import java.util.*;
-
/**
* This resolver module implements a "captive" DNSSEC validator. The captive
* validator does not have direct access to the Internet and DNS system --
// The local verification utility.
private DnsSecVerifier mVerifier;
- private Logger log = Logger.getLogger(this.getClass());
+ private Logger log = Logger.getLogger(this.getClass());
public CaptiveValidator() {
- mVerifier = new DnsSecVerifier();
- mValUtils = new ValUtils(mVerifier);
- mTrustedKeys = new TrustAnchorStore();
+ mVerifier = new DnsSecVerifier();
+ mValUtils = new ValUtils(mVerifier);
+ mTrustedKeys = new TrustAnchorStore();
}
// ---------------- Module Initialization -------------------
/**
* Add a set of trusted keys from a file. The file should be in DNS master
* zone file format. Only DNSKEY records will be added.
- *
+ *
* @param filename
* The file contains the trusted keys.
* @throws IOException
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
- public void addTrustedKeysFromFile(String filename)
- throws IOException {
+ public void addTrustedKeysFromFile(String filename) throws IOException {
// First read in the whole trust anchor file.
- Master master = new Master(filename, Name.root, 0);
+ Master master = new Master(filename, Name.root, 0);
ArrayList<Record> records = new ArrayList<Record>();
- Record r = null;
+ Record r = null;
while ((r = master.nextRecord()) != null) {
records.add(r);
}
// If this record matches our current RRset, we can just add it.
- if (cur_rrset.getName().equals(rec.getName()) &&
- (cur_rrset.getType() == rec.getType()) &&
- (cur_rrset.getDClass() == rec.getDClass())) {
+ if (cur_rrset.getName().equals(rec.getName())
+ && (cur_rrset.getType() == rec.getType())
+ && (cur_rrset.getDClass() == rec.getDClass())) {
cur_rrset.addRR(rec);
continue;
}
public void addTrustedKeysFromResponse(Message m) {
- RRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
+ RRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; ++i) {
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.DNSKEY) {
* This routine normalizes a response. This includes removing "irrelevant"
* records from the answer and additional sections and (re)synthesizing
* CNAMEs from DNAMEs, if present.
- *
+ *
* @param response
*/
private SMessage normalize(SMessage m) {
return m;
}
- if ((m.getRcode() != Rcode.NOERROR) &&
- (m.getRcode() != Rcode.NXDOMAIN)) {
+ if ((m.getRcode() != Rcode.NOERROR) && (m.getRcode() != Rcode.NXDOMAIN)) {
return m;
}
- Name qname = m.getQuestion().getName();
- int qtype = m.getQuestion().getType();
+ Name qname = m.getQuestion().getName();
+ int qtype = m.getQuestion().getType();
- Name sname = qname;
+ Name sname = qname;
// For the ANSWER section, remove all "irrelevant" records and add
// synthesized CNAMEs from DNAMEs
// This will strip out-of-order CNAMEs as well.
- List<SRRset> rrset_list = m.getSectionList(Section.ANSWER);
- Set<Name> additional_names = new HashSet<Name>();
+ List<SRRset> rrset_list = m.getSectionList(Section.ANSWER);
+ Set<Name> additional_names = new HashSet<Name>();
for (ListIterator<SRRset> i = rrset_list.listIterator(); i.hasNext();) {
SRRset rrset = i.next();
- int type = rrset.getType();
- Name n = rrset.getName();
+ int type = rrset.getType();
+ Name n = rrset.getName();
// Handle DNAME synthesis; DNAME synthesis does not occur at the
// DNAME name itself.
Name cname_alias = sname.fromDNAME(dname);
// Note that synthesized CNAMEs should have a TTL of zero.
- CNAMERecord cname = new CNAMERecord(sname,
- dname.getDClass(), 0, cname_alias);
- SRRset cname_rrset = new SRRset();
+ CNAMERecord cname = new CNAMERecord(sname, dname
+ .getDClass(), 0, cname_alias);
+ SRRset cname_rrset = new SRRset();
cname_rrset.addRR(cname);
i.add(cname_rrset);
sname = cname_alias;
} catch (NameTooLongException e) {
- log.debug("not adding synthesized CNAME -- " +
- "generated name is too long", e);
+ log.debug("not adding synthesized CNAME -- "
+ + "generated name is too long", e);
}
continue;
for (Iterator<SRRset> i = rrset_list.iterator(); i.hasNext();) {
SRRset rrset = i.next();
- int type = rrset.getType();
+ int type = rrset.getType();
- if (((type == Type.A) || (type == Type.AAAA)) &&
- !additional_names.contains(rrset.getName())) {
+ if (((type == Type.A) || (type == Type.AAAA))
+ && !additional_names.contains(rrset.getName())) {
i.remove();
}
}
/**
* Extract additional names from the records in an rrset.
