import java.util.Iterator;
-
/**
* This is a collection of routines encompassing the logic of validating
* different message types.
*/
public class ValUtils {
private static Logger st_log = Logger.getLogger(ValUtils.class);
- private Logger log = Logger.getLogger(this.getClass());
+ private Logger log = Logger.getLogger(this.getClass());
/** A local copy of the verifier object. */
private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier;
/**
* Given a response, classify ANSWER responses into a subtype.
- *
+ *
* @param m
* The response to classify.
- *
+ *
* @return A subtype ranging from UNKNOWN to NAMEERROR.
*/
public static ResponseType classifyResponse(SMessage m, Name zone) {
- SRRset [] rrsets;
+ SRRset[] rrsets;
// Normal Name Error's are easy to detect -- but don't mistake a CNAME
// chain ending in NXDOMAIN.
- if ((m.getRcode() == Rcode.NXDOMAIN) &&
- (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0)) {
+ if ((m.getRcode() == Rcode.NXDOMAIN)
+ && (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0)) {
return ResponseType.NAMEERROR;
}
// 1) nothing in the ANSWER section
// 2) an NS RRset in the AUTHORITY section that is a strict subdomain of
// 'zone' (the presumed queried zone).
- if ((zone != null) && (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0) &&
- (m.getCount(Section.AUTHORITY) > 0)) {
+ if ((zone != null) && (m.getCount(Section.ANSWER) == 0)
+ && (m.getCount(Section.AUTHORITY) > 0)) {
rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; ++i) {
- if ((rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NS) &&
- strictSubdomain(rrsets[i].getName(), zone)) {
+ if ((rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NS)
+ && strictSubdomain(rrsets[i].getName(), zone)) {
return ResponseType.REFERRAL;
}
}
* Given a response, determine the name of the "signer". This is primarily
* to determine if the response is, in fact, signed at all, and, if so, what
* is the name of the most pertinent keyset.
- *
+ *
* @param m
* The response to analyze.
* @return a signer name, if the response is signed (even partially), or
// FIXME: this used to classify the message, then look in the pertinent
// section. Now we just find the first RRSIG in the ANSWER and AUTHORIY
// sections.
- for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section < Section.ADDITIONAL;
- ++section) {
- SRRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section);
+ for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section < Section.ADDITIONAL; ++section) {
+ SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; ++i) {
Name signerName = rrsets[i].getSignerName();
/**
* Given a DNSKEY record, generate the DS record from it.
- *
+ *
* @param keyrec
* the DNSKEY record in question.
* @param ds_alg
* The DS digest algorithm in use.
* @return the corresponding {@link org.xbill.DNS.DSRecord}
*/
- public static byte [] calculateDSHash(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int ds_alg) {
+ public static byte[] calculateDSHash(DNSKEYRecord keyrec, int ds_alg) {
DNSOutput os = new DNSOutput();
os.writeByteArray(keyrec.getName().toWireCanonical());
MessageDigest md = null;
switch (ds_alg) {
- case DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID:
- md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
+ case DSRecord.SHA1_DIGEST_ID:
+ md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA");
- return md.digest(os.toByteArray());
+ return md.digest(os.toByteArray());
- case DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID:
- md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA256");
+ case DSRecord.SHA256_DIGEST_ID:
+ md = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA256");
- return md.digest(os.toByteArray());
+ return md.digest(os.toByteArray());
- default:
- st_log.warn("Unknown DS algorithm: " + ds_alg);
+ default:
+ st_log.warn("Unknown DS algorithm: " + ds_alg);
- return null;
+ return null;
}
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {
st_log.error("Error using DS algorithm: " + ds_alg, e);
/**
* Check to see if a type is a special DNSSEC type.
- *
+ *
* @param type
* The type.
- *
+ *
* @return true if the type is one of the special DNSSEC types.
