; section++) { + SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section); + for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) { + setRRsetSecurity(rrsets[i], security); + } + } } - - return root; - } - /** - * Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the rrset name was - * the result of a wildcard expansion. - * - * @param rrset The rrset to examine. - * @return true if the rrset is a wildcard expansion. This will return false - * for all unsigned rrsets. - */ - public static boolean rrsetIsWildcardExpansion(RRset rrset) - { - if (rrset == null) return false; - RRSIGRecord rrsig = rrsetFirstSig(rrset); - - if (rrset.getName().labels() - 1 > rrsig.getLabels()) - { - return true; + + /** + * Given an SRRset that is signed by a DNSKEY found in the key_rrset, verify + * it. This will return the status (either BOGUS or SECURE) and set that + * status in rrset. + * + * @param rrset + * The SRRset to verify. + * @param key_rrset + * The set of keys to verify against. + * @return The status (BOGUS or SECURE). + */ + public byte verifySRRset(SRRset rrset, SRRset key_rrset) { + String rrset_name = rrset.getName() + "/" + + Type.string(rrset.getType()) + "/" + + DClass.string(rrset.getDClass()); + + if (rrset.getSecurityStatus() == SecurityStatus.SECURE) { + // log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + // + "> previously found to be SECURE"); + return SecurityStatus.SECURE; + } + + byte status = mVerifier.verify(rrset, key_rrset); + if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) { + // log.debug("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + + // "> found to be BAD"); + status = SecurityStatus.BOGUS; + } + // else + // { + // log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name + + // "> found to be SECURE"); + // } + + rrset.setSecurityStatus(status); + return status; } - return false; - } - - /** - * Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the RRset name was - * the result of a wildcard expansion. If so, return the name of the - * generating wildcard. - * - * @param rrset The rrset to chedck. - * @return the wildcard name, if the rrset was synthesized from a wildcard. - * null if not. - */ - public static Name rrsetWildcard(RRset rrset) - { - if (rrset == null) return null; - RRSIGRecord rrsig = rrsetFirstSig(rrset); - - // if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual labels, - // then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard. - // Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. - int label_diff = (rrset.getName().labels() - 1) - rrsig.getLabels(); - if (label_diff > 0) - { - return rrset.getName().wild(label_diff); + /** + * Determine if a given type map has a given typ. + * + * @param types + * The type map from the NSEC record. + * @param type + * The type to look for. + * @return true if the type is present in the type map, false otherwise. + */ + public static boolean typeMapHasType(int[] types, int type) { + for (int i = 0; i < types.length; i++) { + if (types[i] == type) return true; + } + return false; } - return null; - } - - public static Name closestEncloser(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec) - { - Name n1 = domain.longestCommonName(nsec.getName()); - Name n2 = domain.longestCommonName(nsec.getNext()); - - return (n1.labels() > n2.labels()) ? n1 : n2; - } - - public static Name nsecWildcard(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec) - { - try - { - return new Name("*", closestEncloser(domain, nsec)); + + public static RRSIGRecord rrsetFirstSig(RRset rrset) { + for (Iterator i = rrset.sigs(); i.hasNext();) { + return (RRSIGRecord) i.next(); + } + return null; } - catch (TextParseException e) - { - // this should never happen. - return null; + + /** + * Finds the longest common name between two domain names. + * + * @param domain1 + * @param domain2 + * @return + */ + public static Name longestCommonName(Name domain1, Name domain2) { + if (domain1 == null || domain2 == null) return null; + // for now, do this in a a fairly brute force way + // FIXME: convert this to direct operations on the byte[] + + int d1_labels = domain1.labels(); + int d2_labels = domain2.labels(); + + int l = (d1_labels < d2_labels) ? d1_labels : d2_labels; + for (int i = l; i > 0; i--) { + Name n1 = new Name(domain1, d1_labels - i); + Name n2 = new Name(domain2, d2_labels - i); + if (n1.equals(n2)) { + return n1; + } + } + + return Name.root; } - } - - /** - * Determine if the given NSEC proves a NameError (NXDOMAIN) for a given - * qname. - * - * @param nsec The NSEC to check. - * @param qname The qname to check against. - * @param signerName The signer name of the NSEC record, which is used as - * the zone name, for a more precise (but perhaps more brittle) - * check for the last NSEC in a zone. - * @return true if the NSEC proves the condition. - */ - public static boolean nsecProvesNameError(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname, - Name signerName) - { - Name owner = nsec.getName(); - Name next = nsec.getNext(); - - // If NSEC owner == qname, then this NSEC proves that qname exists. - if (qname.equals(owner)) - { - return false; + + public static boolean strictSubdomain(Name child, Name parent) { + int clabels = child.labels(); + int plabels = parent.labels(); + if (plabels >= clabels) return false; + + Name n = new Name(child, clabels - plabels); + return parent.equals(n); } - // If NSEC is a parent of qname, we need to check the type map - // If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then this NSEC - // is being misused. - if (qname.subdomain(owner) - && (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.DNAME) || (typeMapHasType(nsec - .getTypes(), - Type.NS) && !