- *
+ *
* @param additional_names
* The set to add the additional names to, if any.
* @param rrset
}
for (Iterator<Record> i = rrset.rrs(); i.hasNext();) {
- Record r = i.next();
- Name add_name = r.getAdditionalName();
+ Record r = i.next();
+ Name add_name = r.getAdditionalName();
if (add_name != null) {
additional_names.add(add_name);
}
private SRRset findKeys(SMessage message) {
- Name qname = message.getQName();
- int qclass = message.getQClass();
+ Name qname = message.getQName();
+ int qclass = message.getQClass();
return mTrustedKeys.find(qname, qclass);
}
* on in the original request, the response was already validated, or the
* response is a kind of message that is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL,
* REFUSED, etc.)
- *
+ *
* @param message
* The message to check.
* @param origRequest
* The original request received from the client.
- *
+ *
* @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not
* mean we can actually validate this response).
*/
return false;
}
- if (!mTrustedKeys.isBelowTrustAnchor(message.getQName(),
- message.getQClass())) {
+ if (!mTrustedKeys.isBelowTrustAnchor(message.getQName(), message
+ .getQClass())) {
return false;
}
* Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the
* question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response. This generally
* consists of verifying the answer RRset and the authority RRsets.
- *
+ *
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
- *
+ *
* @param response
* The response to validate.
* @param request
* answer.
*/
private void validatePositiveResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
- Name qname = message.getQName();
- int qtype = message.getQType();
+ Name qname = message.getQName();
+ int qtype = message.getQType();
- SMessage m = message;
+ SMessage m = message;
// validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself
- SRRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
+ SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
- Name wc = null;
- boolean wcNSEC_ok = false;
- boolean dname = false;
- List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null;
+ Name wc = null;
+ boolean wcNSEC_ok = false;
+ boolean dname = false;
+ List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null;
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
// Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME.
// If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this message is
// BAD.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("Positive response has failed ANSWER rrset: " +
- rrsets[i]);
+ log.debug("Positive response has failed ANSWER rrset: "
+ + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
// a
// bad message.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: " +
- rrsets[i]);
+ log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
+ + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
if ((wc != null) && (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC)) {
NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
- if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname,
- key_rrset.getName())) {
+ if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname, key_rrset
+ .getName())) {
Name nsec_wc = ValUtils.nsecWildcard(qname, nsec);
if (!wc.equals(nsec_wc)) {
// records.
if ((wc != null) && !wcNSEC_ok && (nsec3s != null)) {
if (NSEC3ValUtils.proveWildcard(nsec3s, qname, key_rrset.getName(),
- wc)) {
+ wc)) {
wcNSEC_ok = true;
}
}
}
// validate the AUTHORITY section.
- SRRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
+ SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
- boolean secure_delegation = false;
- Name delegation = null;
- Name nsec3zone = null;
- NSECRecord nsec = null;
- List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null;
+ boolean secure_delegation = false;
+ Name delegation = null;
+ Name nsec3zone = null;
+ NSECRecord nsec = null;
+ List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null;
// validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be the
// NS rrset, plus proof of a secure delegation or not
// have
// a bad message.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: " +
- rrsets[i]);
+ log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
+ + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
switch (type) {
- case Type.DS:
- secure_delegation = true;
+ case Type.DS:
+ secure_delegation = true;
- break;
+ break;
- case Type.NS:
- delegation = rrsets[i].getName();
+ case Type.NS:
+ delegation = rrsets[i].getName();
- break;
+ break;
- case Type.NSEC:
- nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
+ case Type.NSEC:
+ nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
- break;
+ break;
- case Type.NSEC3:
+ case Type.NSEC3:
- if (nsec3s == null) {
- nsec3s = new ArrayList<NSEC3Record>();
- }
+ if (nsec3s == null) {
+ nsec3s = new ArrayList<NSEC3Record>();
+ }
- NSEC3Record nsec3 = (NSEC3Record) rrsets[i].first();
- nsec3s.add(nsec3);
- nsec3zone = rrsets[i].getSignerName(); // this is a hack of
- // sorts.
+ NSEC3Record nsec3 = (NSEC3Record) rrsets[i].first();
+ nsec3s.add(nsec3);
+ nsec3zone = rrsets[i].getSignerName(); // this is a hack of
+ // sorts.