*/
public static boolean isDNSSECType(int type) {
switch (type) {
- case Type.DNSKEY:
- case Type.NSEC:
- case Type.DS:
- case Type.RRSIG:
- case Type.NSEC3:
- return true;
+ case Type.DNSKEY:
+ case Type.NSEC:
+ case Type.DS:
+ case Type.RRSIG:
+ case Type.NSEC3:
+ return true;
- default:
- return false;
+ default:
+ return false;
}
}
/**
* Set the security status of a particular RRset. This will only upgrade the
* security status.
- *
+ *
* @param rrset
* The SRRset to update.
* @param security
* Set the security status of a message and all of its RRsets. This will
* only upgrade the status of the message (i.e., set to more secure, not
* less) and all of the RRsets.
- *
+ *
* @param m
* @param security
* KeyEntry ke;
- *
+ *
* SMessage m = response.getSMessage(); SRRset ans_rrset =
* m.findAnswerRRset(qname, qtype, qclass);
- *
+ *
* ke = verifySRRset(ans_rrset, key_rrset); if
* (ans_rrset.getSecurityStatus() != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
* return; } key_rrset = ke.getRRset();
m.setStatus(security);
}
- for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section <= Section.ADDITIONAL;
- section++) {
- SRRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section);
+ for (int section = Section.ANSWER; section <= Section.ADDITIONAL; section++) {
+ SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(section);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
setRRsetSecurity(rrsets[i], security);
* Given an SRRset that is signed by a DNSKEY found in the key_rrset, verify
* it. This will return the status (either BOGUS or SECURE) and set that
* status in rrset.
- *
+ *
* @param rrset
* The SRRset to verify.
* @param key_rrset
* @return The status (BOGUS or SECURE).
*/
public byte verifySRRset(SRRset rrset, SRRset key_rrset) {
- String rrset_name = rrset.getName() + "/" +
- Type.string(rrset.getType()) + "/" +
- DClass.string(rrset.getDClass());
+ String rrset_name = rrset.getName() + "/"
+ + Type.string(rrset.getType()) + "/"
+ + DClass.string(rrset.getDClass());
if (rrset.getSecurityStatus() == SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name +
- "> previously found to be SECURE");
+ log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name
+ + "> previously found to be SECURE");
return SecurityStatus.SECURE;
}
byte status = mVerifier.verify(rrset, key_rrset);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name +
- "> found to be BAD");
+ log.debug("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name
+ + "> found to be BAD");
status = SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
} else {
- log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name +
- "> found to be SECURE");
+ log.trace("verifySRRset: rrset <" + rrset_name
+ + "> found to be SECURE");
}
rrset.setSecurityStatus(status);
/**
* Determine if a given type map has a given type.
- *
+ *
* @param types
* The type map from the NSEC record.
* @param type
* The type to look for.
* @return true if the type is present in the type map, false otherwise.
*/
- public static boolean typeMapHasType(int [] types, int type) {
+ public static boolean typeMapHasType(int[] types, int type) {
for (int i = 0; i < types.length; i++) {
if (types[i] == type) {
return true;
/**
* Finds the longest common name between two domain names.
- *
+ *
* @param domain1
* @param domain2
* @return
int d1_labels = domain1.labels();
int d2_labels = domain2.labels();
- int l = (d1_labels < d2_labels) ? d1_labels : d2_labels;
+ int l = (d1_labels < d2_labels) ? d1_labels : d2_labels;
for (int i = l; i > 0; i--) {
Name n1 = new Name(domain1, d1_labels - i);
/**
* Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the rrset name was
* the result of a wildcard expansion.
- *
+ *
* @param rrset
* The rrset to examine.
* @return true if the rrset is a wildcard expansion. This will return false
* Determine by looking at a signed RRset whether or not the RRset name was
* the result of a wildcard expansion. If so, return the name of the
* generating wildcard.
- *
+ *
* @param rrset
* The rrset to check.
* @return the wildcard name, if the rrset was synthesized from a wildcard.
/**
* Determine if the given NSEC proves a NameError (NXDOMAIN) for a given
* qname.
- *
+ *
* @param nsec
* The NSEC to check.