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA)))) - { - return false; + /** + * Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the rrset name was + * the result of a wildcard expansion. + * + * @param rrset + * The rrset to examine. + * @return true if the rrset is a wildcard expansion. This will return false + * for all unsigned rrsets. + */ + public static boolean rrsetIsWildcardExpansion(RRset rrset) { + if (rrset == null) return false; + RRSIGRecord rrsig = rrsetFirstSig(rrset); + + if (rrset.getName().labels() - 1 > rrsig.getLabels()) { + return true; + } + + return false; } - if (qname.compareTo(owner) > 0 && (qname.compareTo(next) < 0) - || signerName.equals(next)) - { - return true; + /** + * Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the RRset name was + * the result of a wildcard expansion. If so, return the name of the + * generating wildcard. + * + * @param rrset + * The rrset to chedck. + * @return the wildcard name, if the rrset was synthesized from a wildcard. + * null if not. + */ + public static Name rrsetWildcard(RRset rrset) { + if (rrset == null) return null; + RRSIGRecord rrsig = rrsetFirstSig(rrset); + + // if the RRSIG label count is shorter than the number of actual labels, + // then this rrset was synthesized from a wildcard. + // Note that the RRSIG label count doesn't count the root label. + int label_diff = (rrset.getName().labels() - 1) - rrsig.getLabels(); + if (label_diff > 0) { + return rrset.getName().wild(label_diff); + } + return null; } - return false; - } - - /** - * Determine if a NSEC record proves the non-existence of a wildcard that - * could have produced qname. - * - * @param nsec The nsec to check. - * @param qname The qname to check against. - * @param signerName The signer name for the NSEC rrset, used as the zone - * name. - * @return true if the NSEC proves the condition. - */ - public static boolean nsecProvesNoWC(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname, - Name signerName) - { - Name owner = nsec.getName(); - Name next = nsec.getNext(); - - int qname_labels = qname.labels(); - int signer_labels = signerName.labels(); - - for (int i = qname_labels - signer_labels; i > 0; i--) - { - Name wc_name = qname.wild(i); - if (wc_name.compareTo(owner) > 0 - && (wc_name.compareTo(next) < 0 || signerName.equals(next))) - { - return true; - } + + public static Name closestEncloser(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec) { + Name n1 = longestCommonName(domain, nsec.getName()); + Name n2 = longestCommonName(domain, nsec.getNext()); + + return (n1.labels() > n2.labels()) ? n1 : n2; } - return false; - } - - /** - * Determine if a NSEC proves the NOERROR/NODATA conditions. This will also - * handle the empty non-terminal (ENT) case and partially handle the - * wildcard case. If the ownername of 'nsec' is a wildcard, the validator - * must still be provided proof that qname did not directly exist and that - * the wildcard is, in fact, *.closest_encloser. - * - * @param nsec The NSEC to check - * @param qname The query name to check against. - * @param qtype The query type to check against. - * @return true if the NSEC proves the condition. - */ - public static boolean nsecProvesNodata(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname, - int qtype) - { - if (!nsec.getName().equals(qname)) - { - // wildcard checking. - - // If this is a wildcard NSEC, make sure that a) it was possible to have - // generated qname from the wildcard and b) the type map does not - // contain qtype. Note that this does NOT prove that this wildcard was - // the applicable wildcard. - if (nsec.getName().isWild()) - { - // the is the purported closest encloser. - Name ce = new Name(nsec.getName(), 1); - - // The qname must be a strict subdomain of the closest encloser, and - // the qtype must be absent from the type map. - if (!qname.strictSubdomain(ce) || typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) - { - return false; + public static Name nsecWildcard(Name domain, NSECRecord nsec) { + try { + return new Name("*", closestEncloser(domain, nsec)); + } catch (TextParseException e) { + // this should never happen. + return null; } - return true; - } - - // empty-non-terminal checking. - - // If the nsec is proving that qname is an ENT, the nsec owner will be - // less than qname, and the next name will be a child domain of the - // qname. - if (nsec.getNext().strictSubdomain(qname) - && qname.compareTo(nsec.getName()) > 0) - { - return true; - } - // Otherwise, this NSEC does not prove ENT, so it does not prove NODATA. - return false; } - // If the qtype exists, then we should have gotten it. - if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) - { - return false; - } + /** + * Determine if the given NSEC proves a NameError (NXDOMAIN) for a given + * qname. + * + * @param nsec + * The NSEC to check. + * @param qname + * The qname to check against. + * @param signerName + * The signer name of the NSEC record, which is used as the zone + * name, for a more precise (but perhaps more brittle) check for + * the last NSEC in a zone. + * @return true if the NSEC proves the condition. + */ + public static boolean nsecProvesNameError(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname, + Name signerName) { + Name owner = nsec.getName(); + Name next = nsec.getNext(); + + // If NSEC owner == qname, then this NSEC proves that qname exists. + if (qname.equals(owner)) { + return false; + } + + // If NSEC is a parent of qname, we need to check the type map + // If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then this + // NSEC + // is being misused. + if (qname.subdomain(owner) + && (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.DNAME) || (typeMapHasType( + nsec.getTypes(), + Type.NS) && !typeMapHasType( + nsec.getTypes(), + Type.SOA)))) { + return false; + } - // if the name is a CNAME node, then we should have gotten the CNAME - if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.CNAME)) - { - return false; + if (qname.compareTo(owner) > 0 && (qname.compareTo(next) < 0) + || signerName.equals(next)) { + return true; + } + return false; } - - // If an NS set exists at this name, and NOT a SOA (so this is a zone cut, - // not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a referral (or we just got - // the wrong NSEC). - if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS) - && !