- break;
+ break;
- default:
- log.warn(
- "Encountered unexpected type in a REFERRAL response: " +
- Type.string(type));
+ default:
+ log.warn("Encountered unexpected type in a REFERRAL response: "
+ + Type.string(type));
- break;
+ break;
}
}
}
if (nsec3s.size() > 0) {
- byte status = NSEC3ValUtils.proveNoDS(nsec3s, delegation, nsec3zone);
+ byte status = NSEC3ValUtils
+ .proveNoDS(nsec3s, delegation, nsec3zone);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
// the NSEC3 RRs MUST prove no DS, so the INDETERMINATE state is
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
}
- private void validateCNAMEResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {}
+ private void validateCNAMEResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
+ }
/**
* Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a
* qtype==ANY question, with answers. This consists of simply verifying all
* present answer/auth RRsets, with no checking that all types are present.
- *
+ *
* NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records
* here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the
* upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead
* treating them as referrals.
- *
+ *
* NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon
* clarification.
- *
+ *
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
- *
+ *
* @param message
* The response to validate.
* @param key_rrset
if (qtype != Type.ANY) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
- "ANY validation called on non-ANY response.");
+ "ANY validation called on non-ANY response.");
}
SMessage m = message;
// validate the ANSWER section.
- SRRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
+ SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.ANSWER);
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
// If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this message is
// BAD.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("Positive response has failed ANSWER rrset: " +
- rrsets[i]);
+ log.debug("Positive response has failed ANSWER rrset: "
+ + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
// a
// bad message.
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: " +
- rrsets[i]);
+ log.debug("Positive response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
+ + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
* the authority section rrsets and making certain that the authority
* section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname does exist and the qtype
* doesn't.
- *
+ *
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
- *
+ *
* @param response
* The response to validate.
* @param request
* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response.
*/
private void validateNodataResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
- Name qname = message.getQName();
- int qtype = message.getQType();
+ Name qname = message.getQName();
+ int qtype = message.getQType();
- SMessage m = message;
+ SMessage m = message;
// Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to
// validate. (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here --
// responses.)
// validate the AUTHORITY section
- SRRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
+ SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
- boolean hasValidNSEC = false; // If true, then the NODATA has been
- // proven.
+ boolean hasValidNSEC = false; // If true, then the NODATA has been
+ // proven.
- Name ce = null; // for wildcard NODATA responses. This is the proven
- // closest encloser.
+ Name ce = null; // for wildcard NODATA responses. This is the proven
+ // closest encloser.
- NSECRecord wc = null; // for wildcard NODATA responses. This is the
- // wildcard NSEC.
+ NSECRecord wc = null; // for wildcard NODATA responses. This is the
+ // wildcard NSEC.
- List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null; // A collection of NSEC3 RRs found in
- // the authority
- // section.
+ List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null; // A collection of NSEC3 RRs found in
+ // the authority
+ // section.
- Name nsec3Signer = null; // The RRSIG signer field for the NSEC3 RRs.
+ Name nsec3Signer = null; // The RRSIG signer field for the NSEC3 RRs.
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("NODATA response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: " +
- rrsets[i]);
+ log.debug("NODATA response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
+ + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
if (nsec.getName().isWild()) {
wc = nsec;
}
- } else if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname,
- rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
+ } else if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname, rrsets[i]
+ .getSignerName())) {
ce = ValUtils.closestEncloser(qname, nsec);
}
}
}
if (!hasValidNSEC) {
- log.debug("NODATA response failed to prove NODATA " +
- "status with NSEC/NSEC3");
+ log.debug("NODATA response failed to prove NODATA "
+ + "status with NSEC/NSEC3");
log.trace("Failed NODATA:\n" + m);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
* Rcode. This consists of verifying the authority section rrsets and making
* certain that the authority section NSEC proves that the qname doesn't
* exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist..
- *
+ *
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
* completed.
- *
+ *
* @param response
* The response to validate.
* @param request
* The trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response.
*/
private void validateNameErrorResponse(SMessage message, SRRset key_rrset) {
- Name qname = message.getQName();
+ Name qname = message.getQName();
- SMessage m = message;
+ SMessage m = message;
if (message.getCount(Section.ANSWER) > 0) {
- log.warn(
- "NAME ERROR response contained records in the ANSWER SECTION");
+ log
+ .warn("NAME ERROR response contained records in the ANSWER SECTION");
message.setStatus(SecurityStatus.INVALID);
return;
// Validate the authority section -- all RRsets in the authority section
// must be signed and valid.