* @param qname
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNameError(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
- Name signerName) {
+ Name signerName) {
Name owner = nsec.getName();
- Name next = nsec.getNext();
+ Name next = nsec.getNext();
// If NSEC owner == qname, then this NSEC proves that qname exists.
if (qname.equals(owner)) {
// If NSEC is a parent of qname, we need to check the type map
// If the parent name has a DNAME or is a delegation point, then this
// NSEC is being misused.
- boolean hasBadType = typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.DNAME) ||
- (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS) &&
- !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA));
+ boolean hasBadType = typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.DNAME)
+ || (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS) && !typeMapHasType(
+ nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA));
if (qname.subdomain(owner) && hasBadType) {
return false;
}
- if (((qname.compareTo(owner) > 0) && (qname.compareTo(next) < 0)) ||
- signerName.equals(next)) {
+ if (((qname.compareTo(owner) > 0) && (qname.compareTo(next) < 0))
+ || signerName.equals(next)) {
return true;
}
/**
* Determine if a NSEC record proves the non-existence of a wildcard that
* could have produced qname.
- *
+ *
* @param nsec
* The nsec to check.
* @param qname
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNoWC(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
- Name signerName) {
- Name owner = nsec.getName();
- Name next = nsec.getNext();
+ Name signerName) {
+ Name owner = nsec.getName();
+ Name next = nsec.getNext();
- int qname_labels = qname.labels();
- int signer_labels = signerName.labels();
+ int qname_labels = qname.labels();
+ int signer_labels = signerName.labels();
for (int i = qname_labels - signer_labels; i > 0; i--) {
Name wc_name = qname.wild(i);
- if ((wc_name.compareTo(owner) > 0) &&
- ((wc_name.compareTo(next) < 0) || signerName.equals(next))) {
+ if ((wc_name.compareTo(owner) > 0)
+ && ((wc_name.compareTo(next) < 0) || signerName
+ .equals(next))) {
return true;
}
}
* wildcard case. If the ownername of 'nsec' is a wildcard, the validator
* must still be provided proof that qname did not directly exist and that
* the wildcard is, in fact, *.closest_encloser.
- *
+ *
* @param nsec
* The NSEC to check
* @param qname
* @return true if the NSEC proves the condition.
*/
public static boolean nsecProvesNodata(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname,
- int qtype) {
+ int qtype) {
if (!nsec.getName().equals(qname)) {
// wildcard checking.
// The qname must be a strict subdomain of the closest encloser,
// and
// the qtype must be absent from the type map.
- if (!strictSubdomain(qname, ce) ||
- typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) {
+ if (!strictSubdomain(qname, ce)
+ || typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), qtype)) {
return false;
}
// be
// less than qname, and the next name will be a child domain of the
// qname.
- if (strictSubdomain(nsec.getNext(), qname) &&
- (qname.compareTo(nsec.getName()) > 0)) {
+ if (strictSubdomain(nsec.getNext(), qname)
+ && (qname.compareTo(nsec.getName()) > 0)) {
return true;
}
// not a zone apex), then we should have gotten a referral (or we just
// got
// the wrong NSEC).
- if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS) &&
- !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA)) {
+ if (typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.NS)
+ && !typeMapHasType(nsec.getTypes(), Type.SOA)) {
return false;
}
public static byte nsecProvesNoDS(NSECRecord nsec, Name qname) {
// Could check to make sure the qname is a subdomain of nsec
- int [] types = nsec.getTypes();
+ int[] types = nsec.getTypes();
if (typeMapHasType(types, Type.SOA) || typeMapHasType(types, Type.DS)) {
// SOA present means that this is the NSEC from the child, not the
// These are response subtypes. They are necessary for determining the
// validation strategy. They have no bearing on the iterative resolution
// algorithm, so they are confined here.
- public enum ResponseType {UNTYPED, UNKNOWN, POSITIVE, CNAME, NODATA,
- NAMEERROR, ANY, REFERRAL,
+ public enum ResponseType {
+ UNTYPED, UNKNOWN, POSITIVE, CNAME, NODATA, NAMEERROR, ANY, REFERRAL,
// a referral response
THROWAWAY;
// a throwaway response (i.e., an error)
git://blacka.com / captive-validator.git / blobdiff