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA)) - { - return false; + + /** + * Determine if a NSEC record proves the non-existence of a wildcard that + * could have produced qname. + * + * @param nsec + * The nsec to check. + * @param qname + * The qname to check against. + * @param signerName + * The signer name for the NSEC rrset, used as the zone name. + * @return true if the NSEC proves the condition. + */ + public static boolean nsecProvesNoWC(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname, + Name signerName) { + Name owner = nsec.getName(); + Name next = nsec.getNext(); + + int qname_labels = qname.labels(); + int signer_labels = signerName.labels(); + + for (int i = qname_labels - signer_labels; i > 0; i--) { + Name wc_name = qname.wild(i); + if (wc_name.compareTo(owner) > 0 + && (wc_name.compareTo(next) < 0 || signerName.equals(next))) { + return true; + } + } + + return false; } - return true; - } - - public static int nsecProvesNoDS(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname) - { - // Could check to make sure the qname is a subdomain of nsec - int[] types = nsec.getTypes(); - if (typeMapHasType(types, Type.SOA) || typeMapHasType(types, Type.DS)) - { - // SOA present means that this is the NSEC from the child, not the - // parent (so it is the wrong one) - // DS present means that there should have been a positive response to - // the DS query, so there is something wrong. - return SecurityStatus.BOGUS; + /** + * Determine if a NSEC proves the NOERROR/NODATA conditions. This will also + * handle the empty non-terminal (ENT) case and partially handle the + * wildcard case. If the ownername of 'nsec' is a wildcard, the validator + * must still be provided proof that qname did not directly exist and that + * the wildcard is, in fact, *.closest_encloser. + * + * @param nsec + * The NSEC to check + * @param qname + * The query name to check against. + * @param qtype + * The query type to check against. + * @return true if the NSEC proves the condition. + */ + public static boolean nsecProvesNodata(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname, + int qtype) { + if (!nsec.getName().equals(qname)) { + // wildcard checking. + + // If this is a wildcard NSEC, make sure that a) it was possible to + // have + // generated qname from the wildcard and b) the type map does not + // contain qtype. Note that this does NOT prove that this wildcard + // was + // the applicable wildcard. + if (nsec.getName().isWild()) { + // the is the purported closest encloser. + Name ce = new Name(nsec.getName(), 1); + + // The qname must be a strict subdomain of the closest encloser, + // and + // the qtype must be absent from the type map. + if (!strictSubdomain(qname, ce) + || typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) { + return false; + } + return true; + } + + // empty-non-terminal checking. + + // If the nsec is proving that qname is an ENT, the nsec owner will + // be + // less than qname, and the next name will be a child domain of the + // qname. + if (strictSubdomain(nsec.getNext(), qname) + && qname.compareTo(nsec.getName()) > 0) { + return true; + } + // Otherwise, this NSEC does not prove ENT, so it does not prove + // NODATA. + return false; + } + + // If the qtype exists, then we should have gotten it. + if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) { + return false; + } + + // if the name is a CNAME node, then we should have gotten the CNAME + if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.CNAME)) { + return false; + } + + // If an NS set exists at this name, and NOT a SOA (so this is a zone + // cut, + // not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a referral (or we just + // got + // the wrong NSEC). + if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS) + && !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA)) { + return false; + } + + return true; } - if (!typeMapHasType(types, Type.NS)) - { - // If there is no NS at this point at all, then this doesn't prove - // anything one way or the other. - return SecurityStatus.INSECURE; + public static int nsecProvesNoDS(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname) { + // Could check to make sure the qname is a subdomain of nsec + int[] types = nsec.getTypes(); + if (typeMapHasType(types, Type.SOA) || typeMapHasType(types, Type.DS)) { + // SOA present means that this is the NSEC from the child, not the + // parent (so it is the wrong one) + // DS present means that there should have been a positive response + // to + // the DS query, so there is something wrong. + return SecurityStatus.BOGUS; + } + + if (!typeMapHasType(types, Type.NS)) { + // If there is no NS at this point at all, then this doesn't prove + // anything one way or the other. + return SecurityStatus.INSECURE; + } + // Otherwise, this proves no DS. + return SecurityStatus.SECURE; } - // Otherwise, this proves no DS. - return SecurityStatus.SECURE; - } } -- 2.36.6