// In addition, the NSEC record(s) must prove the NXDOMAIN condition.
- boolean hasValidNSEC = false;
- boolean hasValidWCNSEC = false;
- SRRset [] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
- List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null;
- Name nsec3Signer = null;
+ boolean hasValidNSEC = false;
+ boolean hasValidWCNSEC = false;
+ SRRset[] rrsets = m.getSectionRRsets(Section.AUTHORITY);
+ List<NSEC3Record> nsec3s = null;
+ Name nsec3Signer = null;
for (int i = 0; i < rrsets.length; i++) {
int status = mValUtils.verifySRRset(rrsets[i], key_rrset);
if (status != SecurityStatus.SECURE) {
- log.debug("NameError response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: " +
- rrsets[i]);
+ log.debug("NameError response has failed AUTHORITY rrset: "
+ + rrsets[i]);
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
if (rrsets[i].getType() == Type.NSEC) {
NSECRecord nsec = (NSECRecord) rrsets[i].first();
- if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname,
- rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
+ if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNameError(nsec, qname, rrsets[i]
+ .getSignerName())) {
hasValidNSEC = true;
}
- if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNoWC(nsec, qname,
- rrsets[i].getSignerName())) {
+ if (ValUtils.nsecProvesNoWC(nsec, qname, rrsets[i]
+ .getSignerName())) {
hasValidWCNSEC = true;
}
}
return;
}
- hasValidNSEC = NSEC3ValUtils.proveNameError(nsec3s, qname,
+ hasValidNSEC = NSEC3ValUtils.proveNameError(nsec3s, qname,
nsec3Signer);
// Note that we assume that the NSEC3ValUtils proofs encompass the
// wildcard part of the proof.
- hasValidWCNSEC = hasValidNSEC;
+ hasValidWCNSEC = hasValidNSEC;
}
// If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus.
if (!hasValidNSEC) {
- log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: " +
- "qname does not exist");
+ log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: "
+ + "qname does not exist");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
}
if (!hasValidWCNSEC) {
- log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: " +
- "covering wildcard does not exist");
+ log.debug("NameError response has failed to prove: "
+ + "covering wildcard does not exist");
m.setStatus(SecurityStatus.BOGUS);
return;
return SecurityStatus.BOGUS;
}
- ValUtils.ResponseType subtype = ValUtils.classifyResponse(message, zone);
+ ValUtils.ResponseType subtype = ValUtils
+ .classifyResponse(message, zone);
switch (subtype) {
- case POSITIVE:
- log.trace("Validating a positive response");
- validatePositiveResponse(message, key_rrset);
+ case POSITIVE:
+ log.trace("Validating a positive response");
+ validatePositiveResponse(message, key_rrset);
- break;
+ break;
- case REFERRAL:
- validateReferral(message, key_rrset);
+ case REFERRAL:
+ validateReferral(message, key_rrset);
- break;
+ break;
- case NODATA:
- log.trace("Validating a NODATA response");
- validateNodataResponse(message, key_rrset);
+ case NODATA:
+ log.trace("Validating a NODATA response");
+ validateNodataResponse(message, key_rrset);
- break;
+ break;
- case NAMEERROR:
- log.trace("Validating a NXDOMAIN response");
- validateNameErrorResponse(message, key_rrset);
+ case NAMEERROR:
+ log.trace("Validating a NXDOMAIN response");
+ validateNameErrorResponse(message, key_rrset);
- break;
+ break;
- case CNAME:
- log.trace("Validating a CNAME response");
- validateCNAMEResponse(message, key_rrset);
+ case CNAME:
+ log.trace("Validating a CNAME response");
+ validateCNAMEResponse(message, key_rrset);
- break;
+ break;
- case ANY:
- log.trace("Validating a positive ANY response");
- validateAnyResponse(message, key_rrset);
+ case ANY:
+ log.trace("Validating a positive ANY response");
+ validateAnyResponse(message, key_rrset);
- break;
+ break;
- default:
- log.error("unhandled response subtype: " + subtype);
+ default:
+ log.error("unhandled response subtype: " + subtype);
}
return message.getSecurityStatus().getStatus();
}
public byte validateMessage(Message message, String zone)
- throws TextParseException {
+ throws TextParseException {
SMessage sm = new SMessage(message);
- Name z = Name.fromString(zone);
+ Name z = Name.fromString(zone);
return validateMessage(sm, z);
}
git://blacka.com / captive-validator.git / blobdiff